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I owe this book above all to Joanna Zylinska, the most incisive and
generous thinker I have ever met, without whose inspiring mentor-
ship I would never have managed to articulate my critical questions
in such a rewarding way. Sarah Kember introduced me to feminist
technoscience and figuration not just by recommending bibliogra-
phy but also by effectively encouraging me to write, to feel free in
writing even while writing in a (doubly) foreign tongue. No words,
however, can fully express my gratitude to both of them.
I have been extremely fortunate to count Gary Hall and Federica
Frabetti among my interlocutors in the United Kingdom. Each of
them has given me the opportunity to present my work in different
formats and contexts: in the Open Media Research Seminar Series at
Coventry University, in the Living Books about Life project and as a
lecturer of “Writing Technologies” in Oxford Brookes University.
Countless others at Goldsmiths University of London contributed
bits and pieces to the construction of this book, which I am pretty
sure would have been impossible elsewhere in the world. Among
them I especially thank David Morley and Vikki Bell.
It was Mexico, my country, that gave me the possibility and the
financial resources necessary for undertaking the project that led to
this book. Disruptive as it wishes to be, my work remains indebted
to the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT),
which, after funding my graduate studies in the United Kingdom,
awarded me a postdoctoral scholarship to spend at Universidad
Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM), Unidad Cuajimalpa, in Mexico
City. My recent acquaintance with this fine research institution has
allowed me to critically revise the original tonalities and colorations
of the argument in this book. I have benefitted the most from two of
UAM Cuajimalpa’s numerous vibrant seminars: “Equilibrium,” an
science and technology studies graduate seminar led by Nuria Val-
verde, Miruna Achim, Zenia Yébenes and Violeta Aréchiga, and
“Nación y alteridad,” an advanced research seminar focused on the
construction of the Mexican national imaginary. I am especially




“Nación y alteridad” and to Carlos López Beltrán, Alejandro Arau-
jo, Elizabeth Roberts and Francisco Vergara Silva for reading and
responding to it honestly and constructively. I am also thankful to
Laura Carballido Coria, head of postgraduate studies at UAM Cua-
jimalpa, for supporting me in every way so that I could finish writ-
ing this book.
It must be evident from the above that this book has a distinc-
tively transnational quality. It is a work that developed between
languages, between continents, between the global university and
the national university and between the creative world of avant-
garde theory and the critical world of clearly defined case studies
and disciplinary boundaries. In trying to make myself accountable
for such a privileged (and sometimes dizzy) inbetweenness, and in
trying to imagine ways of gearing it to cultural political change in
Mexico, I have counted on the unique inspiration and support of
my dear friends Benjamín Mayer Foulkes, Jessica Bekerman and
Etelvina Bernal Méndez from 17, Instituto de Estudios Críticos.
From them I have learned about a kind of hospitality that only
emerges through the most radical disruption. I would never have
made the connection between this hospitality and the political task
of contemporary cultural studies without the intellectual influence
of Paul Bowman, editor of the Disruptions series and a careful read-
er of my work. I also want to thank Martina O’Sullivan and Sinéad
Murphy for their patience and support throughout the editorial
process and Benjamín Arditi for his rigorous assessment of this
work.
Last but not least, I want to thank my family and friends. The
love of my parents, Elia and Liborio, and my love for them consti-
tute perhaps the most powerful drive at work in all my intellectual
efforts and desires. She is a soil chemist, and he is an agronomist; I
grew up listening to them discuss science, bureaucracy, “rural de-
velopment” and ecology. As a child I was often taken to the labora-
tory and the fields. The smell of ranches and ejidos is still the smell
of home for me. Yet I chose a path different from theirs, a career in
the humanities, and I am grateful that they encouraged me from the
start to follow my own choice, a rare one in the town where we
lived. I thank my young sister Ana Luisa for joining me as soon as
she was able to and for generously helping during stressful times.
Juan Pablo Anaya, Paola de Anda, Mariana Robles, Lourdes Peláez,
Laura Pla, Raquel Bruno and Eva Benítez have been very suppor-
tive and warm throughout the years it took me to see this work to a
more or less finished state. My Spanish stepfamily and friends pro-
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vided me with a delightful refuge between Mexico and the United
Kingdom, where I learned much about food, conviviality and the
art of conversation. Special thanks to Justo Navarro, Esther Moril-
las, Carmen Campos, Juan Pablo Wert, Rogelio López Cuenca, Elo
Vega, Javier Baldeón, Paloma Buendía, Pilar Vázquez, Esteban Pu-
jals, Carmen La Cruz, José Luis Velázquez and Cipri Martín. And in
Mexico, in Spain and in the United Kingdom, Alberto has been by






Maize is a crop plant developed by ancient Mesoamerican farmers
through the domestication of a wild grass called teosinte. A broad
consensus exists today that ancient maize agriculture was a pio-
neering form of biotechnology. Yet controversy keeps growing
around the differences between this kind of biotechnology, which
survives in the practices of small-scale farmers in present-day Mexi-
co, and genetic engineering, which scientific experts perform in the
service of a powerful transnational industry. Disrupting Maize: Food,
Biotechnology and Nationalism in Contemporary Mexico explores the
tension between these different practices of biotechnology as a vital
issue in technoscience. In using the term technoscience, I mean more
than the actual inseparability of knowledge production from capi-
talist industry in the contemporary world. I also understand it phil-
osophically as a complex set of challenges that confront the whole
world with the need to develop “something like an ethico-onto-epis-
tem-ology—an appreciation of the intertwining of ethics, knowing,
and being.”1 My approach to Mexican biotechnology debates at-
tempts to develop such a complex appreciation of the current pre-
dicament of a nation embodied in multiple ways by maize agricul-
ture. In order to so, however, it must in a sense disrupt some natu-
ralized narratives about maize, the Mexican nation and the theory
and practice of cultural studies.
As a center of origin and genetic diversification of maize, Mexico
is regarded today as being under threat of full-scale contamination
by transgenic corn, a biotechnological product first developed in the
United States and imported unlabeled into Mexico since 1997.
“Contamination” is a term used by opponents of transgenic maize
who warn that, once transgenic and native maize accidentally cross-
fertilize, transgenes will prevail and drive native maize, Mexican
biodiversity and, by extension, the nation’s food culture to the point
of extinction. When in 2001 scientists found transgenes in maize
plants from the Mexican state of Oaxaca, a social movement quickly
rose to defend Mexico’s biocultural patrimony from assault by




dium-scale farmers, environmental organizations, cultural activists
and concerned scientists, who have converged around the desire to
reimagine Mexico as a national project based on native maize. In
2003, an exhibition titled Sin maíz no hay país (“without maize, there
is no country”) opened at the National Museum of Popular Cultures
in Mexico City. In the preface to the accompanying publication,
Director of Popular and Indigenous Cultures Griselda Galicia
García states that maize was chosen at a time of “urgent need” to
reimagine “a national project that satisfies all.”2 The title of the
publication—which is also a principal slogan of the Mexican de-
fense of maize: “There is no country without maize”—clearly sug-
gests the urgency of the matter. Disrupting Maize engages with this
particular claim, and it does so from a singular philosophical per-
spective that calls into question the history of Mexican nationalism
so as to understand and intervene in its ongoing reconfigurations in
response to neoliberal globalization.
In October 2009, Greenpeace staged a theatrical protest during
which activists covered emblematic monuments in Mexico City
with black mourning cloths and placards. Over the statues of the
national Heroes of Independence, one could read phrases such as
“Our maize first, traitors!” The traitors in question were the legisla-
tors who had betrayed the nation by ending a ten-year moratorium
on the experimental sowing of transgenic maize in Mexico. When I
first learned about this protest, I thought that Greenpeace’s rhetoric
struck all the right cords. The vast majority of contemporary Mexi-
can citizens lived in urban areas and routinely ate industrial foods
packed with genetically modified organisms; yet it seemed natural
that many of them would identify themselves as victims of corrupt
elites who were letting a foreign enemy “contaminate” (that is, ex-
propriate) “our maize.” Back then I did not know much about
maize itself, agriculture or biotechnology. Yet I was interested in
politics, ethics and technology, and so I asked myself, what is at
stake, ethically and politically, when a biotechnological product is
figured as a threat to national sovereignty? Disrupting Maize per-
forms a deconstructive critique of nationalism so as to diversify and
enrich the content and the orientation of the Mexican debates
around agricultural biotechnology.
At first sight, the Mexican opposition to transgenic maize ap-
pears as just another example of popular resistance against neolib-
eral globalization. Since 1982, neoliberal policies have eliminated
the Mexican state’s commitment to land redistribution and to local




as soon as they were exposed, in 1994, to international competition
under the North American Free Trade Agreement. As imports of
heavily subsidized, lower-quality corn from the United States
flooded Mexico, maize reemerged as “the symbol of nationalism
and the country’s political and cultural resistance.”3 Critics of trans-
genic maize argue that transgene flow or “contamination” of Mexi-
can native maize varieties entails a potentially apocalyptic scenario
for Mexican agriculture and biodiversity. While I try to give serious
attention to the many good reasons why they think so, I also recon-
textualize the term “contamination” in the philosophical context of
antiessentialism so as to theorize a constitutive disruption of the
Mexican national imaginary, one that further enables us to conceive
“the national project” in terms of radical democracy.
By contrast with familiar research methods aiming to produce
accurate representations of the world, deconstruction seeks an
“opening to freedom, responsibility, decision, ethics and politics.”4
One crucial premise of thinkers attuned to deconstruction is the
notion that identity, as being in time, can only be constituted precar-
iously in relation to time itself. In this vein, Jacques Derrida argued,
“The at-home has always been tormented by the other, by the guest,
by the threat of expropriation. It is constituted only in this threat.”5
The radical threat of temporality, in my view, constitutes the un-
thought in the Mexican debates around transgenic maize. It is also
what I attempt to think through by means of a semantic displace-
ment of “contamination,” the term that activists use to denounce
biotechnological disruption of the nation’s genetic archives.
Through a slightly perverse shift of perspective, I want to dwell on
the idea that the Mexican nation has always been contaminated,
indeed disrupted, by its own constitutive temporality.
Rather than undermining the Mexican opposition to corporate
biotechnology, I want to position a historico-philosophical interro-
gation of identity politics that helps to unlock repetitions and diver-
sify the contents and the orientation of Mexican biotechnology de-
bates. In “What Is Deconstruction?” Nicholas Royle argues that de-
construction operates as a procedure or a method of critical analysis
only in a “stupidly formalistic” sense.6 A more rigorous approach,
he suggests, would start by focusing on the performative capacity of
language to produce effects beyond representation.7 Cultural stud-
ies has been described in a performative sense as an antidisciplinary
project in which “readings reach from within artefacts to the para-
digms that govern their interpretation and beyond these paradigms




than merely representing popular cultures, cultural studies has
challenged the paradigms that govern what gets to count as nature
and culture in specific contexts and with specific political implica-
tions. In close spirit, feminist theorists of technoscience have drawn
attention to the material import of epistemic boundary-making
practices in technoscience.9 Echoing Martin Heidegger’s proto-per-
formative account of technology as world-making rather than a set
of tools,10 Donna Haraway invites us to consider contemporary
technosciences in noninstrumental fashion, as “ways of life, social
orders, practices of visualization.”11 Her feminist “no-nonsense
commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world,”12 however, al-
lows her to eschew Heidegger’s metaphysical nostalgia of premod-
ern worlds and affirm contemporary technoscience as “a form of
life, a practice, a culture, a generative matrix.”13 In kindred spirit,
Disrupting Maize seeks to release the critique of biotechnology from
cultural nationalism in order to create conditions for more and more
creative engagements with technoscience as a nondeterministic
event.
Contemporary biotechnology disrupts maize at the molecular
level, by inserting bacterial gene sequences into the maize genome
with unpredictable consequences. Neoliberalism disrupts maize ag-
riculture at the social and economic levels, by displacing and frag-
menting rural communities, by reducing their members to the stat-
us of precarious individual laborers who have no option but to feed
themselves with low-quality, potentially poisonous imported
maize. This book disrupts maize at the theoretical level, by ques-
tioning the assertion that maize can describe a national community,
the unity of a nation or a “national being.” To disrupt maize in this
way entails an acknowledgment of the violence at work in represen-
tation, as well as a desire to undermine naturalized representations
of Mexican nature and culture as pregiven entities. The aim of this
risky intervention in the Mexican biotechnology debates goes be-
yond the wish to expose their metaphysical assumptions. It is to
apprehend the dynamism and the indeterminacy of the maize-hu-
man complex understood as a material process that includes but is
not exhausted by language and texts. To that extent, Disrupting
Maize also disrupts itself, or allows itself to be disrupted, as well.
Chapter 1, “Mexican Maize: A Biotechnological Story,” frames
the relationship between maize agriculture and the Mexican nation,
from narratives of state-led development to the technoscientific con-
juncture in which maize is being reclaimed by rural and urban acti-




Western technological paradigms. This particular framing illumi-
nates from the start the global or transnational relevance of the
Mexican defense of maize, as well as the possibility of apprehend-
ing it in terms other than nationalism. Yet, in view of the actual use
of nationalist rhetoric as part of that defense, I also point out the
reasons why it would be problematic to get stuck in that rhetoric as
opposed to engaging with contemporary biotechnology from the
standpoint of a critique of nationalism’s epistemic legacy. Under
Mexican postrevolutionary nationalism, rural and indigenous sub-
jects were identified as “backward,” that is, as raw matter for educa-
tion according to the modern imperatives of urbanization and in-
dustrialization. Through the developmental discourse and the
Green Revolution, nationalist governments actually undermined
the vitality of maize agriculture, its diversity and its status as a
culturally specific form of biotechnology. That is, nationalism most-
ly rearticulated the logics of European colonialism and only appro-
priated maize as a national symbol by virtue of its effective perfor-
mance as a homogenizing metaphor for a “developing” capitalist
nation.
In this opening chapter, Disrupting Maize seeks to disrupt the
appropriation of maize as “a symbol of unity for an authoritarian
regime.”14 I ask whether and how it would be possible for Mexican
defenders of native maize to reconfigure nationalism as part of a
democratic agenda. The desire to do so was indeed activated after
the political disruption of 1968 and more strongly in the 1980s, in
response to political and economic disruption. Whereas an impor-
tant trend in the academic literature has been to foreground the
series of catastrophes that neoliberalism brought to Mexico and the
world, I want to focus on the rebirth of cultural politics that neolib-
eralism also brought about. Only in the neoliberal era did indige-
nous peasants take to the stage in popular and academic discourse
as an active part of the present, rather than a negligible “problem”
from the past. While the Zapatista insurrection of 1994 has justly
taken most of the credit for this change, I suggest in my critical
review of maize nationalism that it includes another distinctively
neoliberal and even technoscientific ingredient; hence I call this po-
litical shift a “technoscientific mutation” in Mexican cultural poli-
tics.
In chapter 2, “Colonial Legacies, Constitutive Disruptions,” I
show how the deconstructive turn in political philosophy and cultu-
ral theory can contribute to useful theorization of the history and
the politics of contemporary Mexican nationalism. Theories of na-
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tionalism have oscillated between explaining the nation as an ideo-
logical function of capitalist nation-states and positing it as a neces-
sary expression of specific cultures.15 Yet, while ideology and mate-
rial conditions are both important aspects of nationalism, unless
they incorporate a deconstructive perspective they tend, as Homi
Bhabha warns, to fix or totalize a sign that is “always multi-accentu-
al and Janus-faced.”16 In other words, they end up reasserting, like
nationalism itself, an impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic
force. What matters from a deconstructive perspective are not self-
consciously held political ideologies but larger cultural systems out
of which the nation comes into being as a transitional narrative—
that is, a narrative that lives in the ambivalence between histories
that speak of a national origin and a social temporality that upsets
the totalization, or fixation, of such histories.17 In chapter 2, I
present a sketch of the larger cultural systems—that is, the colonial
legacies—out of which the Mexican national imaginary has come
into being as a disputed terrain, rather than as a homogeneous
ideology that reflects the power of a specific state or the essence of a
specific “culture.” Drawing on post-Marxist political philosophy, I
then interpret the predicament of Mexican nationalism as the at-
tempt to overcome the “structural dislocation”18 of the national
text, its temporality or constitutive disruption. Structural disloca-
tion follows from the ontological postulate that “the real . . . is in the
ultimate instance temporal.”19 From a psychoanalytic perspective,
this is a traumatic fact in response to which the subject emerges as
an attempt, always already failed, to overcome dislocation. Nation-
alist claims may thus be interpreted as simultaneously tools of polit-
ical negotiation within particular power arrangements and as un-
conscious subjective attempts to overcome the temporality, or the
structural dislocation, of the national text.
Why would it be so important to interpret nationalism in pre-
cisely this way? I am interested in understanding the ethical and
political consequences, for activism, of forgetting the structural dis-
location of “the national project” that they constantly invoke in a
melancholic way. Even though forgetfulness is inevitable and, in a
sense, constitutes the very aim of political subjectivity, the recogni-
tion of that very fact holds the promise of a more democratic sen-
sibility. In this vein, the post-Marxist vision of radical democracy is
premised on a recognition of “the historicity of being” and of the
“purely human and discursive nature of truth.”20 A radical demo-
cratic sensibility necessitates, it seems to me, a renunciation of na-




tangible social, political, economic and environmental devastation
that neoliberalism has inflicted on Latin American nations since the
1980s, some Latin American scholars have publicly lamented the
demise of national identity as a political category, specifically tak-
ing issue with post-Marxism and deconstruction as globalizing
theoretical trends that contribute to the disarticulation of critical
efforts in Latin America.
Not just Latin American critics of globalization but also cultural
and political theorists outside Latin America have observed a prob-
lematic inclination in Laclauian post-Marxism to present itself as a
“sutured” political theory comfortably above and beyond the dislo-
cation that it detects in everything else.21 Others have cautioned
against the potential authoritarianism of reducing politics to a logi-
cal formula.22 A mere rehearsal of Laclauian formulae would in-
deed make it hard to see how anything new—aside from a vague
disbelief in nationalism—might emerge from my critical engage-
ment with biotechnology debates or “how new social and political
articulations could be wrought from the subversion of the natural
attitude in which we live.”23 While the political reasons for oppos-
ing transgenic maize are clear enough to me, I want to problematize
the sedimented narratives privileged by some activists, which tend
to lock their political analysis in fruitless moralistic denunciation.
Moralism is fruitless in so far as it merely rehearses an inherited
paranoia around modern technology, whereas the most difficult
and urgent task in the face of technoscientific challenges requires, in
my view, that we assume responsibility for the language that we
speak, for its consequences and its transformation. With this pur-
pose in mind, I undertake in subsequent chapters a close reading of
selected texts in the Mexican biotechnology debates in order to
identify to what extent and with what consequences each estab-
lishes a link between the origin of maize and the origin of national
identity.
Under the dominant orientation of technoscience, the success
and legitimacy of nation-states seems to reside in their ability to
exploit knowledge so as to compete in a global market. In chapter 3,
“Resisting Technoscience: The Nationalist Trap,” I develop a cri-
tique of Mexican nationalism’s historical response to such a capital-
ist imperative. Through an examination of the recent emergence of
science policy discourse in Mexico, I draw attention to the false
polarization between a nationalist opposition to and a nationalist
celebration of technoscientific links between national science and
corporate business. If I challenge the nationalist subject-position at
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both ends of the polarity, this is because I see a problem with the
wider cultural narrative that both of them fail to address. Both na-
tionalist rejection and nationalist celebration of technoscience fail to
question not just the universality and superiority of Western science
and technology but also their instrumental role in the attainment of
national development and sovereignty. The failure to challenge sci-
entific rationalism, universalism, humanism and instrumentalism
amounts, I argue, to an uncritical relation with the metaphysical
legacy of Western colonialism. In order to illustrate the lessons that
this story holds for activism against transgenic corn, I analyze the
narrative and its reception by activists of the Master Project of Mexi-
can Maize (PMMM), a technoscientific project partly funded by
Monsanto and implemented since 2007 by Mexican research institu-
tions in a controversial collaboration with rural communities from
the state of Puebla. Last, as a point of contrast with mainstream
nationalist narratives of progress through Western science and tech-
nology, I draw attention to the work of Mexican historians and
philosophers of science who have in recent years explicitly and sys-
tematically challenged the metaphysical legacy of revolutionary na-
tionalism. Among other contemporary phenomena, they have stud-
ied the singular trajectories of local knowledges on the basis of a
sociocultural understanding of science. In my argument, such work
constitutes a creative political engagement with technoscience in
Mexico. As the neoliberal reorganization of social labor blurs divi-
sions between mental and manual labor,24 I take the opportunity to
reexpose the metaphysical structure of such divisions and keep the
way clear for renewed political articulations across traditional aca-
demic boundaries. To contest the dominant framing of biotechnolo-
gy chiefly in terms of “the genetic informationalisation of life itself,”
for example, appears as a destabilization of what counts as the
proper experience and practice of biotechnology inside and outside
academia.25 This is a necessary condition, I argue, for a critical
imagination and a viable practice of different forms of biotechnolo-
gy—including media and cultural studies as one among multiple
forms of technoscientific practice.
What, then, can media and cultural studies contribute to the
analysis of biotechnology debates in Mexico? If it seems strange to
assert that media and cultural studies is a kind of biotechnology, it
might seem less so to assert that food practices are indeed biotech-
nologies and directly relevant to media and cultural studies. Hav-
ing expanded the field of biotechnology studies through an under-
standing of technoscience as a sociocultural process, I turn my at-
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tention from science policy to cultural policy as a terrain of struggle
around maize-based cuisine as “living” heritage. Chapter 4, “The
People of Maize and the Technoscience of Culture,” examines the
story of cultural activism that led to the inscription, in 2010, of Mex-
ican cuisine in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage of Humanity of the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). For Mexican defenders of
maize, intangible cultural heritage became a key platform via which
to articulate and expand their cause through international organiza-
tions such as UNESCO. In my account of intangible heritage dis-
course, I figure it as the institutionalized offspring of a “postmod-
ern” strand in cultural anthropology on the one hand and neoliberal
rationality on the other hand. Intangible heritage appears as a para-
digmatic embodiment of the ambiguous operations of technosci-
ence where the boundaries between science, culture and industry
seem to have collapsed forever. In my reading of the texts com-
posed by Mexican activists, I suggest that their success ultimately
depended on a contamination of their anthropologically inspired
identity politics with the neoliberal technoscience of culture. Where-
as the more critical activists regard this contamination as a dead end
for Mexican cuisine, I try instead to highlight its political lessons as
an inescapable condition in technoscience. It so happened that pre-
cisely at the moment when all Mexicans seemed to converge around
the urgency to preserve maize as cultural heritage, multiple dis-
agreements cropped up regarding what exactly should be pre-
served and how. The disagreement among activists precluded the
desired totalization of the national text. In my argument, contami-
nated life is all about coming to terms with the impossibility of
totalization. It is not an apocalypse, I argue, and activists’ subver-
sive deployment of contamination within the ongoing commodifi-
cation and “heritagization” of Mexican indigenous cuisines contin-
ues to be vital.
In chapter 5, “The Gift of Biotechnological Disruption,” I open
up the question of whether the “contamination” denounced by en-
vironmental activists can be productively refigured in terms of a
textual ontology inspired by the ethics of deconstruction and femi-
nist technoscience. By way of experimenting with this idea, I engage
with scientific and activist texts aligned with the Mexican defense of
maize. After analyzing the disruptions that those texts both invoke
and, in a sense, enact, I suggest that textual engagements with the
cultural terrain in which maize anticapitalism takes place are not






all empirical claims in the Mexican biotechnology debates but per-
haps also necessary from a (bio)ethical perspective. Taking inspira-
tion from Bernard Stiegler’s philosophical anthropology, I propose
to think about biotechnological disruption as a gift in a very particu-
lar sense, as a realization that Mexicans, however close their rela-
tionship with maize, are ultimately “without qualities, without pre-
destination: they must invent, realize, produce qualities, [but] noth-
ing indicates that, once produced, these qualities will bring about
humanity. . . . [T]hey may rather become those of technics.”26 Rath-
er than figuring maize and the human as individual agents interact-
ing with each other or “civilizing” each other, I locate agency in the
unstable relations through which they constitute each other as they
both take part in a wider technical process that it is impossible to
calculate or appropriate as a whole or once and for all. Such a pro-
cess is the world understood as “a doing, a congealing of agency.”27
It therefore includes everything addressed by Disrupting Maize: ag-
ricultural histories, cultural nationalism, academic research disci-
plines and antidisciplines, psychoanalysis, science policy, cultural
policy, popular gastronomies, tourism, democratic struggles, politi-
cal disappointment and “the deepest personal and collective experi-
ences of embodiment, vulnerability, power, and mortality.”28
From a deconstructive ethical perspective, we do not discover
the point at which material processes threaten to annihilate our
traditional conception of agency as a property of individual human
beings (or individual crops) by invoking empirical facts or data.
Witnessing and investigating empirical causes and effects might be
indispensable for human survival at this point in human history;
yet the point at which we humans transform our ethical relation to
the nonhuman (including the nonhuman in us) involves a deeper
and perhaps unconscious aspect of our being that I locate in decon-
struction as an “experience of the other.” Such an experience is
necessarily disruptive, and it is the aim of this book to reflect on the
promise it may hold for Mexican maize agriculture.
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WHAT KIND OF BIOTECHNOLOGY?
In 1926 Soviet geneticist Nikolai Vavilov established that maize’s
center of origin and genetic diversity is located in Mesoamerica,
somewhere between southern Mexico and Guatemala. A center of
origin is the geographical area where a group of organisms, either
domesticated or wild, first developed their distinctive properties.1
Whereas Vavilov’s definition of a center of origin and the exact time
and location of the origin of maize continue to be a matter of scien-
tific debate, consensus has been established regarding the fact that
ancient Mesoamerican farmers achieved maize through the domes-
tication of a wild grass called teosinte (Z. mays parviglumis). By
contrast with teosinte, maize produces abundant, large and nutri-
tious kernels that can be stored for long periods. This characteristic
is the result of human selection, and it would be lost without human
maintenance because the seeds of maize grow tightly packed to-
gether in the ear and are prevented by the husk from dispersing
into the air. After each harvest, farmers must save and replant some
seeds if they want to grow more and better maize in the next season.
Over time, farmers combine seeds from different plants and pro-
duce virtually endless varieties of maize. It is now universally rec-
ognized that maize biodiversity originated from “a prolonged effort





mous agricultural experimenters over dozens of generations.”2 It is
not so well known that it took as much interest and passion from
the last two generations of social scientists to frame maize agricul-
ture as a sophisticated kind of biotechnology.
In 1981, Guy Rozat, a French sociologist who had recently ar-
rived in Mexico, published a polemical essay titled “The Western
Redeemer and His Technical Fantasies.” In it, he denounced that
most Mexican academic accounts had so far depicted pre-Colum-
bian societies as fundamentally lacking technical skills and achieve-
ments. Among their typical assumptions had been the notion that
pre-Columbian technology was structurally impossible due to an
alleged unfamiliarity with the wheel and a failure to cast iron weap-
ons. As he argued that both assertions were historically inaccurate
and indeed absurd, Rozat highlighted maize agriculture among oth-
er examples of pre-Columbian technology:
Maize is a Mesoamerican “invention,” everybody knows this
very well, in the sense that it does not appear spontaneously in
nature and human care is needed so that the ridiculously small
wild grass teosinte can turn into that biological monster that is the
corn on the cob. The pre-Columbians achieved this invention as a
kind of “social security” plant, and, the problem for these com-
munities—who certainly did not participate in the curse of la-
bor—presented itself thus: we need a plant that requires little
labor (both in land preparation and throughout growing), that
gives high yield, that can adapt to many climates and to every
type of soil and, finally, that produces a fruit that can be stored
for a long time and be prepared in various ways. The result of
their centuries-long investigation is maize, a plant that then and
now has demonstrated its extraordinary capacity to adapt to eve-
ry soil and latitude; endowed with a multi-factor plasticity which
has permitted nearly every local community, from Nicaragua to
Labrador, to possess its own varieties of maize adapted to their
own climatological and soil conditions.3
Maize agriculture is a technological practice, Rozat insisted pas-
sionately, but not in the modern European sense of dominating,
exploiting or enslaving Nature in the service of Man. This is merely
the fantasy of “the Western redeemer,” a colonial phantom that had
so far prevented Mexican historians and anthropologists from
understanding and appreciating the technological skills and
achievements of their pre-Columbian ancestors. Relatively unusual
in Mexican academic discourse before the 1980s, Rozat’s critique of
epistemic colonialism has come to be widely shared throughout the
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world, inside and outside the university, in light of the economic,
social and environmental disasters wrought by neoliberal globaliza-
tion. His essay appeared only one year before Mexico defaulted on
its international loan payments and initiated a “structural adjust-
ment” of its state apparatus. Everything that happened and contin-
ues to happen as a consequence of such an adjustment constitutes
the immediate backdrop of the contemporary valorization of pre-
Columbian techniques, inventions and knowledges. In a time of
enforced austerity, flexibilization and individualization, the search
for wiser worldviews and more sensible technological paradigms
has become less a matter of exoticizing imagination than of plane-
tary survival.
In Mesoamerica, maize has been cultivated for millennia accord-
ing to the principles of the milpa, a method of mixed cropping that
operates cyclically with minimum labor and input requirements. In
the traditional milpa, maize grows not on its own but rather in close
association with beans, squash and other crops. Thus, the milpa
system is best described as a living complex that hosts multiple
organisms, including edible weeds and useful insects. The recipro-
cal interaction between all these organisms makes the milpa strong
against pest attacks and effectively prevents erosion of the soil. Mil-
pa economy is based on optimal use of resources, energy and space
inside and between plots. Farmers cultivate one to five milpas and
tend them sequentially or simultaneously.4 Such a strategy aims at
securing the harvest. In addition, they combine farming with other
activities such as stockbreeding, forestry, hunting, apiculture and
collection of edible, medicinal and ornamental plants. Therefore,
rather than maize as an individual plant, a whole outlook and strat-
egy premised on adaptation to a dynamic environment with unpre-
dictable weather and poor soil conditions has gone underappreciat-
ed in Mesoamerican biotechnology. In Rozat’s interpretation the
highest virtue of maize within this technological framework was
that it allowed Mesoamericans to stay relatively free from “the
curse of labor” without ever going hungry. Without complex ma-
chinery, too much space or indeed too much work, Mesoamerican
milpas were able to support large populations who enjoyed a more
diverse and nutritious diet than most Europeans could hope for at
the time of the conquest. Colonizers, however, would not under-
stand and, above all, would not tolerate the adaptive technological
rationality of Mesoamerican societies, since they brought with them
their own technological fantasies and projects. According to




the idea of a closed and fixed system governed by principles of
abstract equivalence. This mind-set was carried by the English
translation of maize into “corn,” which signified grain of all kinds in
the colonial world. Reflecting on the overall consequences of this
translation, Fussell concludes, “The greatest difference between
corn and maize . . . lies in the symbolic freight that each word
carries. If north of Mexico, European immigrants built an industrial
kingdom and a global empire on the economic power of corn, in
Mesoamerica the Olmec a thousand years before Christ founded a
complete universe—a language, calendar, mythos, and cosmos—on
the symbolic power of maize. If the one culture diminished a staple
food to merchandise, the other sanctified it as divine.”5
Fussell’s distinction between maize and corn is well grounded in
the cultural history of Mesoamerican societies. The Olmec, a civil-
ization that flourished between 1500 and 300 bc alongside the Gulf
of Mexico, gave maize three characteristic functions that would en-
dure throughout successive Mesoamerican cultures. Maize symbol-
ized fertility and the substance of human beings, connected human
beings with the cosmos and gave symbolic legitimation to political
power.6 The Mayan saga Popol Vuh famously recounts that the
gods first tried to create human beings with wood and soil, but the
creatures resulting from those experiments could not think or feel—
that is, they could not remember their creators. For this reason they
were destroyed, and human beings were only born when the gods,
after patient and careful deliberation, decided to use maize to make
their flesh and blood. Later on maize was called Tlaolli, and it was
also sometimes referred to as tonacayo, which means “our suste-
nance.”7 According to early colonial records, the Aztec god Cintéotl
generated the different crops out of his (human) body parts, with
maize growing out of his nails.8 The harvest of maize cobs was
understood as a beheading of Cintéotl, whose life, like that of
maize, was governed by cyclical death and resurrection. Aztec war-
riors and priests based their theocratic hegemony on claiming privi-
leged access to the highest virtue of the god of maize—namely, that
of resurrection. It was no accident that the cob, the most popular
figure for representing the god of maize, lent its shape to both agri-
cultural tools and weapons of war. Yet a Promethean-like figure
named Quetzalcóatl took maize as a more democratic gift for hu-
man beings, so that they could survive and flourish through its
cultivation.
Thus Mesoamerican societies undeniably “sanctified” maize,
and yet Fussell’s distinction between maize and corn tends to lock
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them in the modern epistemic framework that starkly separates the
cultural from the economic sphere, religious from rational thinking
and agricultural wisdom from successful agribusiness. Such dichot-
omies have played a role in the long-standing academic denial of
the technological skills and achievements of pre-Columbian soci-
eties and have contributed to the fact that Mesoamerican agriculture
qua biotechnological practice has been thought marginally in com-
parison with maize as a cultural trait, a religious symbol or an eth-
nic food. Nevertheless, they constitute a useful entry point into cur-
rent debates around biotechnology, food and agriculture at a time
when the global penetration of capitalism threatens definitively to
wash away, like rising sea levels, all practical wisdoms, symbolic
resistances and sacred domains. Whatever has been left of milpa
agriculture after five centuries of colonial and modern acculturation
is now undergoing both scientific revision and political reimagina-
tion. In this conjuncture, the practice of maize agriculture south of
the North American border no longer appears as an atavistic rem-
nant of lost civilizations. Instead it appears as a contemporaneous
struggle of transnational dimensions against the global empire of
corn.
Approximately one-fourth of the world’s population currently
depends on direct consumption of corn, while more than half of the
global corn harvest goes into animal feed. By consuming meat, milk
and eggs, and other processed foods, wealthy populations consume
many times more corn than people, such as Mexicans, whose diet is
based on direct consumption of it. In addition, corn is being increas-
ingly used as a source of industrial inputs and of biofuel, a contro-
versial alternative to fossil fuels. This industrial kingdom, as Fussell
calls it, was made possible by a displacement of the adaptive kind of
biotechnology practiced by Mesoamerican societies among many
other small-scale societies around the world. It was made possible
by the scientification and globalization of the Western understand-
ing of agriculture as “planting fields with crops to feed flocks to
supply fields with manure for more crops.”9 Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, newly trained agronomists in the United States
devoted themselves to designing fertilizers, pesticides and hybrid
seeds with the goal of maximizing yields. Public institutions were
created to coordinate agricultural production with trade policy.
Oriented toward the conquest of foreign markets, agricultural pro-
duction was made to depend on mechanization, agrochemicals, and
the constant replacement of improved crop varieties. In the second




sive monoculture farming everywhere led to soil erosion, water pol-
lution and numerous other serious damages, such as the loss of
plant and animal species, the destruction of natural pest-control
mechanisms, the consequent proliferation of new pests and “super
weeds,” and global warming. In recent years, the efficiency of com-
mercial inputs has decreased, and the yields of key crops have in
some places been leveling off. Mainstream agroscientists believe
that this is happening because the maximum yield potential of cur-
rent varieties is being approached, and therefore genetic engineer-
ing must be applied to the task of redesigning crops.
Based on a generative partnership of molecular biology and in-
formation technologies, genetic engineering produces commodities
designed to further the expansion of a corporate-controlled global
food system, one seen as threatening to displace local agricultural
knowledges and practices. As Melinda Cooper points out, contem-
porary biotechnology is “inseparable from the rise of neoliberalism
as the dominant political philosophy of our time.”10 While neoliber-
alism makes capitalism into “the organizing and regulative princi-
ple of the state and society,”11 biotechnology inserts neoliberalism
into the core of life itself, harnessing for that purpose “the specific
power of life activity of cells, molecules, and genes.”12 By inserting
bacterial genes into a higher organism such as a maize plant, genetic
engineers have created transgenic maize, a new kind of hybrid or-
ganism that would have been impossible to create through conven-
tional breeding methods. The most common variety of transgenic
maize has been engineered to produce a protein (Cry) that was
originally isolated from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis and is
lethal to many insects that damage crops specifically in the United
States.13
Most transgenic maize is engineered by means of a physical
technique called bioballistics, which involves the use of gold or
tungsten bullets covered with transgenic sequences to cut through
the protective membranes of cells. Since the site of cutting is itself
random and must be repaired by the organism, the technique poses
a risk of “illegitimate recombination” in the organism’s genome.14
Commercial transgenic seeds rarely produce weird plant behavior
only because companies select a posteriori the best outcomes of
transgenesis and then conventionally generate “pure lines.”15 Yet
the risk of “illegitimate recombination” remains within the plant
and is increased by the use of promoting sequences, which regulate
the expression of transgenes. 35S from the cauliflower virus is a




sion in all types of tissues throughout the whole development of
plants. Some scientists argue that 35S is able to behave autonomous-
ly and activate genes other than the desired ones. Moreover, 35S has
been identified as a recombinant hotspot, which increases the
chances that its behavior causes genomic instability.16 Such a risk is
qualitatively different from anything entailed by earlier forms of
biotechnology and springs from the fact that scientists do not yet
understand the mechanisms through which organisms are able to
maintain their genomic integrity—that is, their species boundaries.
Scientists define “gene flow” as the incorporation of genes from
one population into the gene pool of another population.17 Gene
flow means that once transgenic plants are released into the envi-
ronment, it is possible for transgenes to insert themselves into non-
transgenic organisms. This would be a natural phenomenon as in
cases of spontaneous hybridization, when the pollen of a plant, car-
ried by an insect or the wind, fertilizes another plant, resulting in a
hybrid organism.18 Whereas some crops only hybridize with mem-
bers of the same species, others can hybridize with members of
other species. Mexican scientists cite evidence that cross-species hy-
bridization has stimulated, at least in the cases of sorghum and
radish, the evolution of more persistent and invasive weeds and has
increased the risk of extinction by hybridization.19 In Mexico, the
risks of spontaneous hybridization of transgenic and nontransgenic
plants are higher than in the United States due to the existence of
biodiversity and wild relatives. As a center of origin and diversifica-
tion, Mexico hosts the wild relatives of maize, which spontaneously
hybridize with maize at a rate of 50 percent. In other words, Mexi-
can maize is a “very promiscuous” plant living in a context where
cross-pollination is the rule.20 Moreover, the toxicity of transgenic
plants, which targets pests, can also impact nontarget organisms,
such as beneficial insects, pollinators and worms that preserve soil
nutrients. Other varieties of transgenic maize that are tolerant of
herbicides such as gliphosate are incompatible with milpa agricul-
ture because gliphosate attacks all plants. Moreover, if herbicide-
tolerant transgenes reach the genome of teocintle, the wild relative of
maize that is abundant in Mexico, herbicide-tolerant weeds may
result.21
In so far as techniques such as genetic engineering are allowed to
displace the patient selection of observable, slow-evolving pheno-
typical traits, as well as the ecological interactions among different
organisms, this has cultural and political implications alongside ec-




produce life itself as a body that never stops laboring. Plants, ani-
mals, humans and even bacteria are increasingly defined by labor at
the molecular level, and “a body that never stops laboring is also a
biology defined by production.”22 Thacker’s notion of “biomaterial
labor” seems to place us far from Mesoamerican agriculture, with
its refusal of labor on a human scale. Cooper, however, brings us
back to that scale by pointing out that in effacing the boundaries
between labor and life, between production and reproduction, bio-
technological neoliberalism seeks to efface nothing less than the
very boundaries that were constitutive of welfare biopolitics and
human rights discourse. The end of welfare biopolitics signals the
end of a particular relationship between Mesoamerican humans
and maize. In that relationship the Mesoamericans were called
“Mexicans,” and maize was their national symbol.
Even though the vast majority of contemporary Mexicans live in
urban areas and do not directly participate in agriculture, many
continue to regard themselves as privileged heirs of maize. The crop
indeed remains a staple of their cuisine and everyday rituals, so it
hardly surprises to read that maize “provides [Mexicans] the es-
sence of their identity.”23 Cultural historian Jeffrey Pilcher provides
an engaging history of the place of maize in narratives of Mexican
nationhood, which he begins by recreating the Mesoamerican sa-
cralization of maize that Fussell contrasts with the European com-
modification of corn. He describes an Aztec practice that horrified
the Spaniards when they first arrived in Mesoamerica in the six-
teenth century: “Before farmers could cultivate maize, priests had to
fertilize the soil with sacrificial victims. The flesh of young warriors
revitalized the fields and their free-flowing blood assured steady
rains. [Obviously, people] did not see this relationship in scientific
terms of decomposing bodies providing nutrients to the soil. . . .
[Rather, t]heir perception was much more direct: corn really was
‘our sustenance, our flesh.’ They called babies ‘maize blossoms,’
young girls were ‘tender green ears,’ and a warrior in his prime
represented ‘Lord Corn Cob.’”24
Such an extreme identification between human beings and
maize made sense, as Pilcher evocatively suggests, in the context of
Mesoamerican cosmogony. While anthropologists have certainly
found traces of such a cosmogony in the rituals and beliefs held by
some self-identified indigenous communities in Mexico, what does
it mean to insist, today, on a cultural identification between all Mex-
icans and maize? At present, when Mexican activists denounce that





associated biodiversity, they simultaneously denounce a radical
threat to the nation itself, to its life, its labor and the social relations
that sustain it. Their slogan is straightforward in this regard: “There
is no country without maize.” Yet a critique is in order of national
narratives and their cultural and political role in the future of maize
agriculture, understood as a culturally specific form of biotechnolo-
gy.
In what follows I briefly reconstruct the history of “maize na-
tionalism,” the historical and ideological backdrop for the current
struggle against transgenic corn. The main point of my critical re-
construction is that the nationalist celebration of maize emerged
through a devaluation of maize agriculture as a culturally specific
form of biotechnology. That is to say, in order to qualify as a nation-
al symbol, maize had to be abstracted from its Mesoamerican bio-
technological context. In this process, Mexican nationalism partially
undermined the material vitality of maize agriculture, as well as its
public valorization as a culturally specific form of biotechnology.
The question, then, is whether nationalism lives in any form in the
present technoscientific conjuncture for the Mexican defenders of
native maize.
THE PLACE OF MAIZE IN
NARRATIVES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
In 2003, an exhibition titled Sin maíz no hay país (“without maize,
there is no country”) opened at the National Museum of Popular
Cultures in Mexico City. Griselda Galicia, director of popular and
indigenous cultures and author of a preface in the accompanying
publication, states there that her department’s mission is to encour-
age public debate around the topics of national interest at a time
when there is an “urgent need” to reimagine “a national project that
satisfies all.” Among other topics, maize was chosen for its capacity
to meet the national challenge of “satisfying all.” Such a “loyal wit-
ness of the Mexican past and present,” Galicia says, will also be a
“central protagonist of the future that comes close to us simultane-
ously as hope and uncertainty.” Galicia’s stated hopes for national
reconciliation and universal satisfaction, however, only manage to
underline the deep wounds that have historically defined the Mexi-
can nation and that maize has certainly protagonized: “Maize has
been ignored as the central element of indigenous cultures, rural




cluding its nutritional value; its contributions to the industrial de-
velopment and engineering of our country unknown; utilized as a
sedative for social unrest and discriminated against in its healing
powers. For all this it was decided to address the topic of maize and
its circumstance as a metaphor of the country.”25
Since the defeat of the Aztec Empire by the Spaniards
(1519–1521), throughout the colonial centuries of New Spain
(1535–1821), and for most of Mexico’s national history
(1821–present), maize bore a stigma of defeat. As the European sta-
ple, wheat, became a sign of superior status in New Spain, Catholic
evangelization of indigenous people included constant encourage-
ment to replace maize with wheat, the only authorized grain for the
holy communion, and wheat farms employing forced labor served
in fact as the foundation for colonial usurpation of indigenous lands
in Mesoamerica. After the first colonial century, nine out of every
ten people in New Spain had died due to the negative impact of the
conquest on the indigenous population’s capacity to produce its
own food.26 Those who survived did so largely because, by contrast
with European wheat agriculture and stockbreeding, maize cultiva-
tion and consumption does not require complex equipment or too
much space.
Following independence from Spain in 1821, Mexican Creole
elites defined national culture in strictly European terms. All maize
products were excluded from the national cuisine, reflecting the
continuing exclusion of the lower classes, particularly individuals of
indigenous descent, from citizenship. Such an association of maize
with racialized poverty was rearticulated toward the end of the
nineteenth century in response to the troubling developments in the
European scientific discourse. Against social Darwinism, which
postulated a biological inferiority of non-European populations, na-
tionalist intellectuals argued that the real cause of Mexican “back-
wardness” was nutritional rather than hereditary and stemmed
from the population’s consumption of maize.27 Taking heed of
these ideas, dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) launched a series of
campaigns to educate poor women about the importance, for na-
tional progress, of eating wheat bread instead of maize tortillas.
Maize thus became a target for modern state biopolitics, a scientif-
ically oriented regime that seeks to exert “a positive influence on
life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subject-
ing it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.”28 The
biopolitical attempt to replace maize with wheat lasted well beyond




end to Díaz’s regime. The winning factions of this war set out to
rebuild the Mexican nation around a cultural politics called “revolu-
tionary nationalism.” Revolutionary elites used cultural nationalism
as a way to create consensus around an imperative to modernize
through industrialization and urbanization, neither of which could
be achieved if the vast majority of the people lived and worked in
small, isolated communities.29
Many studies highlight the continuities between nineteenth-cen-
tury thought about “the indigenous problem” and postrevolution-
ary indigenismo. In both cases the indigenous was thought in racial
and civilizatory terms.30 Contestation of biological determinism
had begun in the Porfiriato (1880–1910), when Mexican scientists
became interested in Jean-Baptiste Lamarck as they searched for
racial theories that allowed for an “improvement” of the Mexican
population. If the environment had a role to play in racial forma-
tions, then modifying environmental conditions could improve “the
race.” After the revolution, those same ideas allowed intellectuals
and politicians to defend the “educability” of indigenous peoples.31
Indigenismo was “applied social anthropology,” and it was aligned
with the state.32 Manuel Gamio, Mexico’s first professional anthro-
pologist and author of Forjando patria (1916), was its representative.
Gamio thought that anthropologists could be nation builders be-
cause “the Indian” was capable to transformation and assimilation
into the anthropological ideal: the mestizo. This ideal embodied for
him “the historical agency of the Mexican nation,” an agency that
consisted in assuming the direction (that is, the civilization) of the
indigenous classes.33 José Vasconcelos, postrevolutionary intellectu-
al and author of the motto of mestizaje, “For my race the spirit will
speak,” disagreed with indigenismo to the extent that it treated those
classified as “indigenous” as different from the Mexican. In this
sense, he was an anticulturalist who thought that differential treat-
ment would merely delay the incorporation of the indigenous into
the nation. Despite their disagreements regarding how those clas-
sified as “Indians” should be integrated into the national society,
both Gamio and Vasconcelos believed that the existence of “In-
dians” in the Mexican territory was a problem that required state
intervention and that such an intervention must seek racial and
cultural improvement of the Mexican population.
By 1925, an assumed equivalence between the rural and the in-
digenous was institutionalized through state-led educational pro-
jects. At the time, anthropologists, educators and politicians shared
the idea that “backwardness” stemmed from geographic and cultu-
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ral isolation.34 In order to annul the “evolutionary distance” be-
tween Indians and modern Mexicans, early indigenista policies pro-
posed to annul the spatial distance between them.35 Their initial
project was to create, by means of rural education, a new class of
entrepreneurial farmers who would assimilate the new technical
knowledge and the behavior appropriate to modern economies.36
Urban educationalists went out to the countryside to teach rural
peoples to speak the Spanish language and to consume wheat
bread, on the assumption that “our customs and lifestyle . . . are
unquestionably superior to theirs.”37 At the same time, a new class
of professional agronomists learned to apply genetics and chemis-
try to produce high-yield varieties of maize, fertilizers and pesti-
cides. Given the state’s active promotion of large-scale, intensive
agriculture, both rural teachers and agronomists failed to accom-
plish their initial project of producing a mass of entrepreneurial
farmers. Most rural dwellers ended up migrating to the cities in
order to engage in wage labor, and Mexican cultural elites finally
welcomed maize in the context of this transformation. Whereas for
centuries a tiny elite of Creoles and European immigrants had
judged the rural life of the majorities as barbaric and “Indian,”
working-class Mexicans of the postrevolutionary would be allowed
to boast about urban modernity at the same time that they celebrat-
ed a “conveniently mesticized and mainstreamed” rural culture.38
In his fascinating examination of this phenomenon, Pilcher re-
counts, “In the early 1950s, one newspaper announced the end of
antagonisms between corn and wheat, explaining that sociologists
no longer considered the European grain essential to Mexico’s de-
velopment. A leading nutritionist, Alfredo Ramos Espinosa, formu-
lated the simple equation that people who ate only corn were In-
dians, those who only ate wheat were Spaniards, while Mexicans
were fortunate enough to eat both grains.”39
According to cultural historian Arthur Schmidtt, there are two
dominant interpretations of Mexico’s trajectory from the economic
model of import substitution industrialization (1940–1982) to neo-
liberalism (1982–present).40 The “revolution-to-evolution” interpre-
tation derives from the ideological legacy of the Mexican Revolu-
tion coupled with the post–World War II development policies
coming from the United States. Such policies were part of a strategy
launched by the United States in the process of consolidating its
global hegemony. The henceforth-called “developing world” was a
means for expanding and deepening markets for US products, for




cheap raw materials. Given their fear of Soviet expansion, anticolo-
nial struggles in Asia and Africa, and growing nationalisms in Latin
America, American economists described the Mexican experience
as “a preferred solution for the hemispheric problem of change and
development” that “had much to offer the world.”41 The whole
world’s faith in Western science and technology as a means of eco-
nomic progress also played a role in shaping “development” as a
friendly face of US capitalist expansion. Thus, the dominant “revo-
lution-to-evolution” narrative emphasized Mexico’s political stabil-
ity and material progress, as well as the new patterns of friendship
and cooperation with US administrations and social scientists dur-
ing the Cold War.
By the 1970s, an alternative “revolution-to-demolition” narrative
had emerged, which interpreted Mexico’s “golden age” of capitalist
development as a betrayal of revolutionary ideals. In this vein, Mex-
ican sociologist Roger Bartra’s The Cage of Melancholy critically ad-
dressed agrarian myths of peasant heroes and “lost” paradisiacal
countrysides as they appeared in the nationalist writings of postrev-
olutionary intellectuals. He saw such literature as embedded in “a
modern network of cultural and political mediations”42 wherein a
melancholic reaction to the fact of change worked to legitimize bru-
tal processes of modernization. According to Bartra, the revolution-
ary intellectual’s gaze fixed the peasant as an apathetic or melan-
cholic being, one belonging to a temporality “in which present and
past are confused in order to exclude the future.”43 Melancholy
could only arise from an urban experience of solitude, that of an
intellectual who then projected the sentiment onto rural inhabitants.
In Bartra’s words, “The modern form of solitude is generalized as a
feeling of isolation with respect to the Other. Given this feeling, the
suffering caused by solitude is frequently transferred to the Other:
the solitude of neighbors, of peasants, of the savages of the Third
World.”44
Of course, the Mexican “peasant hero” was nothing but “an arti-
ficial entelechy” that existed only in the books and speeches that
described or exalted it in the service “a powerful nationalist will
bound to the unification and institutionalization of the capitalist
state.”45 At a time still dominated by a more reductionist kind of
political economy, Bartra’s work was innovative for seriously con-
sidering the role of cultural narratives in creating hegemony, or
political consensus, around an oppressive regime. New cultural his-
torians of the Mexican nation tend to agree with his “revolution-to-




mation of popular agency within capitalism—for instance, through
“consumer choice.”46 A new cultural history of maize in relation to
Mexican nationalism would involve showing how heterogeneous
actors and interests have negotiated the capitalist appropriation of
maize and how definitions of Mexican and maize-based identity
might feed counterhegemonic impulses as well as regime projects.
Already in this spirit Pilcher concluded his story of Mexican food
with an assertion that the nationalist celebration of maize “owed as
much to capitalist development as to a search for lo mexicano.”47 In
her analysis of La casa del estudiante indígena (1927–1932), a short-
lived experiment of indigenous education, Ariadna Acevedo dem-
onstrates that the government framed indigenous images in terms
of a postrevolutionary search for “justice.”48 She argues that in this
particular case, rural education and indigenista policies went beyond
romanticization and folklore. They were rather about “a redefini-
tion of indigenous peoples that vindicated their capacity for educa-
tion and progress, and so more emphasis was placed on the person
than on the product (crafts, dances or music).”49 Among her evi-
dence is a photograph titled “Tortillera. México” showing a woman
grinding maize with a metate, while the text alludes to “metate slav-
ery” and the fact that indigenous women lack access to a technology
that frees them from the work of manually grinding maize. Thus,
the text seeks to break idealization and point toward justice. This
propaganda book also contests other ideas of the “melancholic” In-
dian and exalts the joy and grace achieved by students after spend-
ing some time at the educational institution.
More recently, anthropologists David Lind and Elizabeth Bar-
ham analyzed the social history of the maize tortilla with the pur-
pose of more closely examining what the struggle for meaning in-
volves in commodification processes. Drawing on Margaret Radin’s
work, they understand commodification as a worldview that de-
pends on the degree to which the monetary principle of abstract
equivalence has come to dominate social processes. For commodifi-
cation to become a worldview, it must first cross “a threshold or
sacred boundary” imposed by the human perception that certain
aspects of experience should be protected from exchange.
Lind and Barham’s social history of the tortilla begins with a
Mesoamerican cultural situation, in women serve as “gatekeeper[s]
to the inside meanings of culture, the family, the home, and the
meal.”50 In this setting, the preparation of tortillas begins with
maize kernels typically grown and harvested by men. At home, the




ashes, to improve taste, texture, and digestibility. Afterward wom-
en prepare the maize dough on a three-legged metate, or grinding
stone, then shape it by hand into flat disks that are cooked for less
than a minute on each side on a comal, or griddle, placed over three
stones encircling the fire. Each time a woman kneels in front of the
metate to work the nixtamal, she is said to reenact a cosmogonic
story. The three stones of the comal symbolize the “three hearth-
stones of creation” placed by the Mesoamerican gods on the center
of the earth, while maize dough is called by its indigenous names,
which signify “our flesh”—hence the anthropologists’ understand-
ing that “maize and the people who consume it are joined in one
continuum of divine creation.”52 The next situation, or “epoch,” as
Lind and Barham refer to it, results from the European conquest of
Mesoamerica, which subjects the people’s flesh and worldview to
commodification processes. Progressively assimilated into the polit-
ical economy of colonialism, maize becomes the food of the world’s
poor. Wherever it goes, it gets new names, often reflecting the atti-
tudes of “fungibility and commensurability” with which Europeans
approached the newly discovered grain, as we already heard from
Fussell.
After centuries of localized resistance to the commodification
processes imposed by European colonialism, the postrevolutionary
state inaugurates a new kind of sacredness for maize. No longer just
the food of the poor, it becomes a symbol of modern national iden-
tity under a capitalist regime. In order to negotiate with the new
urban populations, the postrevolutionary Mexican state embraces
maize as a protected agricultural product and a subsidized urban
consumer item.53 It offers price supports and marketing assistance
to maize farmers as a way of encouraging them to supply to urban
consumers. Both a network of small tortilla factories and a large
industry of maize products develop under the aegis of welfare pro-
grams. In Lind and Barham’s view, these reinforce the idea that
maize is somehow special and even incommensurable with the oth-
er food commodities. The sacredness of maize is transferred from
the peasant household to the link between urban populations and
their modern rulers, from the stone and hearth to the mechanized
tortillerías that Mexican women of the postrevolutionary era no
doubt welcomed.
A fourth epoch starts with the economic crisis of 1982 and the
subsequent adoption of neoliberal policies. The state withdraws its
economic support for small- and medium-scale agriculture, and the





berto González Barrera. This “tortilla king” becomes the world’s
leading producer of maize flour and a Forbes billionaire. When in
1999 government subsidies are finally eliminated, small-scale maize
producers are unable to compete with the large producers. They go
bankrupt. Social relief programs start to distribute small amounts of
cash instead of maize. In February 2001, Mission Foods, a division
of Maseca-Gruma and the largest tortilla manufacturer in the Unit-
ed States, partners with Disneyland to build an “authentic tortilla
factory attraction.” As Lind and Barham describe it, the attraction’s
tour starts with the ancient Mayans and their primitive stone grind-
ing methods, then leads straight to the mechanized techniques that
rely on industrial corn flour. Visitors see an actual tortilla produc-
tion line, at the end of which they are invited to sample fresh tortil-
las from the conveyor belt. While industrialized ready-made foods
such as “wraps” (the globally accepted descendant of the maize
tortilla) become attractive in the context of urban time constraints,
they finally impose commodification as worldview.
For Lind and Barham, the problem with this worldview is that it
ignores “the social, economic and cultural contexts in which Mexi-
cans exist.”54 In Mexico, the majority of seasonal agricultural work-
ers cannot afford to buy the fruit they pick and pack for US and
Canadian markets. They cannot produce their own food, either.
Those who work for high-technology agricultural businesses in-
creasingly face the world as individual competitors for low-paid
jobs.55 Women can be hired more cheaply than men and children
even more cheaply than women. Labor organization is undermined,
and everyone’s economic well-being deteriorates.56 This is clearly a
problem of political economy; yet the status of commodification as a
“worldview” calls for further analysis and interrogation.
THE NATION IN POLITICAL ECONOMY:
A CULTURAL PROBLEMATIC?
Raymond Williams compellingly expressed the issue at stake in the
nationalist appropriation of maize in his classic The Country and the
City. Powerful feelings, he writes, have gathered around country
and city as fundamental ways of life. Lauded as the natural way, the
country is also associated with backwardness, ignorance and limita-
tion. A place of noise, worldliness and ambition, the city neverthe-
less enjoys the aura of an achieved center. Such images that reach





study of “Old England,” in which personal pressure and commit-
ment (“I was born in a village, and I still live in a village”) drive him
to deconstruct their petrified appearance of truth. Yet, rather than
point out historical error, Williams strives to develop historical per-
spective. In perspective there is something more, perhaps even
something other, than historical explanation and analysis.
Nostalgia for the country, Williams observes, is universal and
persistent. Yet, upon reflection, whatever seems to be a single,
transhistorical object turns out to be more like a complex movement
from which the critic herself cannot be detached. What concerns
Williams the critic are the “more real and more interesting social
causes” of the nostalgic “structure of feeling,” of “this particular
kind of reaction to the fact of change.”57 In other words, at stake for
him (and subsequently for the field of cultural studies) is nothing
less than a critique of the present. “As in every kind of radicalism
the moment comes when any critique of the present must choose its
bearings, between past and future. And if the past is chosen, as now
so often and so deeply, we must push the argument through to the
roots that are being defended; push attention, human attention,
back to the natural economy, the moral economy, the organic soci-
ety, from which the critical values are drawn.”58
Like Williams’s “Old England,” maize has been given different
meanings at different times. Meanings related to nationalism have
been established through a contest of imported values associated
with the country and the city. A historical perspective on those
values entails a critical reflection grounded on but not limited to
historical explanations and analyses of maize as symbol. While at-
tentive to the ways in which the uses of maize as a symbolic re-
source are being called into question in the face of biotechnological
disruption, my historical perspective wishes to remain vigilant of
unconscious identifications with the lords and the landowners—
that is, with those who have defined national identity under partic-
ular regimes of representation. What has been, then, the moral econ-
omy at work in the representation of maize as a national symbol?
Such a question involves a particular perspective on the historical
timeline presented above, a perspective that asks how the values of
the landowners came to appear as the natural values and how such
naturalness has come to be shaken and even “disrupted” in the
neoliberal age.
In his important book Encountering Development, Colombian
anthropologist Arturo Escobar undertakes an analysis of political




sive domain that articulates thought and action. He focuses on “de-
velopment,” a particular elaboration of colonial discourse shaped
by academic studies, policies and practices after World War II. Esco-
bar’s analysis of development’s colonial logic combines Michel Fou-
cault’s theory of biopolitics with Edward Said’s theory of oriental-
ism. That is, he shows how the targets of development discourse
were framed as biological entities in need of scientific management,
as well as turned into a visual spectacle that racialized and gen-
dered “the poor” in particular ways. In biopolitical and orientalist
fashion, postwar development discourse framed the “Third World”
as “usually dark and lacking in historical agency, as if waiting for
the (white) Western hand to help subjects along and not infrequent-
ly hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubbornness,
lack of initiative, and traditions.”59 Thus, development discourse
merely reinforced, according to Escobar, the biopolitical project to
map certain people into coordinates of control, fundamentally in
order “to transform the conditions under which they live into a
productive, normalized social environment: in short, to create mod-
ernity.”60
Several decades before World War II, the Mexican revolutionary
gaze had already framed peasants and decided their fate. Specifical-
ly during the political and ideological consolidation of the Mexican
postrevolutionary regime (1921–1940), peasants, a category often
associated with the indigenous, came to be constructed as a national
problem, one of a primarily cultural nature that was to be tackled by
rural education. In his analysis of a periodical edited by the Minis-
try of Public Education, Mexican historian Guillermo Palacios de-
scribes the construction of “the peasant problem” as the discovery
of a whole new universe of knowledge and indeed a whole new
way for rural teachers to look at themselves: “It was as if there had
been a sudden unfolding of ‘national reality’, a new dimension, as if
the reflection of a double could be seen in the light of a recently
discovered perspective.”61 Rural inhabitants came into clear focus
only to be asked to transform themselves into modern subjects. Ap-
athy, passivity, ignorance and backwardness are only a few in a
long list of rural stereotypes that are by no means exclusive to the
Mexican context but in fact reflect the biopolitical and orientalist
legacy of modern Western colonialism.
In the sixteenth century, Spanish conquistadors had received
land grants, or haciendas, from the Spanish Crown in return for
their services. Such a payment included an allocation of indigenous
peones, or peasants, who would work the land as indentured ser-
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vants. Until the 1930s only hacendados and peasants cultivated land
in Mexico. Between 1935 and 1938, President Lázaro Cárdenas met
the Mexican Revolution’s promise of agrarian reform and redistrib-
uted 20 million hectares in the form of communally owned lands, or
ejidos, which became an emblematic institution of the postrevolu-
tionary regime. Haciendas were legally abolished but continued to
exist under an informal pact between the hacendados and the post-
revolutionary state. At first, both the ejidos and the remaining ha-
ciendas kept relying on peasant skills and techniques rather than on
those of professional agronomists. “It was purely Indian techné,”
recounts development critic Gustavo Esteva, or “knowledge dating
from past millennia transmitted through differentiated cultural pat-
terns. Or it was techné mestiza, Indian techné exposed to the practices
introduced by the Spaniards and mixed with them.”62 By the 1940s,
the government had decided that only agronomic science would
provide the models, the instruments, and the technical expertise for
the development of the Mexican countryside. A new class of profes-
sional agronomists learned to apply genetics and chemistry to pro-
duce high-yield varieties of maize, fertilizers and pesticides. A few
years later, more agronomists than peasants were working in rural
projects. Still, their attempts to modernize the countryside failed.
Imported machines could not harvest the crops due to local soil
conditions; the dependence on fertilizers and irrigation turned out
to be both expensive and useless; and peasants were reduced to
passive observers of an expert-driven process, in which their only
role could be to carry bags of fertilizers to the land.63 As already
pointed out, at precisely this conjuncture, Mexican revolutionary
nationalism, a cultural politics aimed at generating consensus
around state-led modernization, finally welcomed maize.
In his analysis of the Green Revolution, Escobar emphasizes the
role of assumptions regarding science, progress and the economy,
as well as the authorial stances of “a father/savior talking with self-
less condescension to a child/native.”64 As part of the American
global “war on poverty,” the Green Revolution came to Mexico
with the purpose of increasing agricultural production through the
use of high-yield seeds in combination with chemical fertilizers and
pesticides. Since the 1920s Mexican agronomists had been working
on raising output in wheat farms; yet their research achieved only
modest results before the arrival, in 1943, of a team of American
scientists supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Norman
Borlaug, a graduate of the Iowa Agricultural College, developed




long plagued Mexican farmers. By crossing seeds gathered from
several different countries, Borlaug developed a highly resistant
strain, Lerma Red, which alleviated stem rust but attracted other
parasites, thus requiring heavier use of pesticides. Dr. Borlaug as-
serted that “in provoking rapid economic and social changes,” the
Green Revolution was “displacing an attitude of despair and apathy
that permeated the entire social fabric of these countries only a few
years ago.”65 For this Nobel Peace Prize winner, anything outside
the market economy, particularly activities of subsistence and local
networks of reciprocity, equated to a threat of engulfment and irra-
tionality.66 Decades after Borlaug, the use of physicalist and probab-
ilistic discourse, a purely instrumental conception of nature and
work, and the use of statistical calculations and models unrelated to
social conditions have continued to guide development policies, not
to mention the fact that “development” has remained unchallenged
as a term in Western media at large.67
In The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas, María Josefina
Saldaña-Portillo demonstrates that the discourse of development
“captured” Latin American revolutionary movements. Like Esco-
bar, Saldaña-Portillo conceives such a discourse as a “regime of
subjection” that rearticulated and redeployed the logics and struc-
tures of colonialism. In Saldaña-Portillo’s view, both developmen-
talism and revolutionary nationalism tried to push subaltern popu-
lations into modernity on the basis of “a theory of human perfect-
ibility that was itself a legacy of the various raced and gendered
subject formations animating colonialism.”68 In the Mexican case,
postrevolutionary elites formulated the “Indian problem” based on
the assumption that “Indians” were incapable of generating moder-
nity by themselves.69 Only mestizos, or Mexicans of “mixed blood,”
could construct a modern nation-state by harnessing indigenous
labor and redirecting its energies against a “pure-blooded foreign
class” (paradoxically, the American friends of “development”).
Mestizo nationalism aimed at the constitution of a homogeneous
citizenry, each member of which would be “an agent of transforma-
tion in his own right, one who is highly ethical, mobile, progressive,
risk taking, and masculinist, regardless of whether [it] is a man or a
woman, an adult or a child.”70 In other words, “a particular rendi-
tion of fully modern masculinity as the basis for full citizenship in
either a developed or a revolutionary society” already drove Mexi-
can nationalism at the discursive level.71
Saldaña-Portillo’s analysis identifies the problem of domination
in the constitution of nationalist subjectivity as such. On that basis,
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it is possible to construct a singular approach to current debates
around maize biotechnology in the context of the deeper articula-
tions between revolutionary nationalism and global capitalism.
From the mid-1960s, a nationalist current of dependency theory in
Latin America began challenging development’s ahistorical treat-
ment of so-called underdeveloped areas. Its critical focus was on the
modern versus traditional dichotomy, which obliterated the extrac-
tive role of urbanization and falsely implied that almost two-thirds
of the world’s population lived in static, archaic societies.72 Depen-
dency theorists showed that underdevelopment actually emerged
hand in hand with capitalist development, as industrial growth dis-
placed and impoverished rural communities. Yet, instead of extend-
ing the critique of modern versus traditional to the center/periphery
dichotomy, dependency theory lamented the periphery’s depen-
dency and prescribed more industrial development as a global
emancipatory solution.73 As in the “revolution-to-demolition” nar-
rative of Mexico’s political economy, dependency theory still fig-
ured the Mexican population as an incomplete subject awaiting na-
tional revolution.
Against this discursive backdrop, my analysis of the Mexican
defense of maize focuses on the modernizing discourses such as
“development” that still dominate, even if in eroded form, the en-
counter between the Mexican nation and biotechnology. Biotechno-
logical disruption, or the debate sparked by transgenic maize in the
Mexican public sphere, calls for a deconstructive interrogation of
national narratives and their cultural and political role in the
present and in the future of maize agriculture in Mexico. By speak-
ing, in what follows, of “technoscientific mutations” in maize na-
tionalism, I seek to highlight the unstable nature of such narratives
or discourses and ask whether and how the experience of their dis-
ruption in the neoliberal age may contribute to the emergence of
more democratic subjectivities that are open to creative experiments
beyond nationalist resistance. Alongside the distressing social in-
equality and the horrific violence, neoliberal Mexico has also seen
hopeful cultural and political alliances between the country and the
city, the promise of which is to displace the hierarchies occluded by
postrevolutionary nationalism. Ultimately, the Mexican defense of
“native maize” calls me to interrogate the possibility of reinventing







In Corn and Capitalism: How a Botanical Bastard Grew to Global Domi-
nance, Mexican anthropologist Arturo Warman celebrates the “bas-
tard” botanical properties of maize, echoing stories about Mexican
identity being a product of interracial fusion, or mestizaje. Warman
does not hide his nationalist pride about the fact that in time maize
proved colonial prejudices wrong by going abroad to become, as an
individual plant, one of the world’s leading crops. He affectionately
describes how maize’s adaptability to diverse ecological conditions,
its high productivity and its multiple applications led to its quick
spread and global acceptance, with the result that “today corn’s
patrimony is universal.”74 Precisely maize’s central role in contem-
porary global capitalism prompts me to interrogate Warman’s call
to regard it as “a unique resource for the construction of a new
reality, for change and social transformation.”75 What kind of trans-
formation did the Mexican anthropologist have in mind when he
first wrote Corn and Capitalism in the 1980s, and how does it relate to
the present conjuncture in which disparate national and transna-
tional actors are reclaiming Mexican maize?
In 1981, a fall in oil prices deprived the government both of the
economic surplus with which it had traditionally sustained its polit-
ical apparatus and of its capacity to pay the country’s foreign debt.
The debt crisis was the starting point of Mexico’s neoliberal turn,
which involved, as everywhere else, the demolition of all social
welfare policies and mechanisms. Yet neoliberalism had circulated
as a set of ideas among Mexican political elites since the 1970s.76
Even though it stems from a narrow domain in economic theory,
neoliberalism has come to refer to a more comprehensive vision of
the social order premised on the primacy of the market and on
competition among self-reliant individuals. Wendy Brown de-
scribes this phenomenon in terms of “governmentality—a mode of
governance encompassing but not limited to the state, and one that
produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and a new
organization of the social.”77 In his analysis of Mexican neoliberal
discourse, political scientist Gavin O’Toole points out that a purely
economic understanding of neoliberalism has tended to downplay
the complex discursive challenges confronting Mexican neoliberals
as they dismantled a political economy legitimized by a potent na-
tionalist tradition. Because revolutionary nationalism had been very




erals to give it up. Instead they attempted to reconcile nationalism
with the neoliberal project by explaining and interpreting in a cer-
tain way the implications of globalization for Mexican society.78
While the implementation of neoliberal policies in Mexico was
not a democratic process, Mexican neoliberals worked hard to elab-
orate a new public philosophy, or “new ways of thinking and
speaking about the republic.”79 Central tenets of neoliberalism in-
cluded the superiority of market mechanisms and the extension of
economic freedoms through the limiting of state intervention; there-
fore the political reform demanded by Mexican individuals had to
start with the withdrawal of the state from large areas of economic
activity. The reformed Mexican state, said the neoliberals, would
regulate and orient the economy but no longer possess, substitute or
extend protectionisms and privileges. As O’Toole carefully ex-
plains, technocrat president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994)
publicly elaborated the theory that an increasingly individualized
Mexican society demanded a comprehensive reform of the state that
recognized both the competitive and the plural nature of party poli-
tics and the individual as a political actor defined by human and
civil rights. Hence Salinas’s Programa Nacional de Solidaridad ex-
plicitly promoted a new civic ethic of “coresponsibility” and self-
reliance. “Solidarity,” a key slogan of the Salinas administration,
played the role of synthesizing the ideals of individual entrepren-
eurship and social justice, serving simultaneously “as a legitimizing
formula for market reforms that reduced the role of the state, and as
a social ethic underpinning the continuing task of nation-build-
ing.”80 The shift from protectionist import substitution to full entry
into global competition was asserted as essential for national survi-
val, for the continuity of Mexico in history. Since the threat of “invi-
ability” in a globalizing world derived from the lack of competitive-
ness, sovereignty became synonymous with “competitive strength.”
Through that, Mexico would at last fulfill its vision of progress,
which Salinas described in terms of becoming part of the First
World and not the Third.
In attacking state paternalism, the neoliberals sought to produce
Mexican citizens as “mature” subjects on the basis of their supposed
individual initiative. In this context, our anthropologist Arturo
Warman argued that the main result of “state paternalism” had
been the treatment of the campesino as childlike, lacking the full
maturity of other citizens, and that the primary aim of reforming
Article 27, which allowed small farmers or campesinos to sell their
collectively owned land (ejidos), was to correct such a denigrating
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situation. Warman believed that the Salinista approach sought a
“third way” between individualism and collectivism that re-
sponded to the historical complexity of Mexican rural society. War-
man’s anthropological work on Mexican rural issues had been
widely acclaimed within the country and abroad, until he became a
functionary of the neoliberal government of Salinas de Gortari.
After the neoliberal policies proved fatal for the Mexican domestic
economy, Warman’s collaboration with Salinas and with the latter’s
successor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), led to his ostracism, particu-
larly by leftist media and in anthropological circles. Warman’s story
is a useful entry point into a time in Mexican history characterized
by discursive instability and “technoscientific mutation” of the na-
tional narratives, not least because in Mexico, anthropology
emerged as a discipline in response to the state’s interest in design-
ing public policies that addressed the existence of indigenous peo-
ples—who were often defined by their rural condition—in the Mex-
ican territory. More than any other social science, anthropology was
supposed to contribute to solving “national problems.”81
According to Mexican historian Alejandro Araujo, the 1980s saw
an adjustment in the relationship between social scientists and the
Mexican state through a generational confrontation, going back to
the political turmoils of the 1960s and 1970s, between indigenista
anthropologists and younger generations who sought to imagine a
new national project through the practice of a more critical anthro-
pology.82 After the violent repression of the 1968 student movement
in Mexico City, the political legitimacy of the Mexican state had
been seriously undermined. State violence intensified, but demo-
cratic demands multiplied steadily in Mexican society as the twenti-
eth century drew to a close. Araujo compares the discourse of Ma-
nuel Gamio (1883–1960), father of indigenismo, with that of Guiller-
mo Bonfil Batalla (1935–1991), leader of critical anthropologists and
author of the anthropological best seller México profundo: una
civilización negada (1987). Bonfil Batalla’s generation had stopped
believing in postrevolutionary nationalism and was pushing for a
critique of the postrevolutionary vision as well as for the imagining
of a new national project.83 For his generation, anthropologists
should no longer be on the side of the state. They had to be critical,
because the state represented not the people but rather one minori-
tarian group of the population.84 Gamio and Bonfil Batalla had in
common, however, the belief that the Mexican population com-
prised cultural groups. Both were “culturalists” in the sense that
they looked at the social order as if a cultural basis made it mean-
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ingful.85 For both “the national problem” was that the Mexican cul-
ture was not homogeneous, and both saw the differences among
Mexicans as caused by something “deep,” something that differen-
tiated Mexico as a whole from other societies that allegedly had
long-standing and solid unity.86 For both, the national project had
never been completed; rather it had been aborted due to the irrecon-
cilable differences between the Mesoamerican and European civil-
izations. While Gamio focused on the possibility of assimilation (of
“the indigenous” into “the mestizo”), Bonfil Batalla stressed con-
flict, since he viewed the subaltern civilization as divergent, as go-
ing in a fundamentally different direction. Bonfil Batalla argued
that Mexicans could not continue to ignore the “deep Mexico” kept
alive by the popular classes. He advocated pluralism led by the
values found in “deep Mexico” and emphasized the unity shared by
“indigenous cultures.” In doing so, he regularly pointed toward
maize agriculture, and so Bonfil Batalla’s discourse strongly reso-
nates in the contemporary struggle for maize.
The presidential administrations of Miguel de la Madrid
(1982–1988) and his successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, culminated
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
came into effect in 1994, deregulating most aspects of trade between
Canada, Mexico and the United States. NAFTA included an end to
legal restrictions to land commodification, an end to tariffs on all
kinds of foreign imports, including food, and the withdrawal of
most state support from domestic production, including small- and
medium-scale agriculture. Salinas put an end to land redistribution,
exerted repression on Zapatista communities and sent the country
into one of its most memorable economic crises in decades. In 1994,
it was anticipated that cheap food imports from the United States
would rapidly flood the Mexican market. For this reason NAFTA
contemplated a transitional exemption of staple products such as
maize and beans, which would last until 2008. It was expected that
from 1994 to 2008, the Mexican agricultural sector would be
strengthened and prepared for competition with its northern
counterparts. In fact, the Mexican government never enforced the
transitional protection. Farmers were abruptly exposed to interna-
tional competition, which drove them out of business and rendered
the whole country dependent on maize imports from the United
States, where agriculture is heavily subsidized, enabling sales of the
grain in Mexico for less than the cost of its production. Pro-NAFTA
politicians defended food imports on the grounds of “food secur-




cheap items in supermarket chains.87 According to them, small-
scale production of maize had to disappear, even though it consti-
tuted more than half of the national output.88 Significantly, the cul-
tivation of maize for subsistence purposes has been maintained and
in some cases increased against the neoliberal odds, which speaks of
the importance of that crop for Mexican sustenance.
In 2001, two Berkeley-based researchers, David Quist and Igna-
cio Chapela, found transgenes in Mexican maize from the northern
highlands of Oaxaca and published their findings in the journal
Nature. In 2002, Nature disowned their article because of alleged
methodological problems. Studies conducted in the same year by
Mexican institutions corroborated Quist and Chapela’s findings,
but Nature again rejected the results, apparently under pressure
from the American biotech lobby. Initially, Mexican farmers were
less concerned about transgenic maize than about the effects of neo-
liberal economic policy;89 yet local and international nongovern-
mental organizations such as Greenpeace and ETC eventually suc-
ceeded in setting up a coalition against genetically modified organ-
isms (GMOs) comprising small- and medium-scale producers, local
environmentalists, social and natural scientists and members of the
national and international public. Before Greenpeace’s campaign
and the ensuing constitution of a Network in Defense of Maize,
professional societies and government agencies had mostly con-
ducted public debate on science and technology in Mexico.90 The
historic deindigenization of peasant identity under developmental-
ist hegemony played a decisive role in fracturing the defense of
maize and in the subsequent radicalization of the network’s dis-
course. In 2002, a coalition of independent indigenous and union-
ized mestizo peasants launched a campaign called El Campo No
Aguanta Más (“the countryside bears it no more”), demanding a
renegotiation of NAFTA and a general reorientation of economic
policy toward the protection of national agriculture. After four
months of nationwide demonstrations, a National Agreement for
the Countryside was proposed by the government and accepted by
peasant unions that had historically emerged through political pacts
with the postrevolutionary government. Since the agreement posi-
tively excluded a renegotiation of international free trade agree-
ments, many independent organizations felt betrayed and progres-
sively aligned their discourse more closely with anticapitalist move-
ments such as Zapatismo and Vía Campesina.
Public outrage at the news of transgenic contamination of native
maize led the Mexican government to create a Commission on Bio-
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security, which initiated procedures for the elaboration of biosafety
legislation. Throughout its existence, suspicion has surrounded its
members, such as José Luis Solleiro, who has links with AgroBio,
the biotech consortium formed by Monsanto, Novartis, Dupont and
Savia, and who became an explicit supporter of transgenics as a
“food security” solution. Over five years, several political parties
presented a total of eight proposals, and the one designed by the
Mexican Academy of Sciences (ACM) served as a basis for the law
finally approved and passed in December 2004. The ACM repre-
sents the elite of the scientific community, meaning that in the final
draft priority went to the scientific content and the role of experts
rather than to the political content of the debate.91 The ACM propo-
sal established case-by-case risk-assessment studies as the duty of
relevant government agencies and recommended application of the
precautionary principle whenever risk studies were deemed un-
satisfactory. However, the final text of the law, which was approved
fast-track without public discussion, partially dropped this latter
point.92 Moreover, it demoted the specific mechanisms for the pro-
tection of native maize to secondary regulations that, according to
their Mexican critics, turned out to be arbitrary and weak. Edith
Antal explains this by pointing out that biosecurity was understood,
from the beginning, as an application in the national context of the
international “rules of the game”—that is, those established by the
World Trade Organization, NAFTA and the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity.93 Worse, such application was done without taking
social dissent into serious consideration, which provoked an angry
reaction from autonomous peasant organizations and made further
dialogue almost impossible. Peasant and indigenous organizations
had no direct participation in the legislative organs, and the politi-
cal parties did not represent their interests in any systematic way.94
Their final response to top-down scientific governance was to take a
radical stance, rejecting transgenic maize in the name of their right
to survival. The Law of Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organ-
isms, which establishes a system of permits for testing and commer-
cializing genetically modified organisms, also met with heavy criti-
cism from a section of the Mexican scientific community and anti-
GMO activists, who dubbed it one of so many “Monsanto laws”
around the world. By framing biotechnology as a threat to national
sovereignty, Greenpeace managed to articulate its environmental
cause together with some other causes, such as economic, political
and cultural struggles. This articulation of issues previously seen as





al maize varieties as fundamental not just to peasant communities
but also to the nation and the world as a whole.
By sacrificing maize, Mexican academics have argued, neoliberal
elites frustrated the democratization of Mexico, an aim of social
movements since 1968. Ana María Ashwell and Armando Bartra
argue that a combination of ineptitude, corruption and inherited
racism guided neoliberal politicians in their negotiations of eco-
nomic policy. Whereas modernizing social policy has long underes-
timated the productive capacities of campesinos, today we are wit-
nessing, Ashwell says, a full-scale attack on the countryside through
the neoliberal decision to renounce national “food sovereignty.” In
a melancholic tone, Ashwell insists that maize coming from “com-
plex and original relationships with the earth” is “the only maize
which they [the campesinos], you and me want to eat.”95 Ashwell
seems more nostalgic than optimistic and so concludes her piece
with a timid reference to European consumers of organic food and
fair trade products. In a similar tone, Armando Bartra’s starts one of
his multiple interventions in defense of maize by stating, “More
than men of maize, us Mesoamericans are people of milpa”; he con-
cludes by asserting, “To save the country is to save maize.”96
In June 2007, the mayor of Mexico City, Marcelo Ebrard, partici-
pated in the official launch of the National Campaign for the De-
fense of Food Sovereignty and the Reactivation of Small-Scale Agri-
culture: Sin maíz no hay país y sin frijol tampoco ¡Pon a México en tu
boca! (“There is no country without maize and nor is there without
beans. Put Mexico in your mouth!”). The campaign aimed to raise
awareness about the importance of food sovereignty and of de-
manding better public policies guided by an alternative, more inclu-
sive national project.97 The first two stages of the campaign focused
on renegotiating NAFTA and tackling the food crisis of 2008. The
third stage strengthened the struggle against GMOs by proclaiming
September 29 as the National Day of Maize and “food indepen-
dence” in Mexico. Thus the critique of transgenic maize, a concern
initially promoted by Greenpeace and ETC, became increasingly
important at each stage of the campaign. Ever since, activist strate-
gies have included mass petitions, demonstrations, local concerts,
performances and food festivals to promote the products of the
Mexican countryside.
The main thread in my analysis of the Mexican defense of maize
focuses on a critical interrogation of the modern political narratives
that still dominate the encounter between the Mexican nation and




Mexico from a variety of social science perspectives; yet the cultural
politics of such debates often appears underanalyzed, either taken
for granted or mystified. “Culture” only makes itself present in as-
sertions about a particular identity, as in “Mexicans are a people of
corn,” implying that corn, like cultural identity, is a sort of posses-
sion that must be kept and celebrated as it faces outside threats such
as modern biotechnology. As in “culturalist” anthropology, the de-
fense of maize frequently presents Mexico as a unity made up of
different civilizatory orders, which is problematic from several
points of view.98
In the 1980s, Mexican history of anthropology was still norma-
tive rather than descriptive, and only in recent years it has shifted
toward the historicizing the logics of knowledge production and the
conditions of knowledge legitimation.99 Bonfil Batalla’s legacy was
a deconstruction of the ideology of mestizaje, since he showed how
“homogeneous Mexico” was premised on exclusion. After him, mes-
tizaje became an object of study rather than a description of what
Mexicans are, and the anthropological discipline started to reflect
on the construction of national imaginaries, the latter’s role in the
legitimization of state intervention in social life.100 Yet, in Araujo’s
view, “Even if Mexican anthropology has diversified its objects of
study and has sought for different ways to legitimize its own role as
a social science, the way in which multiculturalism has been appro-
priated by the national imaginary has revived and reinvigorated
indigenismo. This calls for a re-thinking of such a paradigm and to
understand the theoretical dead-ends it may lead to.”101
A useful precedent for my own critique of the essentialist narra-
tives deployed by the activists with a view to reimagining the na-
tion around native maize was undertaken by rural sociologist Ger-
ard Verschoor in terms of regimes of justification or “grammars of
worth” mobilized by social actors for and against GMOs. As Vers-
choor points out, proponents of GMOs construct their arguments in
terms of industrial efficiency and productivity, emphasizing the
role of experts in deciding about the universal applicability of a
rational logic of comparative advantages. A market-centered regime
defines subjects directly as buyers and sellers in competitive rela-
tions, foreclosing discussion of anything that cannot be reduced to a
commercial logic. In principle this regime seems to be incompatible
with the language of value mobilized by opponents of transgenic
maize. The latter invoke civic values such as solidarity, collective
welfare, resistance against biopiracy and injustice, all excluded from
NAFTA deliberations. The same exclusion would seem to apply to
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the language of tradition and locality typically mobilized by aca-
demic and peasant organizations. Yet the language of tradition in-
vokes a “harmonious, quasi-romantic experience of living off the
land—that is, a close connection between the people and their area,
a relationship mediated by maize.”102 The environmentalist dis-
course in turn articulates this image with the romantic figure of the
noble savage as a “guardian of biodiversity”; yet historical records
show that it is precisely through romanticization that civic demands
“are reduced, de-politicized and made compatible with industrial
or commercial goals logic.”103 Verschoor concludes from this that
asserting the nature and/or culture of particular identities does not
in itself pose an effective challenge to the instrumentalization of
nature and people that capitalist technoscience essentially pro-
motes. Moreover, the language of property rights and community
participation already suggests an implicit neoliberalization of resis-
tance and activism.
Another notable exception to the uncritical acceptance of nation-
alistic cultural essentialism in the name of peasant worlds is Eliza-
beth Fitting’s The Struggle for Maize. Like other observers of the
struggle over maize,104 Fitting praises how the defense of maize has
shifted the debate on GMOs away from a narrow, technocratic focus
on costs and benefits and toward some wider concerns about the
future of the Mexican countryside and culture.105 This is a good
thing, she says, because it challenges the inherited modernizing as-
sumption that peasant maize agriculture is “backward” or “tradi-
tional.”106 Yet she also observes that peasant essentialism, or the
notion of a bounded, millennial people of corn, obscures the way in
which rural communities are in fact being made and remade in the
interaction with larger processes and forces.107 Drawing on ethno-
graphic work, Fitting emphasizes that contemporary Mexican peas-
ants are better described as a rural proletariat, as commercial farm-
ers, or as in the process of transition from one to the other.108 Histor-
ical patterns of migration also complicate the picture because many
of today’s self-labeled campesinos, or peasants, rely on migrants
who go back and forth between the worlds of unpaid work and
paid employment. These are among the many important aspects of
contemporary rural life that Mexicans, both pro- and anti-GMO,
seem to forget when they describe Mexicans, rural and urban, as a
millennial people of corn. My own engagement with the Mexican
defense of maize takes into account the complexities revealed by
empirical work, such as that undertaken by Fitting and Verschoor;





constructive philosophy, post-Marxist political theory, feminist
technoscience and media and cultural studies. As I aim to show in
what follows, it is necessary to interrogate the ethics and politics of
nationalism in a more fundamental way in order to engage critically
and creatively with the challenges posed by capitalist technosci-
ence.
MEXICAN MAIZE AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR TECHNOSCIENCE
Mexican activist and development critic Gustavo Esteva has mov-
ingly narrated the Green Revolution’s failure to “host the otherness
of the other.” In his essay on the subject, Esteva argues that the
Green Revolution was premised on reductionism and simplifica-
tion: first, by abstracting agricultural activities from their social and
ethical context, and second, by attributing a privileged role to pro-
ductivity disarticulated from the overall dynamics of agricultural
life.109 It is possible, Esteva says, that agronomists were right that a
technical change could bring about an increase in production; yet
they were blind to the real situation and the prospects of the major-
ity of peasants. In his view, it would have been more realistic to
consider “the human creativity of alternatives, the multi-direction-
ality of developments, and the multiplicity of time and rhythm of
diverse social groups.”110 Required instead was “a conception of
non-determinist, irreducible, and dialectic approaches to take on the
specific context.”111 In order to illustrate this conception, Esteva
compares the discourse of Dr. Norman Borlaug with that of Mexi-
can scientist Efraín Hernández Xolocotzi, who first advanced a cri-
tique of the devaluation of peasant knowledge. Borlaug saw himself
as a leader striving to “disseminate the benefits of science to all
mankind in the shortest possible time and at a minimum cost.”112
By contrast, Xolocotzi acknowledged the limitations of his own
knowledge and tried to produce new knowledge “through a di-
alogue with the peasant.”113 By recognizing that the peasant has a
different field of observation, Xolocotzi “hosted the otherness of the
other.” Unfortunately, Xolocotzi’s approach did not succeed in pre-
venting the disastrous effects of the Green Revolution.
In the late 1920s, American cytogeneticist Barbara McClintock
identified and characterized the individual chromosomes of maize
by their lengths, shapes and patterns. She integrated her findings
with those of genetic studies, placing maize at the center of genetic
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research alongside the fruit fly Drosophila. Shortly afterward, how-
ever, the new paradigm of molecular biology was born. Whereas
McClintock had shown that the chromosome was the physical locus
of genetic information, molecular biologists searched for the physi-
cal laws and molecular structure of the genetic mechanism.114 When
James Watson and Francis Crick discovered this to be DNA, they
postulated a “central dogma” for molecular genetics according to
which information flows in a single direction from “DNA to RNA to
protein.” Their highly mechanistic account of life was bound to oc-
casion widespread enthusiasm and very quickly rendered unintelli-
gible the more complex, premolecular language of higher organism
biology. Maize no longer attracted the attention of young biologists,
who now devoted themselves to the molecular study of bacteria.
Since the “central dogma” could not account for the variation of
protein with the cell’s chemical environment, two French molecular
biologists later amended it. They explained the variation of protein
in terms of controlling elements that regulated its production. Inde-
pendently and through her own premolecular methods, McClintock
developed an explanation that agreed on the existence of control-
ling elements but differed from the molecular account in regarding
them as unstable. Her theory implicitly challenged even the
amended central dogma, since the capacity of genetic regulators to
move or change position around the cell meant that information did
not flow in a single direction from DNA to protein. For twenty
years McClintock’s work received very little attention, until molecu-
lar biologists confirmed that something like “jumping genes” had
been observed in bacterial genome. She was finally recognized as
having anticipated the findings of molecular biology.
In her biography of the cytogeneticist, Evelyn Fox-Keller asks
what exactly enabled McClintock to achieve such a thing while
working within a premolecular paradigm. Her moving answer rich-
ly illustrates the current clash of paradigms in relation to Mexican
maize agriculture. From Fox-Keller’s conversations with McClin-
tock, it emerges that, besides time and patience, one must have a
feeling for the organism, which is something constantly affected by
the environment.115 Many years of close botanical and cytological
observation of maize plants made McClintock’s scientific achieve-
ment possible. She attached great importance to developing an inti-
mate knowledge of each individual plant, because the scientist
would learn most from the singularity of each plant (rather than
from abstract models) and “begin to do full justice to the prodigious




survival.”116 In other words, McClintock had an acute sense of the
limits of science in relation to a highly complex and dynamic natu-
ral world. Even if, as Fox-Keller stresses, McClintock was still a
scientist and, as such, held a belief in natural laws, her scientific
outlook was unusually receptive and hospitable to other ways of
knowing (from molecular biology to Tibetan Buddhism). Most im-
portantly, perhaps, as a human being she learned how to “host the
otherness” of maize plants themselves. Otherness in this case may
be thought as the singular capacity of maize plants to respond to an
environment. What might have been the history of the Green Revo-
lution had Barbara McClintock led it instead of Borlaug?
As anthropologist Cori Hayden points out in her important
study of bioprospecting in Mexico, we should not underestimate
the legacy of scientific advocacy in contemporary disputes around
the future of the Mexican countryside.117 The problem with the ge-
netic engineering of crops, concerned Mexican scientists argue to-
day, is that it is based on obsolete science—that is, on the “central
dogma” of molecular genetics, according to which a single gene
determines a single visible trait. Even though people like McClin-
tock, among others, have shown that genetic inheritance is more
complex and unpredictable than previously thought, transgenic or-
ganisms have been developed, commercialized and released based
on the previous assumptions.118 The notion of biological complexity
is very much present in the Mexican defense of maize on the scien-
tific front. Like the various levels of biological organization, Mexi-
can molecular biologists say, the risks posed by transgene flow are
complexly related to one another, so that genetics is complexly re-
lated to genomics, genomics is complexly related to the cellular
environment, and this is in turn complexly related to the agroeco-
logical environment and to the human world of culture, politics and
economics.119 Even though gene flow is a risk at the agroecological
level, its most dangerous impact would be on the social, cultural
and economic levels.
The ongoing debates around biotechnology in relation to “the
national problems” present an opportunity to investigate the radical
potential of maize as a symbol of nationhood. And yet I wish to
argue that in order to be radical, the defense of maize must not let
itself be reduced to an identitarian, humanistic self-affirmation, at
least not if it aims to contest the legacy and the logic of colonialism.
Ultimately, the goal of my own engagement with the Mexican de-
fense of maize is to take Mexican biotechnology debates beyond old





sources. Situated at the intersection of cultural studies and post-
Marxism, “cultural politics” refers us to the notion that all social
practices are discursive, or textually organized material phenomena
that can be traced back to political decisions, whether the latter
appear to be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious. An anti-
essentialist elaboration of the cultural politics of biotechnology en-
tails that the production of subjectivity and social organization via
notions of “cultural” identity is, in every case, contingent and alter-
able. Whereas the critique of essentialisms that underwrites this
notion has appeared as undermining the collective causes repre-
sented by various strands of identity politics—in this case “indige-
nous” or peasant “worldviews” and ways of life—I want to suggest
that such an undermining or perhaps “disruption” of identitarian
assertions remains attentive to the most valuable aspects of the lega-
cies at stake, particularly by keeping open the notion of another
kind of biotechnology. This notion is attuned, I believe, to the hopes
of many of the Mexican defenders of maize, such as Gustavo Esteva,
Catherine Marielle and Griselda Galicia: “Many Mexicans today
find inspiration in the dialogue with maize. Not only do they de-
mand hospitable recognition of the existence of indigenous peoples
and of their right to continue being what they are, of their cultures
to flourish in harmony with all the rest within the multicultural
reality of Mexico. They also discover that those cultures, shared
consciously or unconsciously by the majority of Mexicans, may be a
timely and pertinent inspiration to face up to the current predica-
ments and to conceive projects of transformation.”120
The case of maize prompts me to raise radical questions regard-
ing the ethics and politics of nationalism in the context of neoliberal
globalization. In particular, I want to explore in the following chap-
ters whether and how an acknowledgment of the radical contingen-
cy of all identities may bring about a more ethical horizon for the
defense of agriculture as well as a more creative engagement with
technoscience in Mexico. I begin by situating this question in the
context of Latin American debates on the concept of the nation,
globalization and cultural studies.
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In 2002, Argentinian cultural critic Beatriz Sarlo argued for the need
to revise the “globalizing perspective” that in her view had domi-
nated Latin American cultural studies since the 1980s.1 Previously,
Latin American criticism had sought to address social disappoint-
ment at the state’s failure to realize the promises made by nine-
teenth-century liberal nationalists. The tradition evolved from liter-
ary essays on “the national being” toward sociological studies of
popular culture in the 1960s and early 1970s, when Latin American
critics searched for cultural resistance to authoritarian state appara-
tuses. At that time canonical authors of the transatlantic radical tra-
dition, starting with Antonio Gramsci, Frantz Fanon and Walter
Benjamin but extending to Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart,
Stuart Hall and Pierre Bourdieu, all received attention, translation
and publication in Latin America, even prior to their reception in
the United States. Latin American criticism was then unified, Sarlo
says, by a sort of critical arrogance, “as though political issues were
closely tied to our analysis and our concepts.”2 In the 1980s, howev-
er, optimistic studies of democratic transitions under conditions of
globalization displaced the desire to “bridge the gap between the
intellectual and the political fields.”3 According to Sarlo, this cultu-
ral populism, under the influence of deconstruction and poststruc-
turalism, turned out to be merely ideological and detrimental, in





Globalization, Sarlo says, did not bring about a liberated mass
culture but rather enforced the “Hobbesian nightmare” of “a disin-
tegrated society, whose components are all at war with each other
even when they think that they are carrying on the same battle.”4
Latin American cultural studies from the 1980s, however, came to
perceive itself as a break with totalizing Western concepts such as
the nation-state precisely at a time when the nation-state was being
not merely displaced but violently “conquered.”5 In a nutshell, “the
avant-garde representatives of deconstruction and post-structural-
ism” lent themselves to betraying the foundational political com-
mitments of Latin American cultural critique by closing the tradi-
tional debate around nations and national identities.6 Thus Sarlo
seems to blame particular strands of critical theory for Latin
American scholars’ “growing sense of belonging to an unimportant,
secondary and backward region of the world.”7 This situation, she
says, can only be redressed by contributing to “the description, in
precise historical terms, of the ways in which national society is
dismantled.”8 In other words, Latin American cultural criticism
must make “a major effort to relate the philosophical map of con-
cepts with the empirical map of research, and with the ideological
map of the ambitions of cultural studies as a public discipline.”9
Taking heed of Sarlo’s justified call to strengthen the public or-
ientation of cultural criticism in Latin America, in this chapter I
nevertheless problematize the sense of injury that she invokes while
blaming “avant-garde theory” for the marginalization of Latin
American intellectuals. I do so in the course of showing how a de-
constructive approach to nations and nationalism can contribute to
a critical engagement with the Mexican defense of maize, so as to
rethink the task of cultural criticism in relation to technoscientific
debates. The fact that in Mexico a broad coalition of urban and rural
grassroots activists are struggling, with very good arguments,
against a specific violence of globalization (namely, the corporate
enclosure of agriculture) does not imply that critical intellectuals
must automatically accept or adopt a nationalist rhetoric, a national
focus or an empirical research agenda. Nor does it imply that a
theoretical interrogation of nationalism and empiricism is somehow
irresponsibly “divorced” from Latin American reality. Conversely,
the complaint about theory, about its low yield of empirical descrip-
tions and realistic solutions, as well as the suspicion around its eth-
ics and commitments, is arguably itself a symptom of the Left’s
political disorientation in a neoliberal world. Perhaps the marginal-




ity of Latin American intellectuals has something to do with this
too.
In what follows I sketch a story about the cultural systems out of
which Mexican nationalism continues to contingently emerge as a
transitional narrative. Such a narrative is seen here as “transitional”
precisely in the sense that it is thoroughly embedded in material
circumstances and power arrangements. And, for that same reason,
it is always susceptible to a deconstruction on the part of critical
intellectuals, whether or not they identify themselves as poststruc-
turalists or practitioners of cultural studies. As evidence of this pos-
sibility, I present a reading of one of those essays on the national
being that were more common in Latin American criticism before
the globalization of so-called avant-garde theory. My reading of
historian Edmundo O’Gorman’s “México: el trauma de su historia”
(1977) is preceded and framed by more contemporary anthropologi-
cal theorizations of Mexican nationalism, and it is expanded
through a post-Marxist theorization of nationalism. From this per-
spective, Mexican nationalism cannot be reduced to an antiquated
ideology or used innocently as an empirically justified political po-
sition, since it springs—again, contingently—from the deeper dy-
namics of subject formation at the individual and the collective lev-
els. I end by reflecting on what a theoretical focus on political sub-
jectivity informed by psychoanalysis as well as deconstruction may
bring to an analysis of the Mexican defense of maize and to the
public orientation or the “desire to intervene” that contemporary
transnational cultural studies shares indeed with Latin American
cultural criticism.
WHAT IS A NATION?
In a lecture from 1882, French historian Ernest Renan warned
against the dangers of an intellectual mistake: confusing nations
with either “ethnographic” or linguistic groups. France, England,
and Italy came to be individual historical units not because their
respective citizens could be classified as a homogeneous “race” or
spoke the same language. Rather, all nations owe their existence to
multiple factors external to the human groups now described as
their members. In Europe, such factors included the conquest of
parts of the Roman Empire by Germanic tribes, the introduction of
dynasties and military aristocracies, their adoption of the Latin lan-





ulations. To subordinate politics to ethnographic analysis is there-
fore “to surrender it to a chimera.”10 By asking what a nation is,
however, Renan was not trying to correct the so-called ethnograph-
ic confusion between nations and races through a historical per-
spective on national formations. Instead, he was concerned with
defining the nation as a “spiritual principle,” and thus he moved
from a historical argument to one about the desirability of ground-
ing the nation in a liberal conception of politics: “A nation is a soul,
a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, consti-
tute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the
present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memo-
ries; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the
will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in
an undivided form.”11
Renan’s critique of racial and linguistic definitions of nationhood
turned out to be less about their historical inadequacy than about
the will to uphold certain principles, a heritage received in allegedly
undivided form. The text of his lecture invokes the age of Enlighten-
ment, when Man returned, “after centuries of abasement,” to “a
sense of respect for himself.”12 Radical humanism was enacted by
the French Revolution, which affirmed popular sovereignty as just
and legitimate above the divine right of kings. For Renan, this was
not just another story of violent conquest, new dynasties and mix-
ing of populations. This was a historical breakthrough that elevated
nationality above history itself: “Forgetting, I would even go so far
as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a na-
tion, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a
danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry
brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all
political formations, even of those whose consequences have been
altogether beneficial.”13
Since the existence of nations was for Renan a good and even
necessary thing, forgetfulness and historical error appear as benefi-
cial rather than dangerous. After all, nations were “the guarantee of
liberty, which would be lost if the world had only one law and only
one master.”14 Renan’s pragmatic warning as to why it was good
for everyone to know how to forget resonates powerfully today,
after Sigmund Freud, two world wars and a whole Age of Ex-
tremes:
Be on your guard, for this ethnographic politics is in no way a
stable thing and, if today you use it against others, tomorrow you
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may see it turned against yourselves. Can you be sure that the
Germans, who have raised the banner of ethnography so high,
will not see the Slavs in their turn analyse the names of villages
in Saxony and Lusatia, search for any traces of the Wiltzes or of
the Obotrites, and demand recompense for the massacres and the
wholesale enslavements that the Ottoss inflicted upon their an-
cestors? It is good for everyone to know how to forget.15
The precarious foundations of liberal forgetfulness were ex-
posed not just by Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx and Sigmund
Freud but also, and more decisively, by a century of cultural revolu-
tion that culminated in “the ubiquity of capitalist social relations
across the globe and the penetration of capital into nearly every
crevice of every culture.”16 Thus, on the one hand, Renan’s spiritual
principle has come to be seen less as a wise, pacifist choice made by
abstract individuals than as the privilege of some groups at the
expense of others. No longer simply regarded as “Man” and more
often regarded as “white capitalist patriarchy,” the liberal subject
has come to be constantly reminded of its own ethnographic and
linguistic particularities. On the other hand, the capitalist integra-
tion of the world has put into question the liberal faith in social and
political progress. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberalism
became altogether unable to deliver its promises of economic and
“spiritual” progress and sovereignty. Such liberal tenets seem tech-
nically impossible in a time when neither states nor individuals
control their own affairs and when legal codes systematically fail to
revert social inequalities. Political philosopher Wendy Brown has
raised the question that confronts all progressive social movements
in such a global conjuncture: “Can the rights rooted in the presup-
position of sovereign entities—ranging from subjectivity to state-
hood—remain intact? . . . What independent, emancipatory force
can they continue to claim?”17 In her view, the liberal narratives of
sovereignty, progress and rights-based freedom have continued to
live among us in the form of “broken narratives.”18 That is, most
citizens of the Western world continue to live as if those narratives
were true, while painfully recognizing, day after day, that they are
not. For the most part, Brown observes, the political Left has been
unable to respond effectively to this predicament. At least Brown
qualifies the American Left’s reaction as moralistic and melancholic,
and I would risk extending this diagnosis to the Latin American
Left in so far as it insists on reclaiming the eroded space of the
nation against a supposedly traitorous theoretical practice. Accord-





the Left’s own attachment to liberal narratives. Yet the failure to
critique liberalism in a rigorous and consequential way also inhibits
the clearing of new horizons for radical politics.
Rather than advocating pragmatic forgetfulness or a disavowal
of history, a postliberal framework requires us to recognize and
even affirm politics as a domain of power and history. It starts from
a recognition that the realm of politics “cannot be ordered by will
and intention, but is a complex domain of unintended consequences
that follow the unpredictable collisions of human, historical, and
natural forces.”19 Crucially, a postliberal approach to contemporary
Mexican nationalism would involve more than the search for and
presentation of empirical data. It would involve an interpretive ef-
fort and a critical interrogation of how certain ideas, such as the
nation, come to appear as given facts, as “spiritual principles,” in
particular contexts and with what consequences. What kind of po-
litical subjectivity emerges then in response to the colonial legacies
out of which the Mexican nation emerges as a transitional narra-
tive?
NATIONALISM AND THE
POLITICS OF COMMUNITY PRODUCTION
As Renan was well aware, the nation is historically indissociable
from the formation of a state—that is, from processes of expansion,
conquest or decolonization that always involve subjecting a diver-
sity of peoples to a single space in a process that is anything but
harmonious or stable.20 Claudio Lomnitz has delved into the histor-
ical specificities of the national space in Spanish America so as to
critique a popular theory of nationalism that fails, in his view, to
clarify the politics of community production.21 According to Bene-
dict Anderson, the nation was first “imagined” by readers of news-
papers and novels and then actualized through individual self-sac-
rifice in wars between nation-states.22 Much like Renan’s “spiritual
principle,” the nation was imagined as an abstract community de-
fined by horizontal relations of comradery. In Lomnitz’s view, how-
ever, Anderson’s theory forgets both the politics and the historical
specificity of national becomings. In particular, Anderson’s “ima-
gined community” is useless to understand the historical uses of the
term nación in Spanish America, the hierarchical relationships in
which such a term evolved, and the complex mix of coercion and
extranationalistic feeling that contributed to its appearance as per-




sonal sacrifice.23 In a nutshell, national consciousness in Spanish
America did not emerge from “print capitalism” but rather, accord-
ing to Lomnitz, from the religious narratives of Spanish expansion-
ism. Like the Catholic Reconquista (the expulsion of Arab kingdoms
that ruled the Iberian Peninsula for eight centuries), the expansion
of the Spanish Crown into Africa and America was narrated
through the broader teleology of Christendom.
In the Spanish American colonies, the term nación was used to
distinguish the Spaniards from other social categories, signifying
blood or caste as well as religion. Such assets gave Spaniards legal
access to particular forms of sovereignty, above all tutelage over
Indians, blacks, mulattos, and mestizos. Besides “enjoying their
tribute,” the Spaniards were to teach non-Spaniards the Christian
religion and the Spanish language, which was not merely a conven-
ient and profane vernacular but a language closer to God.24 Spanish
blood incorporated Creoles into the nation; yet their birthplace in
the New World excluded them from higher political office, which
was a privilege of peninsulares, or metropolitan Spaniards. The
mythical starting point of Mexican nationalism was therefore not
some feeling of abstract brotherhood but rather a localized family
conflict over access to particular forms of sovereignty.
Like Spain, and unlike England or France, the early Mexican
nation lacked a national bourgeoisie. Instead, it had regional elites
for whom the nation as a unified, sovereign territory was never a
given fact. The mutual allegiance of such elites was, and for a time
continued to be, above of all a religious one. Hence Miguel Hidalgo
and José María Morelos, the two priests who led the popular insur-
rection today remembered as a demand for national independence,
in fact claimed to be fighting for the sake of religion. They accused
Spain of betraying its Christian mission and of using religion as a
pretext for the enslavement and exploitation of New Spain’s poor.
After Morelos and Hidalgo were executed, a loyalist army officer,
Agustín de Iturbide, achieved independence with the support of the
Creole elites, and he made sure that the Spaniards were guaranteed
full inclusion in the new republic. In the end, Mexico’s political
independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century was ulti-
mately due less to Creole nationalism than to the global decline of
the Spanish Empire.
Under the influence of the new British-American global hegemo-
ny, Masonry played a decisive role in shaping the discourse and
institutions of the new Mexican republic. As Lomnitz recounts, the
Scottish Rite, influenced by Great Britain, and the York Rite, influ-
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enced by the United States, functioned as “political parties” in the
early days of Mexican politics.25 Most of Mexico’s regional elites
belonged to the Scottish Rite, which explains the fact that Britain
was the first imperial power to recognize Mexico as an independent
nation. Popular radicals came to be associated with the York Rite,
which instigated anti-Spanish sentiment and supported a move-
ment to expel the Spaniards from Mexico. Liberal ideologues such
as Carlos María Bustamante blamed Spanish colonialism for Mexi-
can “backwardness” and associated “progress” with concepts such
as national sovereignty and freedom. Eventually, Mexican national-
ism converged around three liberal principles: defense against
foreigners, defense of open political parties instead of secret soci-
eties, and economic inclusion of popular sectors through the aboli-
tion of religious tribute, land redistribution and technological mod-
ernization. Yet, even as Mexican nationalism took a more liberal
shape, it did not “ideologically form a single fraternal community,
because it systematically distinguished full citizens from part citi-
zens or strong citizens from weak ones.”26
The liberal identification between nationality and modernization
was steadily fortified toward the end of the nineteenth century, and
more so in the aftermath of the 1910–1921 Mexican Revolution,
when the state actively intervened to produce a secular modern
citizenry out of Mexico’s mostly rural population. This was to be
achieved through education and economic redistribution, through
“land and books” that would transform, according to revolutionary
president Lázaro Cárdenas, “Indians” into “Mexicans.”27 Several
Mexican intellectuals of the nineteenth century had held the idea
that social homogeneity was necessary to achieve a viable nation;
they believed that a nation was made of social homogeneity, not
shared values, feelings and interests. Yet in the nineteenth-century,
citizenship was about abstract law, whereas in the twentieth centu-
ry, the state came to have new aims and turned into an instrument
of vigilance over the ethnic and social composition of the nation.28
Once again the Spanish were the most desirable foreigners, along-
side those labeled as indolatinos, or nationals from Latin American
countries identifiable as either indigenous or Spanish. Other
groups, such as Jews, Arabs, eastern Europeans and Asians, absent
in the nineteenth century, were now regarded as a particular kind of
threat, either as competitors of the Mexican working classes or as
“polluters” of a national body that desired to be homogeneously
mestizo.29 Thus, in both the colonial and the modern settings, inter-
pretations of nationhood in Mexico depended less on the subjective
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imagination of individual readers and more on the mobilization of
specific ideas, such as the desirability of social and even racial ho-
mogeneity, within hierarchical networks of power relations. In this
vein, Lomnitz concludes, “As such, the power of nationalism lies
not so much in its hold on the souls of individuals (though this is
not insignificant) as in the fact that it provides interactive frames in
which the relationship between state institutions and various and
diverse social relationships (family relationships, the organization
of work, the definition of forms of property, and the regulation of
public space) can be negotiated.”30
While Lomnitz emphasizes negotiation and consensus through
tactical deployments of nationalism, this does not prevent him from
stressing that demonstrations of force and coercion often accompa-
ny nationalism. Nor does he underestimate the way in which na-
tionalism takes hold of the souls of individuals. In fact, rather than
as an abstract thesis about the power of nationalism in general, I
find Lomnitz’s discussion of Spanish American nationalism most
valuable for his emphasis on the dynamism of power relations
within the historical trajectory of a particular set of cultural narra-
tives that resist explanation by perhaps the most popular theory of
nationalism in English-speaking cultural studies. Up to a certain
point and in a certain sense, Lomnitz’s work already undertakes the
effort that Sarlo demands from Latin American critics: that of relat-
ing “the philosophical map of concepts with the empirical map of
research.” Up to a certain point and only in a certain sense because
Lomnitz’s work is itself a theoretical pursuit rather than a mere
corrective to theory, and one of its consequences is a denaturaliza-
tion and de-idealization of that national space, which, under the
pressure of current circumstances, we may feel tempted to miss. He
writes, “Nationality is neither an accomplished fact nor an estab-
lished essence; it is, rather, the moving horizon that actors point to
when they need to appeal to the connections between people and
the polity, when they discuss rights and obligations, or try to justify
or reject modernization and social change. National filiation is
therefore used in order to hammer out a consensual, or hegemonic,
arrangement; it involves cajoling and purchasing, exhibits of
strength and coercion. Depth and silence are the Siamese twins of
national state formation.”31
Basic yet complex questions emerge from Lomnitz’s theory for
the Mexican defense of maize: What kind of national invocation
may help whom exactly to negotiate with which state institutions so
as to hammer out a particular scheme of protection for Mexican
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maize agriculture? How can a nationalist rhetoric be deployed by a
plurality of unequal actors so as to gain how much purchasing pow-
er at a time when the liberal tenets of sovereignty, progress and
freedom seem irreversibly eroded? Which maize represents whose
nation through what particular combination of cultural narratives
and under what constraints involving force and coercion? I take
these questions up in chapters 3 and 4; chapter 5 further elaborates
the question I want to examine now, that of relating the philosophi-
cal map of concepts “with the ideological map of the ambitions of
cultural studies as a public discipline.”32
Whereas in Claudio Lomnitz’s theory nationalism is a political
exercise rather than a feeling of abstract horizontal brotherhood, in
Homi Bhabha’s deconstructive perspective, such a political exercise
is conducted through textual strategies, metaphorical displace-
ments, subtexts and figurative stratagems, although this is not the
same as saying that nationalism is merely a matter of language and
rhetoric, as if the latter could exist in isolation of material condi-
tions. Such a textual understanding of the nation eschews a tradi-
tional dichotomy between language and materiality that underlies
the tendency to read the nation in restrictive ways, as either “the
ideological apparatus of state power” or “the incipient or emergent
expression of the ‘national-popular’ sentiment preserved in a radi-
cal memory.”33 While both of these readings may reveal important
aspects of the nation and even assign different meanings and direc-
tions to its history, they run the risk of fixing, or totalizing, a sign
that is “always multi-accentual and Janus-faced.”34 For Bhabha, the
nation is a text in a materialist sense—that is, in the sense that it
lives in the ambivalence between narratives speaking of a national
“origin” and a social temporality that upsets the totalization, or
fixation, of such histories.35 An approach like this offers not a total
explanation of nations or nationalisms but rather an exposure of
their temporality, their constitutive disruptions, in so far as they
behave as texts, or signifying “systems.” After explaining what this
means from a political perspective, I go on to argue that a truly
radical deconstructive approach is not simply directed at other peo-
ple’s nationalisms “out there,” as an empirical description would
be, but rather operates within and upon the critical effort itself,
attempting to disrupt its own tendency toward totalization.




THE NATION AS SUBJECT, OR THE
ONTOLOGICAL LEGACY OF COLONIALISM
In his essay about the “trauma” of Mexican history, Edmundo
O’Gorman gives an account of Mexican nationalism that does not
involve a detailed discussion of empirical facts and offers instead a
provocative interpretation of Mexico’s becoming as an identity pro-
cess.36 Whereas Lomnitz describes the predicament of the Creole
nationalists in terms of their having to negotiate access to limited
forms of sovereignty, O’Gorman figures the Creole as a split soul,
one fiercely loyal to his Catholic roots yet in need of self-affirmation
against metropolitan Spaniards. Through a deliberately polemical
use of psychological language, O’Gorman offers a provocative cri-
tique of Mexican nationalism as based on a disavowed attachment
to the “ontological legacy of the colony.” The framework of this
critique is what O’Gorman calls “the great American dichotomy,” a
fundamental difference between two European civilizatory projects,
those of England and Spain. Whereas the former was orientated
toward the exploitation and instrumentalization of nature for the
creation of material wealth, the latter aimed to establish ecumenical
unity in accordance with the eternal truths of Catholicism. With
Spain directing its imperial power at the enforcement of Catholi-
cism and with England religiously pursuing material wealth,
O’Gorman’s contrast resonates clearly with a now stereotypical dis-
tinction between a future-oriented, technophilic, individualist, ra-
tionalist, disciplined “America” and a “Latin” America that is sys-
tematically described in exactly the opposite terms. For O’Gorman,
the two projects are indeed irreconcilable, and their simultaneous
affirmation on the part of early Mexican nationalists would consti-
tute an ontological predicament.
According to O’Gorman, the Creole soul managed to achieve
“ontological equilibrium” through a recognizably Hispanic sort of
patriotism. Creole resentment against political exclusion was gradu-
ally transformed into a glorification of the fatherland, which ex-
pressed itself through exaggerated tropes borrowed from Iberian
culture: the beauty and abnegation of woman, the sexual potency of
man, his bold courage in the face of danger and effrontery, and the
aesthetic exaltation of nature and land.37 Moreover, there was a
close kinship between Creole heroes and Catholic saints, between
Creole political speeches and the sermons of colonial preachers,38
which meant that Mexican nationalism fully integrated the religious





Once “freed” from its colonial status, however, the Mexican na-
tion had to compare itself with “the other America,” against whose
influence it had been carefully protected during the colonial times.
In the Catholic culture of the colonial setting, modernity had meant
sin, an evil deviation from the true faith and from authentic civiliza-
tion. Cultural isolation, argues O’Gorman, had prevented the colo-
nial soul from ever understanding and assimilating the “utopian”
meaning of modernity. Thus, independence from Spain was actual-
ly experienced as a traumatic exposure to the reality of the other
America: “There it was in all its threatening reality as a gigantic and
inescapable factum which, for better or worse, had to be counted on,
and in relation to which it was necessary to affirm one’s own be-
ing.”39
Initially an object of fascination, the United States became the
lasting point of reference for political disputes within Mexico, with
liberals enthusiastically promoting imitation of North American in-
stitutions and conservatives defending the social and cultural
norms inherited from colonial times. O’Gorman regards such dis-
putes as the “axis-event of national becoming,” and his philosophi-
cal—we may even say deconstructive—dissection of them reaches
the perplexing conclusion that both sides ultimately wanted the
same thing. Both wanted to enjoy modern wealth and prosperity
without ever having to renounce their Hispanic roots.
Whereas conservatives defended Iberian heritage quite simply
because, as Catholic providentialism essentially taught, it was the
only true and authentic way of being, liberals regarded such heri-
tage as perfectly compatible with the Anglo-American project of
economic modernization. They criticized the social hierarchies of
the colonial setting, “the long inventory of injuries contained in the
proclamations of the national heroes of Independence,”40 which
they hoped to redress by asserting the modern principle of natural
equality. It was a fatal mistake of the liberal nationalists, O’Gorman
argues, to assume that equality would result from the mere adop-
tion of modern codes, without anyone having to renounce to his or
her Hispanic heritage, which included precisely a hierarchical or-
ganization of society. The nineteenth century should have been “a
moment of awakening,” O’Gorman says, of realizing that in order
to enjoy the economic and political benefits of modernity, it was
necessary for Mexicans to adopt “the system of beliefs, ideas and
values” of modernity.41 Since the conservatives and the liberals hat-
ed each other much more than they actually disagreed, the question
of national identity in Mexico became fixated on a point of incom-
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patibility between the past and the future. This paralyzing “clash of
two prides” defined the paradox of Mexican becoming as “Let’s be
like the Yankees, but let’s not be them.”42 Such a contradiction,
O’Gorman suggests, has forced Mexicans ever since to arbitrate “be-
tween peculiar and distorted modules of the institutions they only
half-adopted, motivated by the mirage of universal natural equal-
ity.”43 Having diagnosed the problem in these terms, O’Gorman
then examines Mexican liberals’ response to their own failure to
bring about modernity.
O’Gorman’s examination unfolds like the story of a sentimental
affair in which the liberal nationalist refuses to accept the reality of
unrequited love. Rather than admitting their own madness, the lib-
erals quickly blame their Anglo-American neighbor, and so the be-
nevolent and humanitarian Dr. Jekyll of not so long ago suddenly
appears to them as a monstrous Mr. Hyde, who has betrayed his
high mission to redeem all the oppressed peoples of the earth. In
O’Gorman’s view, conspiratorial thinking among Mexican national-
ists resulted from their failure to understand what social progress
was really about—namely, a profound transformation of social and
political values. Through their conspiratorial thinking, the liberal
nationalists refused to acknowledge that there were no grounds for
expecting that social justice, sovereignty and freedom would ensue
automatically from the adoption of a political code similar to that of
the United States. O’Gorman’s diagnosis of the Mexican liberals is
very similar, by the way, to Wendy Brown’s diagnosis of the
American Left, which exhibits moralism as a “compensatory [ges-
ture] in the face of felt impotence.”44 Moralistic condemnation of
the state for not funding politically radical art or not prioritizing the
lives of gay men, prostitutes and drug addicts “implicitly figures
the state (and other mainstream institutions) as if it did not have
specific political and economic investments . . . but was, rather, a
momentarily misguided parent who forgot her promise to treat all
her children in the same way.”45 In Brown’s view, such a naive
figuration of the state not only amounts to “a troubled and confused
political stance” but also rejects politics as a domain of power and
history. Similarly, O’Gorman’s point in criticizing Mexican liberals
here is not to downplay North American exploitative intervention-
ism in Latin America but rather to point out that whoever finds
him- or herself repeatedly surprised at such a fact is merely forget-
ting that, historically, ethical considerations have never guided the




In O’Gorman’s opinion, the three decades of Porfirio Díaz’s rule
of Mexico (1876–1911) provided a great opportunity to overcome,
once and for all, the “ontological legacy of the colony.” A liberal
soldier of humble origins, Díaz had the political talent to break for
the first time the vicious cycle of disputes between liberals and con-
servatives. His thirty-year government resulted in the most stable
and economically progressive period in the history of prerevolu-
tionary Mexico. The only problem was that Díaz was a ruthless
dictator, and so O’Gorman admits that the Mexican Revolution had
to come about. It would have been better had the revolution been
faithful to its own “historical necessity”: correcting the authoritar-
ianism of the modernizing regime by introducing the “utopian”
dimension of modernity. Instead, revolutionary elites set out to de-
stroy the existing liberal institutions and installed a new, even more
perverse version of the “ontological legacy of the colony.”
O’Gorman positions his polemical use of psychological language
against “many contemporary historians who feel disdain for any
explanation that does not subject itself to what they call ‘socio-eco-
nomic factors,’ especially if such an explanation refers instead to
‘the sphere of feelings and the personal singularities of men.’”46
Overlooking the role of emotions, he suggests, makes it impossible
to understand what Mexican liberals actually did when progress
failed to arrive. No socioeconomic factor can explain the renewal of
nationalist self-glorification in the face of social, economic and polit-
ical disaster. After failing to achieve the wealth and freedom of the
Yankees, Mexican nationalists devoted themselves to reasserting
(“as a truth nothing less than apodictic”) the spiritual superiority of
Ibero-American cultures. Mexico’s initial infatuation with North
America had been just a necessary “stage” in the spiritual unfolding
of Ibero-American cultures. It had been necessary so that these cul-
tures finally realized that trying to be like anyone else was a mis-
take. Mexicans already had their own original identity, based on a
unique mixture of indigenous and Spanish blood. This mestizaje
awarded them with a unique historical mission—namely, that of
counterbalancing the “pragmatic spirit” of Anglo-America. Thus
O’Gorman recounts how “from the wretched condition of a beggar
who sought to save himself by taking refuge in the generosity of a
wealthy neighbor, Ibero-America suddenly discovers that its desti-
ny is to occupy the exalted throne reserved to the redeemer of histo-
ry. What else could it do, if the domination of the natural world, so
forcefully achieved by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, inherently lacked




the spirit of a universal justice, a spirit that could only be provided
by the consubstantial idealism of Ibero-American peoples?”47
For O’Gorman, of course, such ideas were nothing but the most
pathetic delusion and a rather poor response to the repeated failure
to bring about social change. Most importantly, they merely rein-
forced the ontological legacy of Spanish colonialism. Almost six
decades into the eighty-year rule of the so-called Party of the Insti-
tutionalized Revolution (PRI), O’Gorman lamented,
With the reiteration ad nauseam of the inextinguishability of the
revolutionary movement as such, the latter is transfigured into a
metaphysical entity . . . which identifies itself, not only with the
interests of the nation, but with the nation itself. The [Institution-
alized] Revolution [now claims] besides infallibility in its leader-
ship of the nation, immortality. . . . A history without adventure,
frozen and condemned to entrapment in the circle of its own
becoming, without more destiny than that of airing a bit its con-
stitutive conflict, without hope of overcoming it. Such is the
crossroads of Eris, the crossroads of discord which Mexican his-
torical becoming got itself into and which—since its origins—had
absolutely no raison d’être.48
O’Gorman’s passionate rhetoric aimed at challenging the eco-
nomicist approaches dominant in Mexico in the 1970s, a time when
Mexican society was beginning to realize the high costs of authori-
tarianism and thus to question the authority of the “institutional-
ized revolution.” It may seem that O’Gorman did not interrogate
modernity as such, its desirability, its identification with universal
freedom, progress, sovereignty and so on. Although he did not ex-
plicitly speak from the vantage point of the new social movements,
his argument was subtle and consistent with his historical mind-set.
First, rather than embracing “modernity” as a whole, O’Gorman
highlighted the “utopian” project of modernity, which is a demo-
cratic practice and not merely, as the liberals thought, a legalistic
means to wealth and prosperity. Second, rather than embracing
modernity as a universal model, O’Gorman insisted on the cultural
specificity of its two aspects—namely, an exploitative economic
drive and a “utopian” set of values; he regarded the latter as incom-
patible with the social hierarchies and the authoritarianism inherit-
ed from Spanish colonialism. Third, rather than advising all Mexi-
cans to stop moaning and suddenly “become Yankees,” O’Gorman
called for Mexican nationalists (among whom he actually found





selves from a cultural essentialism that so far had done nothing for
Mexico but trap them inside “the ontological legacy of the colony.”
Is it possible for Mexican nationalists to emancipate themselves
from this legacy? If so, what would it take? O’Gorman suggests that
finding a way out of the suffocating legacy, of the repetitions ad
nauseam of colonial essentialism in Mexican nationalist discourse,
requires an acknowledgment of disavowed attachments and a rec-
ognition of the historical contingency of both the colonial legacy
and the attachments, which sounds like nothing less than a psycho-
analytic investigation of nationalism as a subjective experience. We
may say that, in the face of social and economic disaster, faced by
the liberals in the nineteenth century and by Mexicans today, in
order to use nationalism effectively as an emancipatory tool, it is
first necessary to achieve a certain “freedom” or critical distance
from it. Since globalization set in, the political philosophy of post-
Marxism has taken up this possibility. Post-Marxism retains the
Marxist recognition of the social transformations entailed by capi-
talism and the commitment to “an alternative project that is based on
the ground created by those transformations, not on opposition to
them.”49 The “post” of post-Marxism, however, indicates a critique
of the essentialist Marxist axiom that capitalism is a system gov-
erned by an internal logic50 and that any transformation can only
result from the predetermined development of such an internal log-
ic.51 Thus, rather than analyzing contradictions within a system,
post-Marxism looks for the political in “the marks that contingency
has inscribed on the apparently objective structures of the societies
we live in.”52 In this sense, for Ernesto Laclau, we will only be able
to undertake a “realistic analysis of socio-political processes” when
we abandon “the objectivist prejudice that social forces are some-
thing” and undertake instead “an examination of what they do not
manage to be.”53 As it turns out, essentialism is not merely a His-
panic phenomenon but actually pertains to the core of Western
thought in general, including the modern emancipatory narratives
that O’Gorman seems to attribute, perhaps too quickly and vaguely,
to the utopian project of Anglo modernity.
POST-MARXISM AND THE
ONTOLOGICAL LEGACY OF MODERNITY
Informed by deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis, post-
Marxism understands the social as a signifying system penetrated
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by lack or dislocation. Structural lack or dislocation amounts to an
ontological proposition—namely, “that the real—including physical
space—is in the ultimate instance temporal.”54 Yet the temporality
of being is not a neutral fact. Rather, it constitutes a threat, in re-
sponse to which the subject emerges through acts of spatialization.
Representation itself is an attempt to spatialize, or fixate, temporal-
ity rather than a description of objective reality. Even the objectivity
of seemingly objective language—think, for instance, of expert sci-
ence or even of “new materialisms”—is a precarious construction
relying on rhetorical, textual, poetic, and otherwise literary tech-
niques. The key idea is that these techniques can never fully succeed
because dislocation itself is “spatially unrepresentable,”55 so there is
“an element of radical undecidability [in] the structure of any objec-
tivity.”56
The political meaning of structural dislocation only became evi-
dent in the aftermath of twentieth-century totalitarianisms. Classi-
cal antiquity had reached its limits in a cyclical reduction of time to
space, whereas medieval thought domesticated time by turning it
into a single, final struggle with the forces of evil. Modern rational-
ism recycled this Christian eschatology by turning it into a rational,
teleological process—that is, into “history.”57 Liberalism and Marx-
ism attempted to take the place of Christianity by claiming to bridge
the gap between particular representations and universal knowl-
edge (“true” or “free society”). By partly secularizing the medieval
model, they made the thinking of democracy possible. That is, they
made possible the recognition of an ontological paradox that all
societies have in common, according to which “the condition of
possibility of a signifying system—its limits—is also what consti-
tutes its condition of impossibility.”58 Laclau embraces the legacy
modern emancipatory narratives in so far as they opened the pos-
sibility of thinking the nature of dislocation “as pure event or tem-
porality.”59 He departs from them in so far as they assume that “a
free society is one from which power has been totally eliminated.”60
This is not possible, the post-Marxists say, because power, like an-
tagonism, is constitutive of social life.
Antagonism, the post-Marxist term for dislocation or temporal-
ity, involves a loss of meaning that cannot be symbolized and is not
captured by any rational framework.61 Against Marxism, for exam-
ple, Laclau argues, “There is nothing in the category of ‘seller of
labour power’ to suggest [that] resistance [to exploitation] is a logical
conclusion.”62 In order for antagonism to arise between the prole-
tariat and the capitalist class, capitalism must threaten something
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outside the relations of production: it must threaten social life as a
whole, wherein the worker’s identity goes beyond work. Thus, fall-
ing wages or labor market fluctuations will threaten the worker’s
identity as a consumer, as a parent, or as a critical theorist, giving
rise to antagonism. But more deeply, antagonism arises as a radical
threat that must be managed or domesticated through representa-
tion. In post-Marxism, the work of representation coincides with the
work of both subjectivity and politics. Like the subject, politics con-
stitutes a precarious response to the lack of an objective identity. It
is an attempt “to suture that dislocated space through the constitu-
tion of a new space of representation.”63
Among other topics, maize was chosen as a subject for the 2003
exhibition at the National Museum of Popular Cultures for its ca-
pacity to meet the national challenge of “satisfying all.” According
to Laclau, “Any frustration or unsatisfied demand will be compen-
sated for or offset by the myth of an achieved fullness.”64 National-
ism seeks to provide such a myth, which has a literal dimension and
a metaphorical one. The literal content consists of concrete empiri-
cal demands that nevertheless represent something different from
themselves, and such is the metaphorical dimension of the myth;
“literality is, in actual fact, the first of all metaphors.”65 In other
words, at a deeper level concrete demands represent “the very prin-
ciple of a fully achieved literality” or “a fullness that cannot be
granted by the reality of the present.”66 Mexican nationalism, for
instance, would emerge in response to the threat of biotechnological
disruption as an attempt to “constitute a certain spatial model—an
ideal model in this sense: the mythical space of a possible social
order.”67 The literal content of this mythical space would be con-
crete demands such as applying the precautionary principle and
banning, on that basis, transgenic seeds throughout the country. On
its own, however, this argument would limit the expansion of na-
tionalism’s mythical space, its capacity to compensate for more and
deeper frustrations or unsatisfied demands, whereas by invoking
maize as fundamental for national identity, nationalism would be
able to articulate more demands, from state support to small-scale
agriculture, to a protected market for organic products and self-
government rights for indigenous peoples. As Laclau explains, the
mythical order invoked by the first demand “only needs other dis-
locations and demands to be added to the fullness that the mythical
space must represent for the metaphorical moment to become
autonomous from the literality of the original dislocation, and for
the mythical space to be transformed into an imaginary horizon.”68




When successful, myth (i.e., subjectivity and politics) becomes a
“social imaginary,” a situation in which metaphor dominates over
literal content, manages to structure “a field of intelligibility” and
becomes the “condition of possibility for the emergence of any ob-
ject.”69 Whether maize will be able to achieve the necessary mytho-
logical strength to redefine social life in Mexico remains an open
question. Even in this scenario, which is ideal from the point of
view of political strategy, the new mythical space would remain
precarious and paradoxical in its attempt to “suture” lack. In post-
Marxism, lack cannot be eliminated because it is nothing less than
the condition of possibility of the national text itself.
Within a rationalist framework, any lasting political victory
against any particular injustice will tend to assume “the form of a
mere objective presence” by concealing its own contingency, which
is to say the traces of the exclusion on which it is based.70 Against
all rationalistic frameworks, Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue,
“The constitution of a social identity is an act of power and that
identity as such is power.”71 Therefore, eliminating the hierarchies
on which particular exclusions are based will “always require the
construction of other exclusions for collective identities to be able to
emerge.”72 In other words, there is no rational solution, in post-
Marxism, to the paradox generated by the temporality of being. We
can negotiate but never supersede the paradox; “we can play with
both sides of the ambiguity and produce results by preventing any
of them from prevailing in an exclusive way, but the ambiguity as
such cannot be properly resolved.”73
In The Democratic Paradox, Mouffe describes liberal democracy as
a system of logical incompatibilities that can be played against each
other in a strategic way. She begins by pointing out that there is no
logical relation between liberal individualism and popular democ-
racy. Liberal-democratic traditions such as the separation between
church and state, between the public and the private, and the rule of
law were themselves unstable outcomes of a political struggle be-
tween liberals, who demanded freedom, and democrats, who de-
manded equality. As Carl Schmitt argued, democracy necessarily
presupposes a dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, because demo-
cratic rights can only be exercised within particular human groups.
Therefore, democracy is logically incompatible with the liberal em-
phasis on universal rights and freedoms. Unlike Schmitt, Mouffe
believes that democracy and liberty can coexist, even if in necessari-
ly imperfect ways. Instead of seeing them in terms of ontological




liberalism and democracy in terms of mutual contamination. As
their incompatible principles are played against each other within
specific circumstances, in every case there will always be an alterna-
tive to the existing configuration of power, unless “the status quo
has become naturalized.”74
What are the implications of recognizing this impossibility of the
nation for contemporary emancipatory struggles that resort to
nationalistic language in response to capitalist agents such as bio-
technology? Post-Marxism once again suggests vis-à-vis the Mexi-
can struggle for maize that not even a wholehearted investment in
the “utopian” project of modernity (in “a truly democratic nation”)
could have spared, or ever could spare, Mexican nationalists from
endless conflicts and paradoxes. It also suggests that these are not
an obstacle for democracy but rather part and parcel of it, in so far
as they keep open the possibility of challenging hegemonic voices
or narratives. The point of post-Marxism is not to celebrate conflicts
or exclusions but rather to strengthen society’s capacity for “agonis-
tic pluralism,” which is premised on the acknowledgment of radical
contingency as the fundamental source and inescapable limit of so-
ciety. Such a pluralism is not an ahistorical ideal but rather has a
specific genealogy or, as some would prefer to say, a “cultural”
specificity that, as O’Gorman insisted, must be affirmed and em-
braced in practice, so as to partake of the benefits of the “utopian”
side of modernity. In more contemporary language, Mouffe puts it
thus: “What is specific and valuable about modern liberal democra-
cy is that, when properly understood, it creates a space in which . . .
power relations are always being put into question and no victory
can be final.”75
In chapters 2 and 3, I attempt to identify some of the ways in
which radical contingency arises in the cultural politics of biotech-
nology in Mexico, preventing the “people of maize” from establish-
ing itself as an object of universal consensus. That is, I attempt to
highlight the moments in which radical disagreements around the
meaning of social life in Mexico take center stage and make evident
the paradoxical constitution of Mexicanness. By invoking post-
Marxism as a reference for this way of proceeding, however, I do
not want to reduce the Mexican debates on biotechnology to a mere
example for political theory. The work of Laclau and Mouffe allows
me to theorize political subjectivity in the Mexican biotechnology
debates in a nonessentialist way, but it does not provide ready-
made answers to the question of what might constitute an effective
intervention in the singular situation faced by the Mexican defend-
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ers of maize. Such a question seems to require a more radical orien-
tation than political theory seems to offer, so I turn now to the
proposition that a particular understanding and practice of cultural
studies may be it.
REGIONAL INTELLECTUALS
AND A RETREAT FROM THEORY
In Post-Marxism versus Cultural Studies, Paul Bowman differentiates
cultural studies from the post-Marxist “realistic analysis” of socio-
political processes recommended by Laclau in terms of how each
disciplinary domain responds to the desire to intervene. Even while
acknowledging the “metaphysical” character of the founding desire
of cultural studies (that is, the desire to intervene “fully”), Bowman
suggests, we can still pursue that desire in a critical way. He argues
that while cultural studies has interrogated its own institutional
place through a rigorous attention to the irreducible singularity of
cultural and political phenomena, post-Marxist political analysis
has used deconstructive formulae merely to confirm the institution-
al authority of political theory. In particular, he calls into question
the post-Marxist tendency to construe the complexity of singular
situations in terms of metadiscursive categories. If anything can be
diagnosed as temporal and thereby undecidable, “So what? Or rath-
er, and what? Then what?”76 Bowman suggests that cultural studies
is better equipped to answer such questions because, unlike post-
Marxism, it has deployed deconstruction as an antidisciplinary or-
ientation rather than as a mere instrument for the analysis of phe-
nomena “out there.” Drawing on John Mowitt’s genealogy of text as
an antidisciplinary object, Bowman argues that cultural studies can
intervene more effectively than post-Marxism to the extent that cul-
tural studies refuses to be “purely logical, formalising, and analyti-
cal.”77 For cultural studies, the task is not only to understand the
ontological mechanisms of the political but also to investigate and
make explicit “how this (each and every ‘this’ of academic intellec-
tual work) might already be ensnared within a complexly reticulat-
ed political context, and how it might thereby seek to make a differ-
ence to it, within it, and ‘beyond’ it.”78 As opposed to subsuming
objects or phenomena in the macropolitical framework of post-
Marxist “discourse analysis,” cultural studies can deploy decon-
struction so as to problematize the construction of knowledge about




and theoretical frames, and exploring the question of their ethico-
political implications.”79
Even though Bowman’s critique of post-Marxism is rather
strong, he actually advocates a more fruitful relation between the
two paradigms, or modes of thinking. He does not outline any gen-
eral recipes for achieving that goal (since this would be inconsistent
with his argument), but he does provide a useful starting point
when he asks, “Once the topic has been chosen, how does the aca-
demic work itself intervene?”80 I only began to address this ques-
tion at the beginning of this chapter by situating my own approach
to Mexican nationalism in the context of recent debates around the
status of the nation as a political category and around the ethical
and political responsibilities of academic or intellectual workers
dealing with Latin American problems. For Sarlo, the erosion of
modern identities entails some very specific challenges for Latin
American scholars. Her critique suggests a tension analogous to
that described by Paul Bowman between cultural studies and post-
Marxism, except for the fact that, in Sarlo’s discourse, both cultural
studies and post-Marxism appear as morally questionable from the
vantage point of a particular location. Fortunately, and even though
its advocacy remains quite minoritarian in Latin American univer-
sities, the legacy of deconstructive theory has not disappeared en-
tirely from Latin American thinking.
Deconstruction continues to stand as a minoritarian position in
Latin American intellectual debates. Philosopher Alberto Moreiras
describes the history of such debates as a “quasi-systematic explora-
tion of the specificity of the Latin American alternative modernity
from what today are outdated concepts of identity and differ-
ence.”81 In his view, precisely the lack of a thorough engagement
with the antiessentialist theoretical explorations of cultural studies
made Latin Americanism uninteresting and even irresponsible
under conditions of globalization. Moreiras agrees that “it is cer-
tainly our responsibility as Latin Americanists to take stock of what
it is that we do, so that our own ‘immaterial labour’ . . . does not end
up serving at the cultural level the very apparatus that constrains
Latin American social and political options.”82 However, “differ-
ence” as an essentialist category has been “exhausted” as a viable
driver of Latin Americanism. Consequently, we need to ask the
following question at a theoretical level: “Can critical reason dis-
solve in identitarian or differential description?”83 For Moreiras, it
must not, which is why, for him, deconstruction is indispensable for
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a critical reimagination of Latin Americanism as a publicly oriented
theory and practice.
In a response to Sarlo’s article, Uruguayan critic Mabel Moraña
interprets Sarlo’s position as a legitimate concern over the need to
conceive forms of organization that effectively respond to the conse-
quences of neoliberal globalization in Latin America. Agreeing with
Sarlo on the need to problematize “redemptionist and self-legiti-
mizing” assumptions in cultural studies, Moraña nevertheless at-
tempts to take the blame for Latin American disaster away from
cultural studies. As an antidote to nihilism and melancholy, she
asks us to differentiate between the need to criticize the critic and
the nature of the phenomena analyzed.84 The Latin American pre-
dicament, Moraña says, calls “now more than ever, for a disman-
tling of the modern ideas that historically constitute a fundamental
part of the extreme situations we now face.”85 We should not forget
that most forms of nationalism in Latin America have legitimated
authoritarian rather than democratic social projects and have done
so under the umbrella of corrupt and incompetent states. We
should not forget that solutions to current problems such as orga-
nized crime and financial bankruptcy are “unthinkable if we are not
able to surpass the imposed parameters of the national, even if the
daily battles as well as the suffering are taking place within
them.”86 Therefore, before reviving nationalism in the name of Lat-
in American suffering, we need an “extensive discussion with re-
gard to the distinction to be made between nation and state in order
to define the role that we would assign to each of these categories,
and the measure of their political and historical responsibility.”87
In her own account of the trajectory of Latin American cultural
studies, Moraña draws our attention to how Latin America has os-
cillated between the imported vocabularies of liberalism and Marx-
ism, none of which have been able to productively engage with
local and regional specificities. In her view, very few thinkers were
occasionally able to “deconstruct” nationalist mythologies. Taking
Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui as an inspiration, she speculates
about a kind of reflection that challenges the bourgeois nation from
within, so as to constitute a critical alternative to the liberal models
of modernity. In this sense Latin American thought may continue to
insist on a mythic dimension of the nation as a place of collective
“communion,” of “solidarity on a grand scale.” Perhaps, she writes,
“it is to this dimension that we are really referring when we discuss
the nation from within the horizons of neoliberalism and globaliza-





citizenship which would fulfill an agglutinating and mobilizing role
in our time. If this were the case, it would be a genuine challenge to
both praxis and theory to examine the ways in which the myth of
the national could be articulated to the realities of globalization.”88
Minoritarian calls for deconstruction in Latin American cultural
studies resonate strongly with the project of “new cultural studies”
proposed by Gary Hall and Clare Birchall in their 2006 collection
devoted to that topic. There, Hall diagnoses a recent “retreat from
theory,” with all its empiricist underpinnings, as a moralizing and
melancholic response to a crisis in the left-leaning political project
that was foundational to the discipline and project of cultural stud-
ies in its early days. He explicitly relates such a disciplinary re-
sponse of cultural studies to the disavowed attachments theorized
by Wendy Brown in Politics out of History. In a situation in which it
is difficult to tell “good” from “evil”—since capitalism now pene-
trates everything, including the university and therefore cultural
studies itself—new cultural studies seeks to invent, through risky
but rigorous strategies, knowledge-based interventions within capi-
talism, beyond the mourning, moralism and melancholia that so
trouble the academic Left, including the Latin American academic
Left.
An ethico-political commitment to theory, and more specifically
to deconstruction, distinguishes “new” cultural studies from its
prior disciplinary incarnations. In this context, theory is understood
as an antidisciplinary practice that seeks to “intervene” by exposing
the incompleteness of disciplinary approaches, not least those
premised on a devaluation of theory. This is not to say that new
cultural studies has renounced its public or political orientation but
rather that it has stopped looking for it, on the basis of equivalence,
somewhere “outside” capitalism. As Joanna Zylinska diagnoses,
The vision of a unified left fighting its crusade against the ills of
capitalism is a symptom of the same moralising desire for totality
and closure. Taking into account the dispersed character of the
left and its politics, as well as the reformulation of its economics-
focused agenda via an engagement with more “culturalist is-
sues” such as new social movements, cultural industries and
identity politics, I postulate that cultural studies—for which cul-
ture is not a mere “decorative addendum to the ‘hard world’ of
production and things” . . . but rather a structuring, material
element in the politico-economic landscape—can help us re-
spond to the current moral conjuncture.89
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A good counterexample to Sarlo’s complaint about “avant-garde
theory” can be found in Anticapitalism and Culture, in which Jeremy
Gilbert argues that contemporary cultural studies remains informed
“by a resolutely political critique of capitalism, individualism, patri-
archy, colonialism and hierarchy in general.”90 He shows there how
the antiessentialist turn in philosophy and political theory has con-
tributed to the transformation of the militant ideology critique into
some more nuanced forms of cultural analysis, which can prove
useful for social movements struggling against the negative effects
of capitalist globalization. Critical, nonessentialist approaches in
cultural studies have in common their rejection of “old-fashioned
ways of thinking about politics which see society as a single coher-
ent thing with a centre, or a top, a singular locus of power, which a
radical movement must seek to occupy and control.”91 For cultural
studies, as for post-Marxism, power resides in “the capacity to set
the terms of reference in any given situation, defining what is to be
accepted, implicitly or explicitly, as truth and normality.”92 By im-
plication, if power is dispersed throughout the culture, argues Gil-
bert, then it is astrategic to connect self-conscious activism with the
“spontaneous” anticapitalism that expresses itself in popular cul-
ture, including mass media culture. Once again, the question for
Gilbert entails what kinds of political work contemporary anticapi-
talist movements need to carry out in order to pursue their goals
effectively. Cultural studies as a mode of critical thinking coming
from within academia can first of all remind those professing the
discourse of anticapitalism that “historically, people do not act
against a given social order unless they believe that there is a good
chance that it can be changed and that the likely benefit to them of
changing it will outweigh the risks involved in the attempt.”93
Drawing explicitly on a post-Marxist framework, Gilbert iden-
tifies two problematic features in contemporary capitalism, which
he sees as remaining under the spell of an “activist imaginary.” One
is blindness to political strategy, derived from the assumption that
heterogeneous political actors already share a fundamental identity.
Symptomatic of this assumption would be the standard form of
activist literature: an endless catalogue of disparate organizations
and movements. The other problematic feature of the activist imagi-
nary is “a state of perpetual outrage and surprise at the exploitative
and undemocratic character of capitalist society.”94 Leading figures
of global anticapitalism, such as Noam Chomsky, often reduce their
interventions to a ceaseless recounting of the outrageous exploits of
corporate power. Rather than persuading people that another world
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is possible, the perpetual outrage of the activist discourse has the
counterproductive effect of “reinforcing the general assumption
that such a state of affairs is normal and inevitable.”95 By contrast,
once social movements acknowledge that the question of rhetorical
strategy is key, they can start to work on “different and unpredict-
able acts of naming and of carefully calculated intervention, which
only detailed analysis of specific conjunctures can make possible.”96
In the United Kingdom, for instance, successful campaigning
against genetically modified organisms strategically mobilized a
cultural attachment to rural aesthetics. While such an attachment
had a conservative face, campaigners were able to mobilize it for
progressive ends. The question, Gilbert says, is how to open more
such possibilities by “actualizing” the radical potential of cultural
attachments while “counteractualizing” their potential to transform
into hostile defensiveness.97 Importantly, aesthetics plays a key role
in this process that the Old Left typically underestimated. Cosmo-
politan values such as cultural diversity and solidarity beyond the
immediately known social group might be more effectively pro-
moted through the aesthetic realm that includes eating, dancing and
lovemaking.98 Social networking sites such as Facebook, where peo-
ple learn to present themselves according to hegemonic values, also
betray a widespread desire for collaboration, cooperation and free
exchange of ideas. All of this makes such sites strategic tools for
anticapitalism.
I can now return to the event that first drew my attention to the
Mexican defense of maize. In October 2009, Greenpeace staged a
theatrical protest in which activists covered emblematic monuments
in Mexico City with black mourning cloths and placards. Over the
statues of the national Heroes of Independence one could read
phrases such as “Our maize first, traitors!” The traitors in question
were Mexican legislators who had betrayed the nation by ending a
ten-year moratorium on the experimental sowing of transgenic
maize in Mexico. Beyond detecting its reliance on unrealistic cli-
chés, post-Marxist cultural studies allows us to position this rhetoric
as a playful tactic within the framework of politics as agonistic plu-
ralism, indeed as one among diverse tactics that Mexican defenders
of maize have creatively deployed so as to request the attention and
the support of Mexican society and the world at large. Exhibitions,
concerts, food festivals, alternative food-distribution networks, con-
temporary art, academic symposia, online petitions, juridical bat-
tles, scientific lobbying, journalism and many other activities have
made up the struggle for maize against the corporate enclosure of




Mexican maize agriculture. In the course of fifteen years, “native
maize” has achieved a remarkable positive presence in the social
imaginary, although unfortunately the political demands of envi-
ronmental and agricultural activists have been mostly ignored by
the state and overshadowed by seemingly “more urgent” issues,
such as state violence against the civilian population and even fur-
ther extractive energy reforms whose consequences for the Mexican
people and environment threaten to be nothing short of catastroph-
ic. Mexican society is currently hostage to an unspeakable brutal-
ity,99 a literally antagonistic conjuncture in which the struggle for
maize has not so much a mere potential as a “historical responsibil-
ity,” O’Gorman would say, to articulate the mythical space of an-
other social order.
That said, what is the task of the critical intellectual here? Per-
haps, like grassroots activists themselves, critical intellectuals can
simultaneously diversify and articulate their approaches to the
Mexican biotechnology debates. Empirical studies need not antago-
nize with theoretical explorations, and both may rather enter into an
agonistic dialogue, a mutual contamination, an alliance of sorts. My
attention in this book to the metaphysical narratives at work in the
contemporary dispute around Mexican maize does not seek to ex-
haust research or thought on the topic; on the contrary, it seeks to
disrupt attachments to the broken narratives of the nation in order
to foreground the wider stakes of the struggle for maize, a struggle
for the meaning of social life under capitalism.
THE NATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
Contrary to what popular and legal discourses routinely imply,
from a psychoanalytic perspective people do not “have” an identity.
The existence of the unconscious means that we are not identical
even to ourselves, which means in turn that identity is never any-
thing more than a mirage. Psychoanalysis helps us to understand
how the subject emerges in response to interpretations, always par-
tial and contingent, of the narratives available in culture. Yet
psychoanalysis is concerned with subjective differences between in-
dividuals, and nothing allows us to conclude that such differences
repeat themselves in order to constitute a collectivity. In other
words, there cannot be anything like a psychoanalysis of “Mexican-




and that is the very existence of a widespread discourse on “Mexi-
canness.”
Argentinian psychoanalyst Néstor Braunstein argues that “the
Mexican does not exist” outside the theories and characterizations
of covertly or openly racist writers. There are no specifically Mexi-
can traits, he says, no “solitude,” no “melancholy,” no “inferiority
complex” due to “racial interbreeding,” no “conquest trauma” and
even no nationalism, that reactive idealization that is “the other face
of racist disparagement.”100 Yet the accumulation of images such as
these imposes itself as “a ghostly presence in the overall image
people have of themselves,” and precisely the ethico-political conse-
quences of such an imposition of sedimented discourse are impor-
tant for psychoanalysis. If Mexican identity is in a sense real for
psychoanalysis, this is only because it contributes to the shaping of
that which is made to count as reality. Braunstein calls on us to ask,
in each instance, who is the optician polishing up the distorting
mirrors, why does he do it, and whom does he work for. If Mexico
is burning now, this is due not to any fundamental characteristic of
its inhabitants but rather to the place assigned to the country by
global organized crime, by authoritarian elites allied to foreign capi-
tal, by the deadly unwritten law enforcing corruption at all levels of
public office and by the multiple forms of social discrimination.
Braunstein’s accusation of racism directed against any psycholo-
gizing approach to Mexicanness may seem to discredit O’Gorman’s
diagnosis of the “traumatized” Mexican soul. According to
O’Gorman, disavowed conservatism—which appears as a kind of
neurotic attachment to the mother—sabotaged the emancipatory as-
pirations of nineteenth-century Mexican nationalists by reinforcing
the social hierarchies inherited from the colonial era. Ultimately, it
also sabotaged the revolutionary aspirations of twentieth-century
Mexican nationalists, to whom O’Gorman addressed his essay. As a
provocative alternative to the routine denunciations of economic
imperialism, O’Gorman exhorted “the nation”—that is, whoever
identified him- or herself with that “spiritual principle”—to free
itself from cultural essentialism, since the latter had only served to
legitimate political authoritarianism as the enduring legacy of colo-
nial times. O’Gorman’s allegorical psychoanalysis of “the Mexican
soul” remains pertinent today precisely and only to the extent that it
resonates with other critiques of essentialism in contemporary phi-
losophy, psychoanalysis and political theory. The latter do not
merely assert that cultural identity does not exist but rather interro-
Colonial Legacies, Constitutive DisruptionsDRAFT
[2.60]
[2.61]
gate the material and ethical consequences of its political emergence
in specific contexts.
Stuart Hall has asked why, after the comprehensive philosophi-
cal critique of “the self-sustaining subject at the centre of post-Carte-
sian western metaphysic,” we should continue to have discussions
about “identity.”101 While such a concept cannot be thought in the
old, essentialist way, Hall argues that we cannot do without it if we
are to think through and understand key issues of politics and agen-
cy. After all, the very idea of a self-sustaining subject continues to
play a dominant role in the context of global capitalism, through its
neoliberal associations with material prosperity, symbolic status,
and “freedom.” As Hall says, for agency to be thinkable at all, it is
necessary to assume that identification requires a psychic invest-
ment not entirely predetermined by power. The point is to recog-
nize that ideology works at the level of both the drives—the subject
as an investment in its own identifications—and the discursive
practices that constitute the social field, for “it is in the articulation
of these mutually constitutive but not identical fields that the real
conceptual problems lie.”102 In this regard, Braunstein reminds us
that Mexican history has been written and rewritten several times,
and none of its versions is the true one because the only “truth” that
psychoanalysis can identify is “that of the battles fought around the
history that will be written.”103 The fictional nature of this process,
as Hall would say, “in no way undermines its discursive, material
or political effectivity.”104
In view of the current situation in Mexico, characterized by in-
creasing levels of violence in all spheres of social life, I would advo-
cate, with Braunstein, the need to align psychoanalysis with a cri-
tique of capitalism understood as a source of human suffering. In a
society that is subjected to the worst possible effects of the three
decades of neoliberal policies, psychoanalysis must actively oppose
the violence exercised by those who produce an essentialist dis-
course on “Mexicanness,” because such a discourse merely conceals
and reinforces the place assigned to Mexico by the forces of global
capitalism. While it is difficult to disagree with Braunstein when he
denounces the overwhelming imbalances in global power that con-
demn places such as Mexico to burn regardless of the best efforts of
their inhabitants, I think psychoanalysis can offer more than a de-
nunciation of Mexicanness as a mirage in the service of power. That
is, perhaps it can do more than a critique of “ideology” in the tradi-
tional sense, the sense in which the problem of “agency” is ultimate-













understood as a complex, always singular negotiation involving
narratives, interpretations and identifications, but also nonhuman
forces. Thus, while I take heed of Braunstein’s professional warning
that there is no psychoanalytic treatment for a collective subject, I
also insist that psychoanalysis is relevant to the extent that it goes
beyond the denunciation of global economic actors and toward a
project of understanding and facilitating agency at the level of the
constitution of identity—that is, at the level of cultural politics.
Historians have long ago problematized the assumptions of
Mexican nationalism, which were borrowed first from nineteenth-
century liberal thought and then from twentieth-century anthropo-
logical and economic discourses. Mexican nationalism has come to
be seen less as an undivided heritage or a spiritual principle than as
a heterogeneous framework for the negotiation of specific social
hierarchies. Most importantly, such a historical perspective has al-
ready stimulated critical, reflective interpretations of the history of
Mexican nationalism as one with deep implications for social strug-
gles in contemporary Mexico. In other words, how Mexicans cur-
rently relate to the complex legacy of nationalism is a problem that
calls for engaged, politically committed interpretation as opposed
to neutral description of historical facts. From the standpoint of a
psychoanalytically informed cultural studies, the question of agen-
cy and politics is not about choosing a pregiven identity. Rather, it
is about working through identifications and rehearsing ways to
make them work against the naturalization of the social order, in-
cluding the capitalist rules of the technoscientific game. To borrow
from Hall’s explanation, agency would involve a creative task, that
of “using the resources of history, language and culture in the pro-
cess of becoming rather than being.”105 It seems to me that psycho-
analysis has a key role to play in this task.
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According to mainstream historiographies, modern science origi-
nated in a “European miracle” made possible by the unmediated
retrieval of Greek knowledge after the so-called Dark Ages. Such
historiographies have come to be regarded as not just Eurocentric
but also “internalist” and “diffusionist,” in the sense that they ex-
plain the universal success of modern science in terms of the trium-
phant irradiation of supposedly European characteristics such as a
“critical attitude toward conventional beliefs, a distinctive method,
uniquely high standards of objectivity, a distinctive rationality, a
distinctive metaphysics that distinguished primary from secondary
qualities, the shift from an organicist to a mechanistic model of
nature, and the reliance on mathematics.”1 The hegemony of Euro-
centric, internalist and diffusionist historiographies began to crum-
ble in the 1960s, when Thomas Kuhn argued, in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, that scientific practices are always just one part
of a complex social process. In this view, systematic knowledge
seeking is indissociable from social practices and institutions such
as education and legal systems, economy and religion, state projects
and gender relations. Post-Kuhnian historical research has contin-
ued to complexify the understanding of modern sciences as local
knowledge systems in competitive relations with other local knowl-
edge systems. The more contemporary interdisciplinary field of sci-





how science(s) and culture(s) constitute each other and coevolve,
even if “constrained in diverse respects by nature’s order.”2
Whereas the pre-Kuhnian interpretations tend to reduce technol-
ogy to “applied science,” STS regards science itself as dependent on
the technologies of its production, both on physical instruments and
machines and on social technologies such as institutions and theo-
ries. STS has also cleared the way for a reconsideration of the
knowledge-seeking practices of non-European societies. According
to postcolonial STS, the development of modern sciences resulted
not from a natural European ability to rise over cultural particular-
ity but rather from a historic “ability to neutralize some cultural
elements while fully exploiting others, in the context of tensions
between the maximally global and the firmly local.”3 Thus, whereas
the technical requirements of European expansion drove much of
the so-called Scientific Revolution, many ideas for navigation, car-
tography, agricultural development, manufacturing and pharma-
cology were actually borrowed from non-European cultures and
incorporated into the colonial project. Finally, postcolonial STS has
traced the connections between this colonial project and contempo-
rary “development” theories and policies. The latter systematically
figure modern science and technology in Eurocentric and diffusion-
ist ways—with “development” understood as knowledge transfer
from the North to the South.4
Despite the historiographic revolution inaugurated by Kuhn and
radicalized by feminist and postcolonial strands in STS, the Euro-
centric, internalist and diffusionist assumptions of traditional
historiographies continue to permeate global culture as “a relic of
western ‘folk belief’” disseminated in popular science texts and the
mass media. Scientists themselves still invoke it when speaking to
funding bodies or when explaining what they do. Sandra Harding
suggests that the resilience of such assumptions does not simply
result from ignorance but reveals a deeply rooted emotional invest-
ment in the standards and values of “civilization.” In her words,
“Commitment to the difference in kind of the beliefs and practices
advanced by European sciences is central to the self-conception of
many people around the world as modern, enlightened, progres-
sive, and guided in our beliefs and behaviors by the highest stan-
dards of objectivity and rationality.”5
Harding herself is more interested in such a “civilizational” di-
mension of Eurocentrism, which accounts for its existence as “an
ethic, an ontology, and an epistemology.”6 Since the latter consti-




not restricted merely to, ways of thinking and speaking,” tolerance
and good intentions are not, she says, enough to avoid reproducing
Eurocentrism.7 It is therefore necessary to actively “decolonize”
representation by investigating the links between knowledge and
power that legitimate Eurocentric social arrangements, as the more
politicized branches of STS have been doing for several decades
now.
A critical approach to understanding the relation between Mexi-
can nationalism and contemporary biotechnology requires both a
historical perspective and an attention to the singularity of local
narratives about science, technology and technoscience. In this
chapter I first address the following questions: How have “science”
and “technology” been conceived and mobilized in Mexican nation-
alism? What has been the connection between the use of such con-
cepts and the exercise of power in the Mexican nation? The cultural
critique of the framing and practice of science and technology and
technoscience in Mexico illuminates, I think, some of the discursive
stumbling blocks faced by the early Mexican defenders of maize.
Nationalism, I argue, historically reduced science and technology to
neutral and universally valid instruments of progress and modern-
ization. By contrast the “technoscientific mutations” in Mexican cul-
tural politics that have resulted from biotechnological disruption—
including, among them, the political activism of concerned scien-
tists around the need to protect native maize from transgenic con-
tamination—have activated the possibility of a deconstructive en-
gagement with inherited notions of science, technology and tech-
noscience. My ultimate concern here is to open up and meditate on
the following questions: What kind of engagement with technosci-
ence is required in Mexico today? Whose technoscience and whose
life is at stake?
In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard discusses the
status of knowledge at a time when science seems “more complete-
ly subordinated to the prevailing powers than ever before.”8 There
is no escape, he asserts, from the fact that “knowledge is and will be
produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to
be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is ex-
change.”9 By contrast with the situation in the United States, the
majority of Mexican maize biotechnologists have shown little inter-
est in using molecular genetics to improve their selection criteria.
Currently, of the six laboratories conducting biotechnological re-
search on maize, only CINVESTAV-Irapuato applies advanced ge-




maize biotechnologists specializing in genetic engineering have
fought hard to persuade their institutions and the government that
their research merits financial investment.10 Most of their efforts
have concentrated on gaining space and equipment; yet Mexican
laboratories are generally underequipped, and only permit basic
analyses of genetic markers to characterize plants, compare germ-
plasms and dilucidate their potential uses. National seed compa-
nies, on the other hand, have limited their research to the testing of
patented seeds and do not plan to develop their own seed varieties
on the basis of local germplasm,11 since this requires much more
money than they are willing to invest in the risky business of bio-
technology.
Although they do not altogether reject assisted genetic improve-
ment, Mexican scientists who actively oppose transgenic maize
argue that the technology is inadequate for Mexico. It has been
proven useless, they say, even in the context of industrialized agri-
culture for which it was created, since it is not effective against the
pests that most often attack Mexican plots (such as Spodoptera frugi-
perda).12 At any rate, they assert, the state’s neoliberal policies, not
the lack of technological alternatives, cause the deficit in maize pro-
duction.13 Mexican hybrids could achieve better results than trans-
genics14 by increasing the annual harvest from around 20 million to
29 million tons if the technology developed by public institutions
through conventional breeding methods were applied on all agri-
cultural lands.15 Yet Mexico’s neoliberal governments have steadily
dismantled such public institutions at the same time that they have
promoted transgenics. According to some activists, the Mexican
government has even asked the infamous corporations Cargill-
Monsanto and ADM-Dreyfus-Maseca to take up its former task of
distributing maize seeds around the Mexican countryside.16 The
government’s behavior clearly indicates that the situation facing the
Mexican defense of maize goes beyond rational scientific argument
within a liberal framework. Such a situation poses for activists a
difficult choice: either continue to demand, on moral grounds, na-
tional sovereignty, progress, and rights-based freedoms or under-
take a thorough critique of the nation’s historical engagement with
such modern political narratives so as to articulate possible futures
beyond a repetitive condemnation of the “traitors” who are giving
“our maize” to Monsanto. Paradoxical as it may still sound, activists
are attempting to do the latter precisely on nationalistic grounds.
Even though factors other than rational or even scientific argu-




the Mexican future, it may be instructive to observe how the adver-
saries of the Mexican defense of maize invoke civilizatory narratives
that mostly agree with the common sense of Mexican nationalism.
With this purpose in mind, I examine in this chapter the Master
Project of Mexican Maize (PMMM), a novel technoscientific project
partly funded by Monsanto and implemented since 2007 by Mexi-
can research institutions in a controversial collaboration with peas-
ant communities from the state of Puebla. While society as a whole
must certainly scrutinize and call into question the nature and or-
ientation of any activities carried out in such a context by biotech
corporations, here I want to pay attention to how PMMM communi-
cated its activities to Mexican society. In other words, rather than
questioning immediately whether a company like Monsanto lies or
tells the truth about the nature and orientation of its activities, I
want to understand how PMMM articulated the rationality and de-
sirability of its role in society. Understanding how an industry of
dubious reputation interpellates Mexicans might be instructive for
activists in many ways, not least by showing the ideological pitfalls
of inherited narratives of nationhood. My analysis of PMMM in-
tends not merely to inform activists about the ideological traps of
their own narratives but also to open up the question of how such




Mexican revolutionary nationalism is most often associated with
rural education, popular arts, entertainment media and tourist
propaganda. What place did science and technology occupy in the
nationalist agenda of the postrevolutionary regime? Early in the
1930s, President Lázaro Cárdenas (1930–1936) defended the post-
revolutionary state’s commitment to science and technology on the
grounds of the their importance for the progress of the country. He
merely continued an older liberal rhetoric that had posited science
and technology as the solution to national problems—that is, prob-
lems related to the economic basis of national sovereignty. The rev-
olutionary endorsement of modern science and technology, which I
here dub “revolutionary science,” certainly involved material in-
vestments on the part of the state, including the building of public




conduct research for the nation’s benefit. I want to argue, however,
that revolutionary science was first and foremost a cultural fantasy
underpinning science patronage in the postrevolutionary era. It had
less to do with coordinating or regulating economically productive
research than with celebrating progress and modernization in order
to create consensus around the postrevolutionary state.
The Mexican “golden age” of industrial progress and political
stability (1940–1968) resulted not from domestic research but rather
from the nation’s alignment with the capitalist “free world” during
the Cold War era. Within the import substitution regime of the
golden age, national industries focused on producing basic com-
modities for protected local markets. It was easier for most of them
to import or imitate technologies developed abroad than to develop
their own technological capacities. Meanwhile, the Mexican state
sponsored the activities of an incipient scientific community, which
cultivated a belief in pursuing science for its own sake rather than
for pragmatic or economic ends. In principle at odds with the in-
strumental attitude required by modernization, the inclination to
“pure science” was not a big problem for the Mexican state during
the prosperous golden years. In fact, the seeming incoherence be-
tween the state’s utilitarian rhetoric and its actual sponsoring of
overtly “useless” science was entirely symptomatic of the role that
science and technology played in revolutionary nationalism. They
served not to sustain the Mexican economy, much less to achieve
social transformation, but rather to consolidate the prestige of revo-
lutionary nationalism. In this the Mexican state was not an excep-
tion. Before the global spread of “science policy” in the 1970s, state
sponsorship of science was analogous to state sponsorship of the
arts, so that “greatness and accomplishment in arts and sciences
reflected state power rather than being a means to achieve pow-
er.”17 Yet I want to suggest here that revolutionary science was not
simply a reflection of Mexican state power. The funding of univer-
sities in the name of scientific progress had a productive role: sus-
taining the allegiance of the new urban middle classes, which were
the main beneficiaries of the political regime. I am interested here in
the workings of revolutionary science as a hegemonic tool on the
one hand and as a halfhearted, uncritical engagement with modern
science and technology on the other.
In the absence of a programmatic agenda for national scientific
research, the state seemed to assume the existence of a magical con-
nection between science, technology and modernization. In this
context, it seems understandable that Diego Rivera’s murals em-
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braced a passionate technological utopianism. The murals, mostly
sponsored by the state with the purpose of enlightening the masses
about the meaning of the Mexican Revolution, seem just as useful
now to illustrate the fantasy of revolutionary science. Rivera’s mu-
rals depict modern technology as a powerful force advancing the
goals of socialism by producing a society in which all men and
women, regardless of race or creed, work together in peace and
harmony.18 This techno-utopian theme appears most clearly in a
mural titled The Arsenal (1928), which depicts Zapatista and Bolshe-
vik revolutionaries working together in a landscape dominated by
industrial machinery. In the mural titled Man at the Crossroads Look-
ing with Hope and High Vision to the Choosing of a New and Better
Future (1935), a man appears in a central position as the technical
controller of a universe populated by electrical transformers, micro-
scopes and telescopes, an X-ray apparatus, numerous tanks, gears,
and other artifacts. Art critic Rubén Gallo has described Rivera’s
man looking at a crossroads as “an android who has gained com-
plete control over the world.”19 Gallo finds rather startling that the
artist actually privileged, in his practice, “the art forms of the past.”
In his depiction of modern technology, Rivera took inspiration from
Italian Renaissance churches and pre-Columbian wall painting. He
never experimented with photography and never learned to drive a
car, not even while living in 1930s Detroit as a friend of Edsel Ford
and working on Detroit Industry, a mural about the Ford factories.
Moreover, Rivera painted murals that, while partly modeled on
photographs, systematically omitted the harsh realities of industrial
Detroit. He left unemployment, gangsterism, racism and anticom-
munism to photographic documentation while instead depicting a
harmonious workplace that went on as if the Great Depression had
never happened. From this, Gallo concludes, “For all of Rivera’s
enthusiasm about modern technology and its potential to revolu-
tionize human experience, he seems to have been blind to the pro-
found antitechnological impulse that permeated Detroit Industry. In
an age dominated by worldwide calls for artists to embrace a photo-
graphic ‘new vision,’ Rivera insisted on working in the entirely un-
modern medium of fresco painting. But the muralist was not only
resisting photography: by transforming photographs into embel-
lished murals, Rivera was in fact subverting the properties—indexi-
cality and mechanical reproducibility—that made photography
both radically modern and politically revolutionary.”20
The argument that “a profound antitechnological impulse” in-
habits Rivera’s art is key to understand my reading of revolutionary
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science. For Gallo, such an impulse amounts to the fact that technol-
ogy is celebrated in a purely thematic or representational way,
while questions “about media themselves, their uses and their ef-
fects on art and perception were a blind spot.”21 While I am not
persuaded by Gallo’s categorical distinction between the “entirely
unmodern” and the “radically modern,” his argument suggests to
me that something like an antitechnological impulse might inhabit
not just Detroit Industry and Man Looking at the Crossroads but also,
and more generally, the cultural politics of revolutionary national-
ism. There is, of course, a connection between the art of Rivera and
the revolutionary enthusiasm about modern science and technology
as means of economic, political and cultural “progress.” The con-
nection appears more interesting if we interpret the “antitechnologi-
cal impulse” detected by Gallo as a refusal to engage with modern
science and technology in a way that would transform society in a
more democratic direction. Following Edmundo O’Gorman, I want
to suggest that what I am positing here as the antitechnological
impulse of Mexican nationalism is related to an authoritarian politi-
cal culture inherited from colonial times and disguised by revolu-
tionary rhetoric (including the celebration of modern science and
technology as instruments of progress).
As we have seen, twentieth-century Latin American national-
isms were premised on an imagined dichotomy between the “ideal-
ist spirit” of Ibero-America and the “pragmatic spirit” of the Yan-
kees. Provocatively, O’Gorman presents the former as wishful
thinking inside the head of a dreamy maiden who is simultaneously
seduced and repelled by the “pragmatic spirit” of the Yankees. The
figuration of Latin American nationalists as maidens dreaming of
masculine Yankees might seem crude and indicative of patriarchal
thinking. I want to suggest, however, that O’Gorman uses this fig-
ure of speech as an ironic device in his critique of cultural essential-
ism, a critique that directly inspires my own interpretation and cri-
tique of “revolutionary science.” In O’Gorman’s view, twentieth-
century Mexican nationalism was reactionary and counterproduc-
tive in that it entailed a compulsive reenactment of “the ontological
legacy of the colony,” that is, of the Hispanic providentialist world-
view that qualified Anglo modernity as a sin or an evil deviation
from the true faith and the authentic civilization. From this perspec-
tive, it is possible to interpret the antitechnological impulse in revo-
lutionary nationalism as something more profound than an aesthet-
ic fixation—namely, as a conservative rejection of social and cultu-
ral democratization. In practice, revolutionary science was rhetori-
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cally and materially sustained by an authoritarian regime that, de-
spite its emancipatory rhetoric, was investing its resources in a par-
ticular kind of capitalist development that was not based on local
knowledges or research but rather on imported technological reci-
pes for the production and subsidization of basic commodities, such
as maize. In the meantime, “pure science” could exist in public
universities without any major political consequence for the regime.
Like the liberal nationalism of the nineteenth century, revolu-
tionary nationalism assumed that modern science and technology
would bring about “progress” just by being promoted and celebrat-
ed in an instrumental way. Philosopher Martin Heidegger designat-
ed the conception of technology as a means to a human end as “the
instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.”22 For
Heidegger, this conception was the symptom of a deeper problem—
namely, the metaphysics of Western thought. The metaphysical tra-
dition operates in analogous fashion whenever we think of art as a
thing, or an object with certain aesthetic properties that are subject
to human directions and judgments. It essentially consists in “for-
getting” that technology and art are more than mere things and that
they have in common a creative or world-making power that pre-
cedes and exceeds individual will and intentions. Both revolution-
ary science and revolutionary art allowed nationalist dreamers to
appropriate the benefits of the North American “pragmatic spirit”
without becoming “polluted” by it. The problem, as O’Gorman
pointed out, is that whatever works in dreams rarely works in real-
ity. Mexican nationalists needed to realize that “there always exists
a condition that the maiden has to observe in order for the hut to be
transformed into a palace and the humble woodcutter into a shiny
prince.”23 Modern science and technology are not magical tools, the
historian tells us, but “the actualization of a whole system” that can
only be possessed “by adhering to the vital program of moder-
nity.”24 Whatever is involved in such an adherence, it certainly re-
quires going beyond a mechanical or “magical” association between
science, technology and economic development and toward an
understanding of the potential of new technologies to change social
relations. By exploring science and technology as something more
or perhaps something other than mere instruments of economic de-
velopment, we may enable ourselves to pursue a more critical and





REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE MEETS SCIENCE POLICY
International relations scholar Martha Finnemore has argued that
the emergence of the “science policy” discourse within international
organizations resulted from political tensions that emerged during
the Cold War. Early science programs at the United Nations were
designed for science and scientists rather than states. They aimed to
advance scientific knowledge regardless of national boundaries.
Conventional wisdom held that the point of bringing science under
UN auspices was to free it from the “unscientific” kinds of interven-
tion associated with national states. By the mid-1950s this “pure
science” orientation had lost ground among UN members, explain-
ing the replacement of individual scientists with state representa-
tives as policymakers at the United Nations. As Americans failed to
make the United Nations an exclusive tool of their foreign policy,
the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies finally agreed to join the
organization in 1954. Shortly afterward came the influx of postcolo-
nial nations with an agenda of their own.25 Among the latter, the
notion that states should and could promote and direct science,
with all its economic and military applications, became very popu-
lar. Yet Finnemore argues that most countries started creating sci-
ence policy bureaucracies at this time not so much because they
needed to but rather because the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) taught them a new
“norm” about the role of states regarding science—namely, that
“coordination and direction of science are necessary tasks of the
modern state and that a science policy bureaucracy having certain
well-specified characteristics was the appropriate means to fulfill
those tasks.”26 In this way “science policy” began to displace the
earlier vision of science as a nongovernmental enterprise—that is,
the vision that allowed science to be based on the model of patron-
age.
In 1962 adoption of science policies around the world peaked.
Significantly, the Mexican state was not among the early adopters of
science policy. At the time, unlike many of the “less developed
countries,” Mexico was still enjoying its “golden age” of industrial
prosperity and friendly relations with the United States. American
historians of the period have pointed out that “the Mexican experi-
ence afforded a preferred solution for the hemispheric problem of
change and development” and “had much to offer the world.”27
The Mexican experience offered a paradigmatic example of a de-
pendent economy, in which national industries were based not on
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local scientific or technological research but rather on imitation or
purchase of obsolete technologies from abroad. Dependency theory
attributed this phenomenon, generalized throughout Latin Ameri-
ca, to a programmed obsolescence exploited by imperial powers. As
María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo explains in The Revolutionary Imagi-
nation in the Americas, dependency theorists argued that in a depen-
dent economy, capital does not complete the cycle of its own repro-
duction without returning to the metropole. Instead, capital returns
to the metropole in order to purchase the technology on which in-
creased profit margins and further industrialization depend. In the
form of license fees, joint venture costs, and direct purchase costs,
capital from “the periphery” returns to “the center” for something it
cannot produce on its own: science and technology. Science and
technology thus emerge, in the revolutionary imagination in the
Americas, as an instrument of domination on the part of “the cen-
ter,” while the imperative to adopt Western technology for progress
emerges as “a policing technique, as an administered technological
obsolescence that determines the terms of dependence.”28
In this section I want to argue that UNESCO’s teachings and
economic imperialism only partially answer why revolutionary na-
tionalism failed to produce its own critical engagement with domi-
nant narratives of science and technology. I want to approach this
question from the perspective of Mexican cultural politics, which I
have formulated so far in terms of the instrumentalist fantasy of
“revolutionary science.” After all, Mexican revolutionary national-
ists shared the belief of American liberals that, with the proper ap-
plication of Western science and technology, the “less developed
countries” would rapidly be able to exploit their newly discovered
“productive capacity.”29 If there ever was a bold attempt on the part
of the Mexican state to make this dream come true, it was in 1968, in
the aftermath of the Mexican army’s violent repression of student
protesters in downtown Mexico City. Two years later, President
Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) embarked on a neonationalist agenda
that would restore the political legitimacy of the revolutionary re-
gime, and at this time revolutionary science finally met “science
policy.” The National Council for Science and Technology (CO-
NACYT) was founded in 1970 with the aim of determining, imple-
menting and evaluating the national science policy. Policy docu-
ments from Echeverría’s presidential term acknowledge an increas-
ingly competitive international market and assert that the national
industry must move from a stage of import substitution to one of
“technological adaptation” and “conquest” of foreign markets. The
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shift to adaptation and conquest was premised on Echeverría’s
claim that Mexico had by that time satisfied its most important
internal demands and could dedicate itself to pursuing “the free-
dom afforded by knowledge” using the techniques “most beneficial
to Mexico.”30
The Plan nacional indicativo de ciencia y tecnología, which strove
mainly to achieve nonimitative scientific development, cultural
autonomy and technological self-determination, and which in-
volved hundreds of scientists and business people, was issued just
three months before the end of Echeverría’s term. Among the steps
that Echeverría’s administration took in the attempt to rescue the
institutionalized revolution from a crisis of legitimacy (sparked by
the massacre of Mexican student protesters in 1968) were a short-
lived nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry and the crea-
tion of the Institute for the Study of Medicinal Plants (Imeplam).
Anthropologist Cori Hayden has analyzed how Imeplam’s ethnob-
otanical collections trace the origin of the “national flora” back ei-
ther to colonial encounters or to observations made in the nine-
teenth century by German traveler-scientist Alexander von Hum-
boldt, whose writings inspired the Mexican nationalist imaginary.
At Imeplam, collections of ethnobotanical knowledge were pro-
duced on the basis of the already existing inventories. The collec-
tions aimed to identify a distinctly national herbolaria that could
serve as a resource for the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, Hayden
points out that the translation of Mexican nationalism into ethnobo-
tanical knowledge was not only metaphorical in its significance but
also historical and institutional. She reminds us that the cultural
politics of the Mexican postrevolutionary state rested on the argu-
ment that while the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples had
provided the nation with a distinctive personality, the present and
future nation would belong to a bioculturally assimilated, national
mestizo citizen.31 Through the ethnobotanical inscription of cultural
and political notions of mixture and hybridity, Imeplam’s collec-
tions helped to materialize the hegemonic story of Mexico as a mod-
ern, racially improved nation. As it turned out, however, the revolu-
tionary science of ethnobotanical nationalism did not achieve the
goal of technological self-determination. No lasting pharmaceutical
industry emerged from Imeplam’s collections, which once again
suggests that their function was from the beginning political. Ime-
plam temporarily satisfied popular aspirations of “development”





Mexico’s next president, José López Portillo (1976–1982), contin-
ued with Echeverría’s neonationalist line of argument. His Plan glo-
bal de desarrollo included a special chapter on science and technolo-
gy, which established that technological policy derived from the
national political philosophy and the national aims.32 The role of
such policy was to achieve a massive diffusion of those technologi-
cal innovations directly impinging on the productivity and training
of the workforce, thus connecting science with the social and pro-
ductive needs of Mexico. For this purpose, the plan prescribed the
strengthening of scientific and technical services through the state
support of basic research carried out in public universities. At the
same time, basic research was seen as incompatible with the short-
term priorities of the productive sector. Implicitly, López Portillo
seemed to be reasserting the ambitions of revolutionary science:
magically deriving national self-determination from “pure science.”
This fantasy would not be exposed in its vulnerability until the
neoliberal age, when the state could no longer guarantee such con-
cessions to national knowledge producers.
Even though the Mexican “neoliberal turn” is most often dated
back to 1982, Miguel de la Madrid’s policies still contained some
key concerns of nationalism, such as the need to “master” imported
technology and to use public research in the solution of national
problems. His administration’s Programa nacional de desarrollo
tecnológico y científico made plain for the first time that science policy
depended not on national aims alone but also on how the country
as a whole adapted to the wider international context. In other
words, the emphasis shifted from technological self-determination
and cultural autonomy to the reduction of dependency in the con-
text of global “interdependence.” Among the main obstacles in this
regard, the program detected technoscientific gaps such as low in-
centives for innovation, the absence of a link between research and
production, the lack of highly trained human resources in the pro-
ductive sector, the focus on short-term technical problems and the
unwillingness to take risks among national business communities.33
Acknowledging the social complexity of these obstacles, de la Ma-
drid’s program concluded that science planning was not just a tech-
nical issue and called for wider participation from “the scientific
and technological community, the public, social and private pro-
ductive sectors, and more generally, all of the social groups con-
cerned.”34 The policy included the creation of the National System
of Researchers (SNI), which supplemented between 50 and 100 per-




neoliberal cuts to higher education. Yet subsequent cuts to public
spending sparked antagonistic responses on the part of many social
groups, including academics. Whereas the neoliberal conjuncture
has irreversibly exposed the failure of revolutionary nationalism to
produce a satisfactory engagement with modern science and tech-
nology, the debate goes on about what would count as a satisfactory
or even desirable engagement with technoscientific capitalism.
Combined with an imperative of competitiveness and self-reli-
ance, attacks on state paternalism set the tone of policy documents
during the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The Plan
nacional de desarrollo (1989–1994) located science and technology
within a chapter on economic modernization, which asserted that
modern policies were necessary for the nation to compete effective-
ly in the global economic game. The Programa nacional de ciencia y
modernización tecnológica (1990–1994) explained that the previous ec-
onomic model had been based on protectionism, isolationism, ex-
cessive regulation, a distorted character of industrial growth and
scientific and technological backwardness, all of which had to be
rectified. While de la Madrid had set the SNI up as a mechanism of
direct compensation to academics struck by neoliberal reforms, Sali-
nas sought to decrease the reliance of the national research system
on public funds and to increase private participation instead. He
also introduced novel requirements to measure the correspondence
between state-sponsored research activities and economic growth in
terms of the degree of connection between such activities and the
private industrial sector. Public funding of scientific and technologi-
cal development had to be reflected in the modernization of the
productive basis and in the development of competitive products
and processes. The assumption was that technological knowledge
was susceptible to “private appropriation,” that it was destined to
generate financial yields, and that the participation of the produc-
tive sector in funding research and development not only was nec-
essary and desirable but also had to respond to criteria of economic
competitiveness. Budgeting measures, which required a consider-
able increase in bureaucratic activities such as evaluation, control
and planning, included the requirement to annually review the cri-
teria for budget allocation to research centers, taking into account
other sources of funding and conditioning funding on percentages
of self-funding.35
Neoliberal science policy provoked a prompt reaction on the
part of Mexican academics. Mauricio Schoijet and Richard Worth-
ington, for example, decried “the collapse of a nationalist science
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policy” and its replacement by “a transnational model of science
and industry as interconnected processes.”36 One of the most prom-
inent casualties of such a new model, they said, was CONACYT.
Created by Echeverría “to break the chains of technological depen-
dency,” it was now being made to “sell off” the research institutions
previously thought necessary for national independence in order to
finance research in which budgets, projects, and results counted as
proprietary information kept by enterprises such as Ericsson, IBM,
and Nestlé.37 Rather than the promised modernization, Schoijet and
Worthington argued, the restructuring of the research system
would bring about “new patterns of discrimination and repression”
against the dissenting scientists, since it was driven not merely by
global economic trends but also by a political system in a state of
decomposition. The critics concluded, “Mexico’s earlier nationalism
in development strategy and science policy, which aimed to build
up the nation’s industrial infrastructure and research system, has
been superseded by a retrograde nationalism that distributes de-
clining resources to a self-serving elite of progovernment ele-
ments.”38 This was the worst of neoliberalism combined with the
worst of nationalism, they thought, representing as it did “both
subjugation to the interests of global capital . . . and [a] retrograde
nationalism that limits the vitality of the research system.”39 Schoi-
jet and Worthington were keenly aware of the dangers entailed by
the appropriation of neoliberalism by an authoritarian state. The
continuity of authoritarianism, however, does not eliminate the fact
that Salinista neoliberalism attempted to formulate, discursively
and materially, a problematic that revolutionary science had sys-
tematically refused to confront. More significant than the continuity
of authoritarianism seems to be the fact that neoliberalism utterly
failed to correct the lack of technoscientific innovation in Mexico. As
late as 1998, and only two years before the democratic transition,
Mexican policy analyst José Cano declared that the Mexican govern-
ment did not have a clue about how to relate scientific research
activities to national priorities, much less a bureaucratic strategy for
doing so.
The last Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) president of the
twentieth century, Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), is remembered less
for any original contributions to national science policy than for
steering the crisis of revolutionary nationalism toward its end: the
so-called transition to democracy. After years of civil struggles and
negotiations with the authoritarian regime, Zedillo facilitated the




elections. In 2000, Vicente Fox Quezada from the Party of National
Action (PAN) became the first democratically elected president of
Mexico. Fox reinforced the neoliberal emphasis on supporting in-
itiatives orientated toward innovation through the generation of
links between public research and private companies. Like his im-
mediate predecessors, he believed that technoscientific links would
lead to an increase in competitiveness for national (private) enter-
prises. In line with his background as manager of Coca-Cola Mexi-
co, he proposed to organize the research system into “strategic ar-
eas” and to manage it efficiently. Fox also proposed a drastic reduc-
tion of state investment in science education, particularly by elimi-
nating the SNI and limiting the number of grants for postgraduate
study. The initiative failed to prosper because the scientific commu-
nity came out against it during a heated consultation hosted by the
national congress in 2002. Because of the strong opposition on the
part of the scientists to the further neoliberalization of science poli-
cy, the 2002 consultation led to legislation that kept science distinct
from technology, reasserted the public importance of basic research,
recognized the humanities and the social sciences as disciplines of
national interest, strengthened the legal status of the SNI and CO-
NACYT and avoided the dismantling of public research centers.40
This spectacular victory of the scientific lobby signals a political
environment very different from that prevailing in 1993, when
Schoijet and Worthington denounced old-style repression against
leftist, foreign-born or dissenting scientists. Mexican neoliberalism
introduced managerial discourses into universities and research
centers; yet it did not succeed in eradicating the strong antitechno-
logical stance of revolutionary science. In 2010, innovation scholars
Carlos Bazdresch and Liliana Meza complained that Mexican econ-
omists still routinely underestimated innovation issues due to their
overreliance on the import substitution regime that had prevailed
until the early 1980s.41 At the risk of playing the devil’s advocate, I
suggest that through their opposition to neoliberalism, the scientists
themselves kept alive the fantasy of a “pure science” that would
lead to national development.
AGAINST NEOLIBERALISM:
REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE STRIKES BACK
Judith Zubieta and Rafael Loyola, passionate critics of Mexican sci-
ence policy of the neoliberal period, argue that framing science in
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terms of an economic strategy and expecting it to show results in
terms of technological development and innovation is incompatible
with science “in its purest sense.” They complain that the legal
agreements reached in 2002 were subsequently “administered by a
team of engineers who had a limited and highly biased vision of
science as well as of technology.”42 The team of engineers focused
on technological development and innovation, wrongly assuming
that technological research can be done separately from the devel-
opment of knowledge, “as if the solution of social problems or com-
petitiveness could be achieved without . . . science, in its purest
sense.”43 It seems to me that Zubieta and Loyola’s categorical rejec-
tion of technoscience resonates with an impulse that is far removed
from “pure science” and situated closer to the historical framing of
science and technology in Mexico. I am thinking of revolutionary
science, or the cultural dream that social and economic progress
will magically come about without any loss of purity. Zubieta and
Loyola conclude that as long as governments continue to privilege
technology and innovation, there will be no science or even technol-
ogy in Mexico.44 Such a categorical prophecy is particularly striking
in the context of a democratic transition that, with all its imperfec-
tions, has seen Mexican scientists and academics rise collectively as
outspoken and organized policymakers—and no longer as just priv-
ileged clients of an authoritarian state or as mere victims of the
state’s authoritarian repression. The vocabulary of “pure science” as
something opposed to technology and innovation suggests a some-
what moralistic hostility to technoscience as a form of life. Whereas
Zubieta and Loyola think that national problems cannot be solved
without “pure science,” they do not seem to base their argument on
any connection, instrumental or otherwise, between “pure science”
and social life. It might rather be based on the immediate threat to
the cultural prestige that sustains academic disciplines and posi-
tions.
Considering that contemporary Mexican scientists tend to see
themselves as liberal and modern rather than as Catholic conserva-
tives, it is ironic that Zubieta and Loyola end up framing technosci-
ence (that is, the interconnectedness of science and technology in
the context of global capitalism) as nothing less than a sin. While I
do not claim to have a solution to the complex challenges that a
country such as Mexico faces in the world of technoscientific capi-
talism, I am not the only one to insist that scientific purism poses
serious limitations on the imagination of technoscientific futures in





technology might become possible on the basis of a recognition that
science has never been “pure” and of this fact as a key factor in
explaining why Mexican basic research has never attained much in
terms of social progress, beyond the narrow circles of individuals
who make up the Mexican scientific community.
In a melancholic tone Zubieta and Loyola assert that the technos-
cientific model has already produced a “regression” that will be
very difficult to undo.45 From their discourse in particular, it ap-
pears as if the aspiration of revolutionary science to bring about
national development by means of pure science has become stuck
and self-defeating. How else can revolutionary science respond to
the technoscience of biotechnology? Rather than downplaying the
real threats of neoliberalism to knowledge production in Mexico
and the world, my intention here has been to interrogate the very
desire for “original projects for national development, in the broad
and shared sense which today is missing.”46 That Mexican science
and technology have failed the expectations of Mexican society is
the perception not just of policymakers but also of Mexican scien-
tists themselves. Rosalba Casas and Jorge Dettmer, for example,
lament that Mexican science policy lacks nothing less than “the
framework of a project of national development orientated to the
satisfaction of social needs.”47 In the meantime, it has become obvi-
ous that biotechnology is inseparable from an economic-business
model that has nothing to do with social needs. In this vein, Eugene
Thacker writes,
Nearly every account of the biotech industry notes the simultan-
eity of scientific and economic innovation: recombinant DNA
and the formation of Genentech, polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) and the Cetus Corporation, transgenics and DuPont, and a
wide range of examples related to the pharmaceutical industry.
However, we should be cautious of any attempt to limit such
views to the commercial sector, for there also exists a “govern-
mentality” surrounding biotech that is in many ways inseparable
from business models: alliances between the corporate and pub-
lic sectors, patenting disputes between developed and underde-
veloped countries, and policies that allow universities and non-
profit organizations to apply for patents based on federally
funded research.48
Clearly, the “pure science mentality” of Zubieta and Loyola does
not fit into the ultracapitalist governmentality described by Thack-
er. While in the United States entrepreneurial start-ups by scientists
have gradually become the foundation of biotechnology, the basic
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research orientation of Mexican scientists, coupled with their “nega-
tive attitudes” toward patenting and their overall pejorative consid-
eration of mixing science with business, has impeded the prolifera-
tion of scientist-entrepreneurs.49 By suggesting resonances between
the disciplinary self-assertion of “pure scientists” and the cultural
conservatism that O’Gorman associates with the ontological legacy
of the colony, I do not mean to uncritically replicate the develop-
mental discourse of the neoliberal managers. Critical accounts of
biotechnology in Mexico routinely stress an uncooperative “atti-
tude” of Mexican scientists and an “unwillingness” of local compa-
nies to invest in research and development. American development
theorist Cynthia Wagner, for instance, includes the “pure science
mentality” of Mexican scientists among major obstacles in the de-
velopment of biotechnology in Mexico.50 Yet a critique of “pure
science” can and must be made from other vantage points. An out-
spoken critic of transgenic maize, Lancaster-based Professor Brian
Wynne, has forcefully argued that the “pure science” discourse is
part of mainstream rhetoric and patently false.
The distinction is part of mainstream rhetoric, and yet patently
false in both industrialized and developing countries. The “classic
mantra” promises absolute freedom and autonomy to pure science,
and on the same basis “pure scientists” are deemed nonresponsible
for whatever use is made of their pure research.51 Historically, how-
ever, science has obtained social legitimacy only through its appli-
cations, and this legitimacy has moreover been exploited as an au-
thority of experts that rules out democratic management of science
and technology. Deeming science as “pure” merely allows it to be
misinterpreted as a mirror of nature.52 The point is not whether
pure science is more “basic” than its applications but rather
“which . . . normative and social imaginaries . . . inspire the combi-
nation of research and development.”53 Recombinant DNA devel-
oped not as “pure science” but in search of pharmaceuticals and in
order to persuade investors. The persuasive role of molecular biolo-
gy was based on reductionism, on the “central dogma” that smaller
things determine larger things, that genes determine higher organ-
isms, and on the dismissal of anything that did not fit with this
molecular paradigm. By contrast, traditional agriculture is not re-
garded as science because it is not orientated toward precise con-
trol, is not exploitable as intellectual property and entails a long-
term investment in sharing knowledge across traditional lines of
expertise.54 Much technological development and its commercial-





human genome, that biological complexity exceeds the determining
capacities of the gene and includes environmental factors.55 In view
of this discovery, a critical concept of technoscience may provide an
alternative to the pure/applied science distinction, which is used by
scientists who want to vindicate their own authority.
In line with international trends, in recent decades Mexican sci-
ence policy started to foreground business as the main engine of
scientific and technological innovation, a neoliberal conception that
merely rearticulated older expectations of development qua mod-
ernization. Yet the documents and analyses of Mexican science poli-
cy examined briefly in this chapter suggest a crisis in the narratives
of national development through state-sponsored science and tech-
nology. The crisis seems to pertain above all to the role of science
and technology in Mexican society, which touches directly on the
self-definition and cultural prestige of scientists and also on their
historical and current relationship with the Mexican government.
While the Mexican problem with technoscience cannot of course be
reduced to a problem of “attitude” or “mentality,” I have tried to
show that a focus on cultural and political narratives does illumi-
nate relevant aspects of the problem, not least questions of agency
and historical responsibility. Scientists (and not just Mexican scien-
tists) are of course being more than reasonable when they warn us
against the extrapolation of productivist parameters to the field of
academic knowledge. I argue that more than self-righteous defen-
siveness or purist contempt for engineers is needed if they are to
satisfy their own desire for “effective interlocution and direct partic-
ipation, with original projects for national development, in the
broad and shared sense which today is missing.”
THE IDEALISTIC SPIRIT OF
“THIRD WORLD BIOTECHNOLOGY”
If biotechnology is defined as “an industrial activity that appropri-
ates the expanding frontier of molecular physiology to produce
molecules and devices that generate wealth,”56 it appears obvious
that biotechnology is not there to save Latin America, or any other
region of the world, from marginality and exclusion. Yet Daniel J.
Goldstein describes “Third World biotechnology” as “an altruistic,
noncompetitive, salvationist, and regionalist enterprise.”57 Gold-
stein’s critique of such an enterprise resonates strongly with




with my own characterization, in this chapter, of revolutionary sci-
ence. Instead of focusing, as the Northern-based biotech industry
does, on the generation of profit through the invention of competi-
tive, high-value products, Third World biotechnology hopes to
eradicate malnutrition and endemic parasitic diseases and to im-
prove the life of poor farmers. In other words, it positions itself as
“the ideal instrument for wiping out the consequences of misery
without touching its causes.”58 “Third World biotechnology” does
not seem to understand, in other words, that hunger and disease are
political problems that will not be solved by technological means.
What is really needed, Goldstein says, is “a radical transformation
of the way in which poor people live and work in urban and rural
areas,” including provision of decent housing, education, better-
paid jobs and adequate working conditions.
Despite the salvationist rhetoric deployed by transnational bio-
tech corporations themselves, the contrary appears to be the case.
Only the Third World can save itself, Goldstein argues, by making a
political decision to enter fully into the game of technoscience. A
whole new corporate, managerial, financial, and political culture of
high technology would have to be created in order to generate the
technoscientific links that would allow biotechnological enterprises
to become commercially viable. Yet the problem is precisely that the
practitioners of “Third World biotechnology” reject and often de-
nounce technoscientific links as “antinational and antiregional,”59
while paradoxically limiting themselves to “relearning the technol-
ogies invented by others.”60 In order to illustrate the daunting task
of actually doing biotechnology in a country such as Mexico, Cyn-
thia Wagner narrates the story of Genin, a biotechnology start-up
founded in the early 1980s by two prominent Mexican scientists.
Francisco Bolívar Zapata and Roberto Quintero, fellow students at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, combined their comple-
mentary skills on returning to Mexico. Borderless Biotech, a corpo-
rate-funded pamphlet on Mexico’s potential for the life sciences,
summarizes Bolívar Zapata’s earlier scientific work with a col-
league as follows:
In California in the late-1970s, Genentech was not as well-known
as it is today. One of its co-founders, Dr. Herbert Boyer, was a
professor of biochemistry and biophysics at UCSF, where several
members of his research team, including Mexican-born Francisco
Bolivar and Californian Ray Rodriguez, were diligently working
to create a safe and effective biological mechanism to facilitate




small, self-replicating genetic element with built-in coding of en-
zymes that allow its host—a bacteria, for instance—to thrive in
environments in which many other bacteria cannot (for instance,
in the presence of antibiotics). The resulting genetic package was
the plasmid pBR322 (the “B” for “Bolivar,” the “R” for Rodri-
guez)—designed to be resistant to two antibiotics (ampicillin and
tetracycline). . . . By subsequently modifying this plasmid, they
were able to stimulate the production of certain hormones by the
bacterial host—such as insulin.61
This work, according to Borderless Biotech, helped to launch the
North American Genentech as a multi-billion-dollar company. Its
patented biotechnology-based invention for producing a biocatalyst
used in the production of penicillin appeared to have a market in
Mexico—hence his attempt to launch Genin. However, the compa-
ny’s initial start-up capital was slashed due to the Mexican currency
devaluation in 1981. A further shock came when it became clear that
the potential customers, Mexican pharmaceutical companies, were
not interested in licensing the technology but preferred to buy the
biocatalyst itself, just as they would buy it from a foreign company.
Genin then faced the typical obstacle encountered by biotechnology
start-ups—namely, a lack of funds to scale up production. As a
result, it had to settle for boutique status, performing contract re-
search projects for various sponsors for about ten years before ulti-
mately closing its operations. As an outcome of this initial failed
venture, Bolívar Zapata and Quintero went on to create the Instituto
de Biotecnología (IBT) at the national university, which they still
lead. As Bolívar Zapata narrates, IBT could have been founded as
an autonomous research center with funds from the United Na-
tions, had the Mexican government not withdrawn the UN-re-
quired cofunding on the grounds of economic crisis (again, 1981
currency devaluation, following the oil crisis). In the end, a relative-
ly small concession from the national government enabled IBT’s
creation as part of the national university’s research system.62
The case of Genin makes clear that other factors besides a “pure
science mentality” lead scientists to take refuge in the dream of
revolutionary science. For reasons that are not merely psychologi-
cal, Mexican biotechnology is a relatively small endeavor centered
in university and federal technical institutes, mostly isolated from
national industry, pursuing projects of a general or “nonapplied”
nature.63 Thus, the fantasies of revolutionary science reappear eve-
rywhere, even among the least expected actors. Francisco Bolívar





of biotechnology as an opportunity and an instrument for “solving
the problems of our country.”64 At the same time, he stresses that
the solution to those problems has nothing to do with the funda-
mental goal of the IBT, which is rather to perform “first-level re-
search” in order to “advance knowledge” under the evaluation and
approval of international experts for publication in prestigious jour-
nals.65 In a gesture all too familiar by now, Bolívar Zapata equates
his job with a desire “to understand our national problems, to
search for solutions and, simultaneously, increase our identity and
sovereignty.”66
In the same year that Bolívar Zapata wrote of such hopes, the
Master Project of Mexican Maize took off in the Mexican state of
Puebla. PMMM is a technoscientific project partly funded by Mon-
santo and implemented by Mexican researchers in a controversial
collaboration with the National Confederation of Maize Produc-
ers.67 PMMM was first mentioned in a series of requests made by
Monsanto, Dow and Dupont-Pioneer to carry out experiments with
transgenic maize in the highly industrialized states of Sinaloa and
Tamaulipas, both in northern Mexico.68 As it actually happened,
PMMM was implemented between 2007 and 2011 in the central
state of Puebla, where small-scale and subsistence agriculture are
still widely practiced and where maize diversity is relatively high.
While the nature and orientation of any activities carried out in such
a context by biotech corporations must certainly be scrutinized and
called into question by society as a whole, here I want to pay atten-
tion to how PMMM communicated its activities to Mexican society.
Analyzing how a technoscientific project justifies itself in nationalist
and salvationist terms might be instructive for activists in many
ways, for instance, in identifying an escape route from the inherited
narratives of nationhood and in opening up the question of how
such narratives may be transformed as well as lived in a critical and
creative way.
FACES OF MAIZE: WHY CULTURE
MATTERS IN TECHNOSCIENCE ACTIVISM
Sociologist Gerard Verschoor, an early observer of the Mexican bio-
technology debates, pointed out that some environmental activists
shared with their pro-industry opponents a modern regime of jus-
tification that was unlikely to aid their cause. In particular, by in-




versity, such activists were unwittingly drawing on the same logic
as their pro-industry opponents. Echoing Martin Heidegger’s fa-
mous critique of modern technology as metaphysics, Verschoor de-
scribed the industrial logic as anthropocentric and instrumentalist.
He wrote, “The main end of all logics that are utilized to distinguish
between right and wrong is always an end that is good for humans,
according to humans. This common anthropocentric truism makes
it possible for all grammars of worth to state with certainty that
everything in creation, whether people or things, can be used mere-
ly as a means and that only man is an end in himself.”69
Verschoor warned that activists would see their position under-
mined once industrial actors managed to mobilize the anthropocen-
tric rationality in a more persuasive way, for instance, by arguing
that biological threats could be managed “by simply extending the
production process and monitoring the ‘health’ of the environ-
ment.”70 Shortly after Verschoor issued this warning, some sections
of the Mexican state apparatus, including research institutions, be-
gan collaborating with the biotech giant Monsanto on the Master
Project of Mexican Maize. PMMM offered to integrate farming com-
munities into the global market economy by designating them as
“custodians” of native maize varieties that would simultaneously
become the object of technoscientific research. PMMM presented
itself on its website as a unique project in the history of Mexico,
whose uniqueness derived from bringing together two distinct
goals: (1) to preserve maize varieties threatened with extinction,
and (2) to improve the quality of life of the “custodians” of those
varieties. By articulating environmental concerns with hegemonic
narratives of development, PMMM came to fulfill Verschoor’s pre-
diction about the industry’s superior ability to profit from the
anthropocentric, instrumentalist common sense.
The website of PMMM was rich in images that associated tradi-
tional agricultural methods with the poverty of rural populations. It
included a series of video interviews in which individual farmers
were shown to support such an association by voicing, through
personal testimonies, the argument of PMMM.71 At first sight it
seemed plain that PMMM reproduced, point by point, the old de-
velopmental narrative of turning “backward” peasants into “mod-
ern” farmers. However, PMMM also exhibited a neoliberal rhetoric;
that is, it updated the modernizing imperative by showcasing ideals
of individual self-reliance within a society led no longer by the na-
tional state but by technical and industrial actors. While PMMM




ment, it also asserted that unlike previous state-led projects, it
aimed to “implement strategies for the preservation and multiplica-
tion of [the Mexican] genetic treasure, and for the viability and develop-
ment of those who guard it” (my emphasis). According to PMMM,
the guardians of Mexico’s “genetic treasure” were those who had
not benefitted from state programs. It even portrayed them as vic-
tims of both inattention and corruption on the part of the state. For
the same reason, perhaps, they were the very subjects chosen to
perform the role of the noble savage, that of an instrument for
“agrodiversity conservation” and economic development. Through
PMMM, private entrepreneurs occupied the place previously as-
signed to the national state, and they did so, I argue, by imposing
themselves not simply through sheer force but also through a labor
of persuasion that rearticulated the inherited narratives and foun-
dational myths of Mexican nationhood.
The text of PMMM’s website started with a series of mythologi-
cal statements about the supposed link between maize and the Mex-
ican nation. It quoted Nobel Prize winner Octavio Paz as saying,
“The invention of maize by the Mexicans can only be compared
with the invention of fire by Man.” It described maize as “the heart
of the world” and as the origin of a relation “between Mexican
culture and civilization.” Nearby was the image of a hairy man
inside a cave, wearing only a loincloth and raising his arms solemn-
ly in some kind of religious gesture. Below the image one could
read, “These producers make it possible that Mexico is the richest
and most complex center of active genetic diversity of maize, which
is also in continuous improvement.” Cave men appeared in the
framework of a teleological narrative of “continuous improvement”
as producers of “the largest wealth of germplasm in the planet” and
(in anticipation of contemporary maize “custodians”) as “funda-
mental agents of germplasm conservation.” Their worldview and
culture were correspondingly framed in terms of labor, the product
of which was to be admired now in “living sculptures, amazingly
beautiful and surprising, which express themselves with a prodig-
ious diversity of shapes and colors, as well as potential uses and
transformation.” That is, maize cobs, cave men and Mexican iden-
tity were made to converge foundationally in the mission of germ-
plasm exploitation, and it was not difficult to detect the shifts
through which PMMM rearticulated previous civilizational mis-
sions conducted by colonial and state powers.
Despite its claim of novelty with respect to the previous ap-




embraced by PMMM was quite obviously not new. In the years
after the Mexican Revolution (1910–1921), the Mexican state had set
out to educate and modernize rural populations. The early labor of
postrevolutionary rural teachers eventually became an international
scientific enterprise in which North American scientists funded by
the Rockefeller Foundation developed high-yield seeds for use in
conjunction with fertilizers and pesticides. Like postrevolutionary
rural teachers, PMMM went “out to the centers of origin . . . just
there where it is needed.” Beyond teaching literacy skills, however,
it aimed to remind rural populations about “the value of their germ-
plasm” as their own contribution to Mexico and humanity, since,
according to PMMM, maize was much more than “the vital center
of Mexican identity, culture and food.” It was above all the most
important grain on the planet, an ingredient in thousands of every-
day products and a key input for technological development and
added value. Like the Green Revolution, PMMM offered to provide
financial and technical assessment, expert-led research on potential
uses of maize varieties, including biochemical and industrial uses,
creation of products, enterprises and commercial strategies and, in a
(hardly novel) neoliberal twist, development of managerial abilities
for custodians to improve both the environment and their relations
with the market.
At the same time it might seem that PMMM’s designation of
rural subjects as custodians shifted an earlier tendency to isolate
indigenous and peasant culture “away from its original creators.”
While classifying and naming maize varieties to be stored away in
ex situ banks, the experts of the Green Revolution had chosen
names such as Ancient Indigenous, Pre-Columbian Exotic, Pre-his-
toric Mestizo and Modern Incipient.72 Their acts of naming clearly
echoed Eurocentric narratives of progress as well as the modern
tendency to confine otherness to spaces such as the museum or, in
this case, the germplasm bank. Nonetheless, in its defense of in situ
(alongside ex situ) conservation, PMMM assigned to living rural
populations an active role in keeping valuable germplasm in close
collaboration with the research industry. At any rate, such a shift
rearticulated the racializing logic of modern power/knowledge.
The designation of nonexpert custodians of particular maize va-
rieties involved a racializing identification between native subjects
and native maize, an identification that operated through the visual
and verbal association of individual human faces with maize
“races.” Like that of its predecessors, the vision of PMMM emerged






tioned the rural subject as “usually dark and lacking in historical
agency, as if waiting for the (white) Western hand to help subjects
along and not infrequently hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed
by its own stubbornness, lack of initiative, and traditions.”73 This
long-duration discursive scheme, I argue, deserves careful attention
in the task of generating alternatives to the logic of industrial actors.
With this in mind, I now return to my analysis of PMMM’s website.
An old woman with a sad expression faced the reader, while
corn was hand-harvested in the background. Not far from this im-
age, one could read a quote attributed to a Jesuit missionary: “The
poor are those who have not, cannot and know not.” It is absurd,
the text claimed, that the producers of the largest wealth are also the
poorest people in the Mexican countryside. If given access to better
technological processes, commercialization and added value, such
producers would at last become able to generate equitable and up-
ward life conditions.
A researcher was not looking at us because his attention was
focused on a small plant, which he was manipulating. Nearby we
could read that Mexican public research institutions had previously
been guided by an erroneous belief that biodiversity conservation
could be achieved by storing seeds away from their original crea-
tors. The problem was that such an approach to conservation lacked
a view of the whole. Guided by a “national vision,” the Master
Project of Mexican Maize would pursue conservation through de-
velopment, first of all the development of those whose role in germ-
plasm conservation had been unjustly neglected.
Rostros de Maíz was one of the promotional spots visitors to the
PMMM website could view.74 A video showed men using animal
traction to plow soil that appeared to be very dry; a woman re-
moved the leaves from a cob, while a child seeded the plot. Labor-
ing hands, subtly foregrounded, manipulated instruments and ani-
mals, shelled maize cobs and dropped maize kernels one by one
along the furrow. An epic soundtrack framed the extreme serious-
ness of hand laborers, suggesting that some dramatic event was
under way. Toward the end of this musicalized introduction, a child
came forward, looking down, for us to inspect him while the older
people continued working in the background. Perhaps, one
thought, this poor child should be attending school instead of work-
ing the land. Once the introduction ended, we heard nonmusical-
ized, seemingly spontaneous testimonies of a series of male farmers.
The first farmer was a thin old man with strong indigenous fea-
tures. He appeared next to a large cluster of dry corn leaves among
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which could be seen the dark purple cobs of a native variety of
maize. The ancient Popocatépetl volcano exhaled picturesque
clouds in a dusky background. Somewhat out of the blue, the man
lamented in broken Spanish, “Nothing comes out from working like
this; it is not possible for us to sell maize, yet we have to make a
living; we need to work.” After him, several farmers appeared
speaking individually about the problems faced by Mexican campe-
sinos. One after another, the testimonies presented the familiar pic-
ture of a needy rural subject; yet their authority seemed to increase
as they featured younger, plumper mestizo subjects who explained
the farmers’ predicament in economic terms. One farmer showed a
handful of maize kernels and stated, against the sunny background
of an incipiently mechanized plot, “This is the white, Creole maize
that we cultivate here.” Another one then explained that he usually
ate his maize because low yield made it difficult to commercialize it.
In such a situation, he concluded, “I’d rather keep some goats.” He
thereby introduced the suggestion that farmers engage in agricultu-
ral activities because they need cash. In sum, in the progression
from a dark to a luminous setting, from dark purple cobs to “Creole
maize,” from aging indigenous subjects to young and robust mesti-
zos, the video made the argument that the main problem faced by
the Mexican countryside was a lack of monetary capital, curtailing
farmers’ access to the machinery and fertilizers that would save
them (and their maize) from extinction.
In a crucial scene, one farmer clarified the role of the government
in the rural predicament. “I’m not saying that the president does not
give us cash. I’m just saying that they play the milpa game, which is
a thousand for you, a thousand for me [mil pa ti, mil pa mi], so that
when it is finally my turn, there is nothing left.” As we know, the
term milpa belongs to the vocabulary of traditional Mesoamerican
agriculture and stands in activist discourse for a radical alternative
to capitalist agribusiness. Yet, through a play of words in Spanish,
the farmer’s testimony equated milpa with a trick played on farmers
by the government. State agencies, the farmer implied, divided pub-
lic money among themselves, and so they constrained the farmers’
ability to increase their monetary capital. Since capital had already
been positioned as the only way to survive extinction, the state’s
failure to fully include farmers in a cash economy was framed as
“that which leads us to the loss of what we campesinos are.” Thus, by
weaving together a series of naturalized perceptions, PMMM fore-
closed a consideration of the (political) history of rural poverty and





Voiced by the farmer himself, a commonsensical equation of pover-
ty with the lack of cash and a widely shared opinion that the money
was there but being mismanaged (or even stolen) by state officials
were skillfully combined in order to legitimize the neoliberal devel-
opmentalism of PMMM. One must ask, of course, whether the Mex-
ican public would buy all of this propaganda and why.
In 2011, PMMM reached the semifinals of a national TV contest
called Iniciativa México (iMx). During an unprecedented security
crisis sparked by the government’s war against drugs, iMx de-
scribed itself as “a great movement to transform the country” by
disseminating “a spirit of change.”75 As the show’s propaganda
unapologetically explained, “the most influential politicians and the
Mexican business elite” had joined forces with the media to com-
municate how “an ordinary Mexican with initiative” could be part
of “a national project, an attitude.” Arguing that “a better nation is
made of better individuals,” iMx instructed Mexican audiences to
transform themselves into “individuals with initiative, courage, will
and strength to attain change.” More precisely, Mexicans had to
“break inertia and evolve” by giving up the belief that “success can
only be attained through cheating, corruption and immorality.” As
if the cause of social problems in Mexico was the corrupt behavior
of individual citizens, iMx enjoined Mexicans to transform them-
selves morally.
While we might explain PMMM’s appearance in this show sim-
ply by pointing out Monsanto’s privileged access to influential poli-
ticians and the business elite, I suggest that we should also pay
close attention to the narratives mobilized by both Iniciativa México
and PMMM among other “initiatives” that took part in the contest.
By framing peasants alongside agronomic technicians and scientists
as heroic individuals who can and do break out of inertia and
evolve, PMMM benefitted from the media’s experience and skill at
tapping into popular desire. Rather than dismissing the neoliberal
narratives of PMMM and iMx as mere ideology (in the old sense of
a distorted representation of reality), I want to consider the serious-
ness of their challenge by looking into the fortunes of the activist
response to PMMM.
Activists had detected and denounced PMMM long before its
implementation in Puebla (2008–2011). In 2006, Greenpeace issued
the first alert against “Monsanto’s Master Project,” charging that the
two Mexican scientists who would become research leaders of
PMMM were conducting tests on Monsanto products. A few
months later, activist Silvia Ribeiro described PMMM as a national
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humiliation. She accused government officials and PMMM re-
searchers of behaving in the same way as Antonio López de Santa
Ana, a villain of Mexican history who had supposedly sold the
fatherland to foreign invaders in the nineteenth century. Through
the “master project of contamination,” as Ribeiro dubbed PMMM,
Mexican authorities would sell the genetic patrimony of the country
against the interests of Mexico, the popular will and the law. Like
Greenpeace, Ribeiro had insisted throughout the years on the inevi-
tability of transgenic contamination, in the sense of a biological phe-
nomenon verified by empirical science. This time, however, she
equated contamination with “a racist attack” on the peasant and
indigenous populations of Mexico. In an opinion piece for La Jorna-
da, she wrote, “Being the center of origin and diversity of maize, the
unavoidable transgenic contamination that will occur [in Mexico]
will seriously affect the world’s genetic reservoir. Worse, maize is
the main element of the economies and cultures of peasants and
indigenous peoples, its ancestral creators, which means that [the
government’s decision to authorize experimental sowing of trans-
genic maize] is an attack on their rights and a violent act of neocolonialist
racism” (my emphasis).76
I would certainly agree with Ribeiro that a racist and neocolonial
logic structures PMMM, which is why I am concerned about her
utter failure to challenge such a logic apart from denouncing the
poor moral quality and economic interests of PMMM’s promoters.
Ribeiro seems to assume that the nation’s so-called genetic patrimo-
ny is as literally given as the territorial boundaries of the nation
itself, and she reduces the problem of transgenic contamination to
the existence of a bunch of corrupt individuals who plan to injure
the nation by selling the national patrimony to a bunch of predatory
foreigners—since PMMM included the creation of a germplasm
bank that would concentrate potentially useful genetic information
about several “races” of maize. Activists point out that the true goal
of PMMM is to facilitate Monsanto’s filing of patents on such infor-
mation.77 By insisting, through nationalistic clichés, on a moral/ju-
ridical battle that has already been lost (since, as she herself claims,
the biotech lobby has already co-opted Mexican legislation), Ribei-
ro’s discourse turns reproachful and bitter to a point that it is not
just useless but also counterproductive. Her outrage reduces acti-
vism to a tiresome lamentation of something that has already hap-
pened and that (one is forced to conclude) is therefore inevitable—
namely, racist attacks, neocolonial violence, corrupt and immoral




injury seems to stop Ribeiro from interrogating why not just a few
corrupt individuals but also farmers unions, farming associations,
and even a good share of the Mexican public actually seem willing
to endure the contamination of Mexican maize and Mexican cul-
ture.
In Ribeiro’s framework, the explanation can only reside in the
widespread moral corruption or sheer ignorance of the masses,
which suggests a rather disturbing resonance with the discourse of
the media and business elite behind Iniciativa México. Like the lat-
ter, Ribeiro’s discourse ends up framing the issue of biotechnology
in terms of moral corruption; yet unlike the elites’ positive injunc-
tion to develop “an attitude toward change,” Ribeiro’s endless re-
criminations against corrupt elites leave her readers feeling that
there is little to be done in the face of such age-old problems. De-
spite the fact that successful entrepreneurship actually requires a
good deal more than moral initiative, iMx’s emphasis on the agency
of ordinary citizens inspired many Mexicans to a surprising point:
while PMMM did not even win the contest, many other “initiatives”
involving organic agriculture and environmental care at the com-
munity level achieved a degree of visibility previously unthinkable
in Mexican media culture. This is not to say that we should cele-
brate the happy discourse of iMx and dismiss the angry discourse of
activists; yet it appears that Verschoor was right in warning activists
that their position would be undermined when the biotech lobby
appropriated their claims of preservation and protection of the en-
vironment without really changing economic priorities.
In order to avoid the logic of the business elite, activism would
need to go beyond a moralistic reassertion of identitarian clichés.
Part of this involves trying to appropriate and subvert the way in
which the business elite mobilizes those same clichés so as to inter-
pellate the Mexicans as such, but, more fundamentally, I agree with
Verschoor about the need to interrogate the philosophical structure
that opposing arguments share in the debates around the contami-
nation of native maize. PMMM raises the issue that some actors
have more material authority than others in determining risk and
accountability within a specific symbolic framework. On the one
hand, this is a political problem (a problem involving power strug-
gles) that cannot be solved in any straightforward rational way, for
instance, by producing more and more empirical information about
environmental risks and planetary health. On the other hand, since
the discourse of development is still commonsensically accepted as






ly mobilize Mexican citizens against the agroindustrial occupation
of the Mexican countryside. What can be done when moralistic de-
nunciations and empirical information turn out to be ineffective?
CONCLUSION: LOCAL KNOWLEDGES,
POSTMODERN TECHNOSCIENCE
At the time of his prescient critique of activist moralism, Verschoor
did not identify different principles of moral and political philoso-
phy in activist discourse. He focused on the underlying logic of all
regimes of justification, which came down, in his view, to a deter-
minist belief in technology. His intervention remains instructive,
particularly as he calls on activists to go beyond the “over-lucid
indictment of all that is morally objectionable.” Mexican scientists
as well as philosophers, however, have actively participated in the
Mexican debate around transgenic maize, developing arguments
beyond moral judgments and calling for a serious ethical question-
ing of the authority of experts.78 Similarly, an acknowledgment of
the historical “impurity” of science and technology need not lead us
to downplay the challenges of technoscientific capitalism. On the
contrary, it might help “us” Mexican knowledge producers to give
up on melancholy, moralism and wishful thinking in order to start
valorizing the increasing politicization and interrogation of our role
in the wider society, for society as a whole is exposed to the trans-
formations entailed by technoscientific capitalism.
Like Argentinian cultural critic Beatriz Sarlo, mentioned in the
previous chapter, Mexican philosophers of science have expressed
frustration at the indifference, on the part of Northern historians,
toward science in “peripheral” places such as Latin America. They
have also described a feeling of entrapment within the kind of ra-
tionality that reinforces the peripherality or marginality of such
places in relation to the dominant narratives of the history of sci-
ence. Frida Gorbach and Carlos López Beltrán write, in this vein, “It
happened that, in many ways, that central history, even when one
attempted to fight it, was repeated locally, again and again, and in
the end we didn’t do more than import Northern methods and
theories, while we exported data and useful case studies so as to
expand the explanatory power of those historiographies.”79
For some of these researchers, the dilemma was whether to flat-
ter the controlling and exoticizing gaze of dominant historiogra-
phies or to take sides with the relativist, postmodern and postcolo-
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nial critics. Both extremes seemed to leave critics without a histori-
cal place for the local sciences. For others, the choice was between
nationalism and diffusionism—that is, between an essentialist at-
tempt to capture the local contributions to science and a “realistic”
vision of such contributions in terms of bad copies of a science
achieved elsewhere. Every path, however, ended up reinforcing the
centrality of Europe as the subject of history; “thus there was no
alternative to showing Europe how modern we are, or to tell her
how we adapt, configure and commemorate the nationalist singu-
larity. In one or another way, we continued searching for essential-
isms.”80 The researchers discovered a fundamental inhibition in the
thinking of non-European sciences and histories from any place oth-
er than Europe. Even though the historiographic revolution made it
possible and necessary to understand sciences as knowledges—that
is, “as cultural practices within complex power relationships”81 —it
did not leave clear instructions as to how Mexican knowledge pro-
ducers must proceed in order to distance themselves from the Euro-
pean frameworks. Nationalism was not an option, since it
amounted to a reproduction of the centrality of the center as the
only possible way of defining oneself in terms of success or failure,
development or stagnation, alignment or nonalignment. Beyond the
melancholic mourning of development’s failure, their historio-
graphic deconstruction of Eurocentric narratives in revolutionary
science has thus turned into an active intervention in the contempo-
rary cultural struggle for a more democratic technoscience.
Writing in 1979, Lyotard argued that scientists must resist the
subordination of knowledge to industry “if they feel that the civil
society of which they are members is badly represented by the
State.”82 A purely oppositional reaction, however, is unlikely to suc-
ceed. Lyotard instead proposes a sort of radical science, a general-
ized and, in a sense, impure scientific practice, which would be
about less about objective expertise than about play. Donna Har-
away’s approach to technoscience illustrates the kind of playful ex-
perimentation that Lyotard recommends as a more effective politi-
cal response to the capitalist imperative of efficiency. She under-
stands technoscience as a domain in which science and technology
are so thoroughly interrelated that one category “cannot be used to
explain the other, and neither can be reduced to the status of context
for the other.”83 At work in this concept of technoscience is a rela-
tional ontology in which language and materiality are inseparable.
Technoscience is about materialized refiguration because technos-



















urative”; their ambiguous nature means that technoscience “must
involve at least some kind of displacement that can trouble identifi-
cations and certainties.”84 Since the power to distinguish between
the technical and the political “is very much at the heart of technos-
cience,” for Haraway technoscience is “more, less, and other than
reduction, commodification, resourcing, determinism, or any of the
other scolding words that much critical theory would force on the
practitioners of science studies.”85 If technoscience cannot be simply
reduced to capitalist competition, what, then, can technoscience be-
come in a context defined by political and economic subordination?
The chapters that follow address this question by taking the focus
from science policy toward cultural policy and finally to the more
speculative field of technoscience feminism, which will allow me to
perform a rhetorical intervention in the biotechnology debates en-
acted by scientific and activist literature from the defense of Mexi-
can maize.
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The People of Maize and the
Technoscience of Culture
In The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard defined post-
modernity as an age in which knowledge, having lost its metaphysi-
cal foundations, is produced as a weapon in a global economic war.
In his prognosis the new economic role of knowledge would lead to
a widening of the gap between rich and poor countries. The same
prognosis underpinned the widespread adoption of science policy
by the Mexican government, which gradually sought to promote
new attitudes and behaviors toward knowledge production based
on the neoliberal premise that a country’s economic survival de-
pended on its technoscientific competitiveness in the global econo-
my. Mexican scientists resisted the implementation of neoliberal sci-
ence policy by invoking older narratives of pure science and nation-
al sovereignty. A failure to question conventional historiographies
of science and technology, however, reduced their engagement with
the technoscientific conjuncture to a reassertion of “revolutionary
science,” that is, to a fantasy of progress by means of science and
technology. By contrast, a new generation of Mexican historians
and philosophers of science started to explicitly challenge the lega-
cies of both revolutionary nationalism and dominant, Eurocentric
narratives of science and technology. Rather than just lamenting the
end of state support for so-called pure science, they focused their
attention on the symbolic and material construction of national sci-
ence in relation to colonial history and global capitalism. Their work
signals a renewed engagement with technoscience that constitutes a
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critical alternative to modernizing judgments of “Third World bio-
technology.” In this chapter I expand the critical notion of science as
culture into a critical notion of culture as science. I focus on heritage
activism as a political engagement with technoscience, so as to ana-
lyze both the possibilities and the potential obstacles of a culture-
centered defense of traditional maize agriculture on the part of so-
cial movements.
Heritage has come to be officially understood as a construct and
a form of cultural politics that inevitably recreates “a sense of inclu-
sion and exclusion.”1 From this perspective, every heritage is intan-
gible in the sense that it is never an objective given. Heritage be-
comes tangible only when certain immaterial values appropriate
institutional spaces through acts of power. For instance, by uphold-
ing the universality of a particular set of European values, the Unit-
ed Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s
(UNESCO) World Heritage List sanctioned an international hierar-
chy of cultural relevance or status, a hierarchy that was challenged
during the culture wars of the 1980s. UNESCO’s concept of intan-
gible cultural heritage in turn institutionalized the critical compro-
mises reached through these wars (such as the official recognition of
“cultural diversity”). Early in the Mexican campaign against trans-
genic maize, a heterogeneous group of activists came up with the
idea of appealing to international cultural policy as a strategic do-
main from which to advance their defense of Mexican maize varie-
ties. A diverse group of citizens, including professional anthropolo-
gists, urban chefs, popular cooks, food writers, journalists and
government officials, sought the inscription of Mexican cuisine in
UNESCO’s List of Masterpieces of Intangible Cultural Heritage
starting in 2002. Through their “nomination files,” advocates of
Mexican cuisine called for a defense of indigenous cultures along-
side national identity, both defined in terms of traditional cuisine,
against global threats such as junk food and genetically modified
organisms (GMOs). They argued that UNESCO’s recognition
would help to ensure the “viability” of Mexican food culture in a
globalized world. It took them eight years to finally achieve inscrip-
tion in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of
Humanity (2010). The process involved one failed attempt under-
taken by Mexican public institutions and academic activists and a
second, successful intervention on the part of urban gastronomic
entrepreneurs sponsored by the transnational food corporation
Maseca-Gruma.
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The role of industrial actors in achieving the UNESCO seal of
approval makes clear that intangible heritage is an ambiguous, slip-
pery terrain rather than a straightforward oppositional force. In-
deed, much like science policy, cultural policy in the neoliberal era
is elaborated by international think tanks promoting attitudes and
behaviors appropriate for the transformation of all social practices
into economic resources. With the argument of making cultures “vi-
able” in the era of globalization, contemporary cultural policy pro-
motes their technoscientific integration into the market economy. At
present, the heritage contest between nations is less about cultural
prestige than about the relative capacity of local cultures to “sur-
vive” the threats of globalization. In the absence of clear alternatives
to global capitalism, cultural policy has become an effort to preserve
cultural diversity through its productive integration into a global
market of symbolic goods and services. In this context, cultural poli-
cy came to promote new technoscientific attitudes as the proper
response to the demise of industrial development. The new technos-
cientific attitudes rely on a figuration of culture as an economic
resource that can allow a country to face up to the challenges of a
global economic war.
Jeffrey Pilcher’s cultural history of Mexican cuisine clearly ex-
plains how the nationalist celebration of maize obscured the deval-
uation of rural life and local agricultural knowledges in postrevolu-
tionary Mexico. His conclusion, however, celebrates revolutionary
nationalism as a key to the continuity of Mexican food culture. In
his view, such a continuity also entails a space for popular agency.2
By contrast, in the age of globalization, “postmodernism” would be
threatening “peasant cuisines” with nothing less than an “apoca-
lypse.”3 In other words, Pilcher later charged that in Mexico “post-
modern” organizations such as Slow Food divert social movements
toward “middle-class agendas with little relevance to the needs of
common people,” that is, of “the mestizo (mixed-race) majority, who
do not speak an indigenous language but still suffer economic and
political marginalization.”4 In Pilcher’s view, since organizations
such as Slow Food are insensitive to class issues, their articulation
with social movements in Mexico promises nothing but a degenera-
tion of peasant cuisines into exoticized commodities for privileged
consumers. Yet, is it fair to blame postmodernism rather than mod-
ern development theories and policies for the current situation of
Mexican peasants and their cuisines? Without overlooking the elit-
ist tendencies of gastronomic discourse, I propose to explore the





nuanced understanding of postmodernism. I aim to eschew apoca-
lyptic moralism so as to elaborate a critical reflection around the
political opportunities opened up by the new technoscience of cul-
ture.
In what follows I first situate historically and philosophically,
and then analyze, the debates to which UNESCO’s recognition led
among the activists and promoters of Mexican cuisine. Such debates
concerned precisely the technoscientific character of UNESCO’s
prescriptions for safeguarding Mexican cuisine as intangible heri-
tage—particularly an articulation of cultural know-how with the
capitalist economy, with all the regulatory and expert intervention
that such an articulation involves. Is intangible cultural heritage a
postmodern apocalypse for Mexican traditional cuisine, or is it rath-
er a platform for postmodern knowledge? Or is it, perhaps, both at
one and the same time?
NATION AND HERITAGE:
UNSTABLE MATERIALIZATIONS OF POWER/KNOWLEDGE
Stuart Hall once defined heritage as “the whole complex of organ-
isations, institutions and practices devoted to the presentation of
culture and the arts.”5 With Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault,
he argued that the cultural domain exercises a specific kind of pow-
er—namely, the power “to order knowledge, to rank, classify and
arrange, and thus to give meaning to objects and things through the
imposition of interpretative schemas, scholarship and authority of
connoisseurship.”6 In short, heritage creates hegemony by means of
power/knowledge, which produces a compliant subjectivity or
governmentality. In order to emphasize the subtlety of these opera-
tions, Hall draws our attention to the very quaintness of the term, to
how innocently it slips into the everyday speech of multicultural
Britain, where heritage automatically evokes the conservation of
historical sites as opposed to the production and circulation of new
work. Such a heritage is intended not for a multicultural society in
which all differences, past and present, count the same but for a
society imagined as culturally homogeneous and unified. The des-
ignation of the English past as the nation’s heritage clearly illus-
trates the role of heritage in creating an imaginary consensus
around “a particular settlement of structured inequalities.”7 More-
over, it conceals the fact that those features appearing in the imagi-
nary as primordial “English” virtues, such as free speech and the
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welfare state, actually form the focus point of ongoing conflicts in a
society in fact characterized as heterogeneous and riven by dis-
agreements.
Contemporary cultural studies has thus undertaken a close scru-
tiny of heritage, paying particular attention to the persistence of
imperial and colonial imaginaries in its construction. It has aimed to
understand and expose how the national heritage works to produce
and organize social hierarchies, as well as how such hierarchies can
be negotiated through heritage practices. In this regard, despite the
usefulness of Foucault’s theory of the productive operations of
power/knowledge, the theory makes it too difficult to explain “how
or why bodies should not always-for-ever turn up, in place, at the
right time.”8 Drawing on Judith Butler’s theory of gender performa-
tivity, Hall argues that heritage involves more than an abstract
power exercised unilaterally through the filtering of representa-
tions. In Gender Trouble, Butler describes how words, acts, gestures
and desire repeatedly enact fantasies of incorporation that end up
producing, on the surface of the body, “the effect of an internal core
or substance.” She writes, “It is clear that coherence is desired,
wished for, idealized, and that this idealization is an effect of a
corporeal signification. In other words, acts, gestures, and desire
produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this
on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences
that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity
as a cause.”9
In Bodies That Matter Butler explains that she conceives “matter”
not really as a pregiven site or a surface but rather as “a process of
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of
boundary, fixity, and surface.”10 She developed this clarification in
response to criticisms of her statements that the body has “no onto-
logical status apart from the various acts which constitute its real-
ity.”11 In this way she strengthens her original conception of perfor-
mativity as “not a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, . . . the
reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the
effects that it names.”12 The popularity of claims that Mexicans are
“a people of maize” and that “maize is our flesh” speaks indeed of a
strong psychic investment in a desired and idealized coherence that
seeks to materialize through the bodily acts of cooking and eating.
These citational practices allow for the positioning of maize as the
“cause” of a collective identity, and institutions that figure maize as
national heritage reinforce (as well as exploit) such a positioning. In




understand heritage as an ongoing series of repeated acts that con-
geal over time and nevertheless remain dependent on reiteration.
If reiteration is necessary for discourse to produce that which it
names, this means that the materialization of discourse remains for-
ever incomplete, for “bodies never quite comply with the norms by
which their materialization is impelled.”13 Thus, people are never
just passive recipients of heritage discourse; rather they identify
actively with that discourse, as if their drives invested themselves
through bodily enactments of heritage. Seen thus, Mexicanness ap-
pears as more than a set of imposed abstract representations; it
appears as a material and discursive terrain in which subjects
emerge through fantasies of substantiality, coherence and indeed
collectivity. Hall writes, “It is through identifying with these repre-
sentations that we come to be its subjects by subjecting ourselves to
its dominant meanings.”14 Yet while such representations necessari-
ly involve a concealment of the filtering operations of power/knowl-
edge, it would be only a matter of time or, as Hall puts it, of a shift
in circumstances, before dominant narrations of “Mexicanness”
were again revealed as “context-bound, historically specific, and
thus open to contestation, re-negotiation, and revision.”15
After the conquest of Mesoamerica, the Spanish Crown sought
to put an end to the research on pre-Columbian history initiated by
Catholic missionaries, whose publications were first of all cen-
sored.16 Thousands of indigenous cities and practices were then
“lost” from the map of knowledge, at least until the nineteenth
century, when Mexico became independent of Spain. At that time,
Creole elites made great efforts to localize the ruins of Mesoamerica,
which they started to imagine as the primordial origins of the Mexi-
can nation. Crucial for the conversion of pre-Columbian ruins into
the “national patrimony” were the writings of foreign traveler-sci-
entists such as Alexander von Humboldt, whose depiction of an-
cient societies as “civilizations” within the Eurocentric vision of
world civilization laid down the narrative structure not just of early
Mexican nationalism but also, much later, of world heritage dis-
course at UNESCO. UNESCO indeed modeled much of its heritage
policy on the history of European architectural and archaeological
conservation—what Laurajane Smith calls an “authorized heritage
discourse”—which defines heritage as aesthetic, tangible and mon-
umental.17 Diverse institutions created in Europe and its colonies
contributed to narrating, naturalizing and universalizing an enlight-
ened enthusiasm for “classical antiquity,” until it became “a self-
evident element of social life.”18
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In the years following the Mexican Revolution (1910–1921), edu-
cational policy took priority over the conservation of ruins. The
state set out to produce a modern citizenry through an ideological
celebration of Mexican national identity as a racial and cultural mix-
ture of Amerindian and Hispanic cultures. The nationalist celebra-
tion of mestizaje expressed a desire for cultural homogeneity
achieved through racial and educational “improvement” of rural
and indigenous populations.19 In this context, ancient Mesoameri-
can ruins were recreated in temporary and traveling exhibits, cultu-
ral missions and pictorial works. Muralists Diego Rivera, David
Alfaro Siqueiros and José Clemente Orozco drew simultaneously on
Mayan and Aztec works, Catholic church altarpieces, regional
handicrafts and European avant-garde experimentalism for their
iconographic constructions of Mexican identity. By the 1950s, indus-
trialization and tourism had given rise to a complex network of
specialized museums and archeological sites, which expanded in
parallel with the schooling system and the mass media. In all these
institutional networks, monumental pre-Columbian sculpture, rural
imagery and indigenous handicrafts dominated the presentation of
the “national patrimony,” mostly along the guidelines of classic Eu-
ropean museums—namely, aestheticism and decontextualization.
Although no institutionalized discipline of cultural studies exists
in Mexico, several scholars, among them Néstor García Canclini,
have studied the exercise of power through the symbolic construc-
tion of the Mexican “national patrimony.” In his classic Hybrid Cul-
tures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity, García Canclini
criticizes the conception of the national patrimony as a set of objects
to be glorified and preserved, with its associated privileging of his-
torical sites over the production and circulation of new work. State
patrimonialism, he says, may have served to preserve and democra-
tize access to cultural goods that would otherwise have disappeared
as a consequence of capitalist modernization. However, precisely
this same process prevented a “just and solidary” reappropriation
of territorial space and historical time.20 As the postrevolutionary
state co-opted cultural production and channeled it toward a reiter-
ation of its nationalist doctrines, continuing social inequality led to
a view of “modernity” as a “mask” or a “simulacrum” to which
new generations of cultural producers could relate only with a
sense of guilt.21 Writing at a time when Mexico was about to under-
go the neoliberal acculturation that eventually marked its “transi-
tion to democracy,” García Canclini proposes to undertake a radical




through an interrogation of traditionalism, which he sees above all
as a false solution to the country’s predicament in the global con-
juncture.
García Canclini emphasizes that Mexican democracy was not
achieved through the celebration of the national patrimony. On the
contrary, such a version of the authorized heritage discourse be-
came the axis of the state’s cultural policy at a very specific time,
when rural populations were being subjected to modernizing or
development policies. Rural imagery and artifacts came to sustain
“a metaphysical, ahistorical view of the national being” strictly for
the sake of modernity.22 The transnational culture industries that
came to permeate everyday life in Latin America by the final
decades of the twentieth century facilitated whatever precarious
cultural democratization took place subsequently. In this context,
state patrimonialism was nothing more than a compensatory prac-
tice, governed by the principle that if we cannot compete with the
culture industries, “let us celebrate our handicrafts and old tech-
niques.”23 Investing in such a principle, however, has the serious
consequence of creating even more “difficulties in performance.”
As an alternative, García Canclini invites us to draw the conse-
quences from “the postmodern deconstruction of Western Moder-
nity.” He envisions an exit from the modern dichotomy of moder-
nity and tradition precisely through an interrogation of the status of
modernity. The critical task is to understand how a plurality of
cultural actors “relocate their practices in the face of [the] contradic-
tions of modernity, or how they imagine they could do so.”24 In a
postmodern, deconstructive spirit, he declares, “There can be no
future for our past while we waver between the reactive fundamen-
talisms against the modernity achieved, and the abstract modern-
isms that resist problematizing our “deficient” capacity to be mod-
ern. To leave behind this “western,” this maniacal pendulum, it is
not enough to be interested in how traditions are reproduced and
transformed. The postmodern contribution is useful for escaping
from the impasse insofar as it reveals the constructed and staged
character of all tradition, including that of modernity: it refutes the
originary quality of traditions and the originality of innovations.”25
As the passage above clearly suggests, the postmodern critique
of metanarratives and essentialisms was crucial to demystify heri-
tage practices and examine them as an arena of cultural and politi-
cal struggle. In the aftermath of that critique, cultural processes are
interesting no longer “for their capacity to remain ‘pure’ and equal
to themselves”26 but rather for their willingness to adapt to the
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needs of the present. While inequalities certainly persist in the ap-
propriation of symbolic goods, they “no longer take the simple and
polarized form we thought we would encounter when we were
dividing every country into dominant or dominated, or the world
into empires and dependent nations.”27 From this perspective, the
challenge for Mexican culture is not an either/or identity choice but
an adaptation to the new conditions of heterogeneity, mobility and
deterritorialization. Hence, in Hybrid Cultures most analyses of con-
crete subjects such as Octavio Paz, Mexican television spectators,
museum audiences, vanguard artists and popular artisans invoke
the need to develop novel theoretical approaches that take into ac-
count “postmodern deconstruction.” In a typical instance, García
Canclini argues, “In almost all the literature on patrimony it is still
necessary to effect that operation of rupture with the naive realism
that epistemology long ago carried out.”28 Yet he himself refuses to
take such a rupture to its last consequences, a refusal that that
speaks of the particularities of cultural studies in Mexico and Latin
America.
Despite his recognition of the critical virtues of “postmodern-
ism,” García Canclini demarcates Latin American cultural studies
from both the earlier literatures on “the national being” and “the
postmodern bibliography.” He explains the reasons for this discipli-
nary demarcation as follows: “It is a question of seeing how, within
the crisis of Western modernity—of which Latin America is a part—
the relations among tradition, cultural modernism, and socioeco-
nomic modernization are transformed. For that it is necessary to go
beyond the philosophical speculation and aesthetic intuitionism
that dominate the postmodern bibliography. The scarcity of empiri-
cal studies on the place of culture in so-called postmodern processes
has resulted in a relapse into distortions of premodern thought:
constructing ideal positions without any real reference.”29
By opposing real referents to philosophical speculation, García
Canclini seems to reinstate the modern epistemic framework that
postmodernism had so usefully called into question. Such a poten-
tial relapse into empiricism may follow from local institutional his-
tories that ground cultural research in disciplines such as anthropol-
ogy and sociology rather than opening it up to contemporary phi-
losophy. With Disrupting Maize I want to contribute in part by di-
versifying cultural research through a distinctively theoretical ap-
proach to heritage activism, one that highlights the vitality of textu-
al philosophical approaches to concrete social phenomena such as




tation of policy documents, nomination files and press coverage
related to the inscription of Mexican cuisine at UNESCO, I attempt
to show that “postmodernism” has been much more than a philo-
sophical tool for social scientists or a preserve of speculators. As a
set of ideas, it has actually permeated the expert field of cultural
policy, which continues to mobilize material resources and stimu-
late competition among states through its recognition of cultural
diversity. Taking heed of Hall’s warnings against an exclusive em-
phasis on abstract domination by discourse, I try to diagnose the
inherent constraints as well as the possibilities opened for activism
by a “postmodern” trend in cultural policy. While the trend sig-
naled a time, and a shift in circumstances, that revealed Mexican-
ness as “context-bound, historically specific, and thus open to con-
testation, re-negotiation, and revision,” it also rendered modern po-
litical narratives useless for the project of revalorizing and protect-
ing maize as national heritage.
INTANGIBLE HERITAGE:
NOSTALGIA, POSTMODERNISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE
The remarkable presence of heritage issues in contemporary social
sciences, public debate, policymaking and intergovernmental dis-
cussions has been aptly interpreted as a nostalgic response to the
postmodern crisis of modern metanarratives. Anthropologist Quet-
zil Castañeda narrates how in the aftermath of “the great culture
wars” of the 1990s, cultural diversity came to be recognized as
“really real reality that could not be uprooted by modernization
schemes and political solutions to the problem of the Other.”30 The
wars, he says, left “no immanent logic of reintegration for the frag-
ments and shards of cultural wholes,” and thus a desire for heritage
installed itself as a desire “to make the present ‘whole’ by reunify-
ing it with a resuscitated past.”31 Heritage thus speaks of the con-
temporary structure of feeling, which interestingly introduces the
possibility of relating heritage practices to the fact of a loss, and a
failure, of modern political narratives. Rather than framing such a
failure as a postmodern apocalypse, I want to explore the possibil-
ities for turning heritage activism into a critical engagement with
technoscience. What does “technoscience” mean the context of heri-
tage practices? Typical technoscientific images of corporate labora-
tories, knowledge productivism and technologically driven re-
search seem to be absent from this field, which is not protagonized
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by scientists and chief executive officers but rather by critical
anthropologists, nationalist bureaucrats and a motley crew of previ-
ously invisible subjects. The transnational world of heritage, how-
ever, turns out to be as enmeshed in technoscientific dynamics as
the world of science itself.
Until the 1980s, national debates around “folk cultures” had res-
onated with larger tensions in international policy discourse be-
tween economic modernizers at the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank on the one hand and UNESCO social scientists
on the other hand. The discursive hegemony of the modernizers
meant that folk cultures needed to be superseded if “Third World”
nation-states were to achieve “development”—hence the ambiva-
lent relation between the Mexican postrevolutionary state and the
nation’s folk cultures. Toward the end of the postrevolutionary era,
which coincided with the decline of the Keynesian paradigm world-
wide, more nuanced positions emerged at both ends of the interna-
tional ideological spectrum. At the economic end, a neoliberal
understanding of culture as “social capital” was developed. At the
anthropological end, a defense of “diversity” began to take shape
on the grounds of a nonessentialist, performative understanding of
culture.32 “Intangible cultural heritage” eventually emerged from
these ideological rearticulations as a strategic domain where experts
and state officials converged around the need to promote “a differ-
ent mix of culture and the economy.”33 Even though the Conven-
tion for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage was not
adopted until 2003, its intellectual and institutional history reaches
back to the 1980s, the decade that saw the legacy of countercultural
politics face the new world order of neoliberalism.
In 1982, the year of the debt crisis that preceded Mexico’s turn
toward neoliberalism, the World Conference on Cultural Policies
took place in Mexico City. There, UNESCO adopted for the first
time a definition of culture that went beyond the arts and human-
ities to include folk cultures, local worldviews and traditional ways
of life. In parallel with the conference, the National Museum of
Popular Cultures opened with a major exhibition called Maize: The
Foundation of Mexican Popular Culture. In the words of museum
founder and first director Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, a leading Mexi-
can anthropologist, the whole point of the museum was “to iden-
tify, display and valorize the autonomous cultural production of the
popular sectors, a production that makes them creators rather than
mere consumers of an imposed culture.”34 The maize exhibition ex-
plicitly opposed, among many other things, “the diversity and flex-
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ibility of traditional agricultural technologies” with the project of
“transnational companies that conceive maize as a mere commodity
unrelated to the cultural and historical context that gives maize its
true importance for the Mexican people.”35 Moreover, besides the
usual gathering of objects, artifacts, images and explanatory notes
within the space of the museum, the exhibition showcased the re-
sults of a larger project involving writing contests and other mecha-
nisms that had encouraged the participation of citizens across the
Mexican republic. In retrospect, Bonfil Batalla’s project for an auton-
omous cultural production based on a revalorization of popular
creativity sounds like an early battle cry, an anticipation of the glo-
bal “culture wars” that would culminate in the international recog-
nition of “cultural diversity” as the main object of heritage preserva-
tion.
Throughout UNESCO’s World Decade for Cultural Develop-
ment (1987–1997), the relation between “culture” and “develop-
ment” was reconceptualized in response to a growing tension be-
tween an anthropological defense of cultural diversity and an eco-
nomic drive to integrate it into global capitalism. By the end of the
1980s, national state officials from the global South, who protested
against the Eurocentric selection criteria of the World Heritage List,
actively sought an international recognition of “living” popular cul-
tures. Their motivations in turn blended the twin desires for cultu-
ral prestige and to set up and benefit from domestic heritage indus-
tries. Debates were held at UNESCO over whether to incorporate
living cultures into the World Heritage List or, rather, to design a
separate “instrument” for them. Preparation of the latter took off
with the 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Cul-
ture and Folklore, in which anthropological experts started to craft
new notions of “development” based on a revalorization of the
creativity and know-how of living traditional cultures. Yet not until
1995 did such a revalorization become a matter of, so to speak,
ecological urgency. Our Creative Diversity, a World Commission on
Cultural Development report, claimed that wars, environmental
disasters and inattentive development policies endangered cultural
diversity. Moreover, it argued that something needed to be done to
preserve living traditional cultures from economic expropriation,
reification and elimination. This project, however, seemed doomed
if it did not somehow get articulated with the global economy.
Eventually, it became a program for the rational management of
cultural “skills, enabling factors, products, impacts and economic
value.”36 Thus defined, intangible heritage came to be permeated
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by neoliberalism as a political rationality of “viability” through cul-
tural performance. Suffused with neoliberal languages, a new “tech-
noscience of culture” (that is, a global industry of cultural conserva-
tion and production) came to operate through a cosmopolitan cele-
bration of intangible cultural heritage. Ironically, another Mexican
anthropologist in this way neutralized Guillermo Bonfil Batalla’s
defense of popular culture.
In a testimonial account of expert intergovernmental meetings
that took place between 1999 and 2003, Mexican anthropologist and
UNESCO advisor Lourdes Arizpe explains that the crafting of in-
tangible heritage involved a “reconstruction of meaning” of the
term “intangible,” so as to mobilize “a people- and process-centred
understanding of cultural heritage.”37 In 2001, Arizpe won a debate
over the definition of intangible heritage. Her adversary was Brazil-
ian anthropologist Manuela da Cunha, who had proposed a broad-
er definition including the management of biodiversity by indige-
nous peoples. Arizpe argued instead for a concept of intangible
heritage as “a process of creation comprising skills, enabling factors,
products, impacts and economic value.”38 By restricting itself to
oral traditions, practices of social cohesion and “beliefs about nature
and the cosmos,” Arizpe’s definition would prevent conflicts
around indigenous property rights with other international bodies
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization. Given that
trade-related issues such as intellectual property fall beyond the
scope of UNESCO, Arizpe’s definition succeeded over da Cunha’s.
The very definition of intangible cultural heritage was therefore
designed to remain neutral in relation to economic disputes be-
tween “cultures,” states and transnational actors. This economic
neutrality does not free intangible cultural heritage from political
implications, so it is worth looking into the kind of politics that
emerges from the discourse of the Mexican author of the UNESCO
concept of intangible cultural heritage.
In “Intangible Cultural Heritage, Diversity and Coherence,”
Arizpe argues that intangible cultural heritage aims at reconciling
“cultural coherence” with “cultural freedom” in a world “over-
loaded” with migration, tourism, television and the Internet. Ac-
cording to Arizpe, these features of globalization induce an experi-
ence of “cognitive dissonance” with “deleterious effects for psycho-
logical well-being.”39 Fundamentalism, for example, is presented as
a psychologically disturbed response to globalization, which “inevi-
tably produces a cultural overload, similar to information overload,





provide the nucleus of individuals’ personalities and norms of be-
haviour.”40 Echoing Castañeda’s angel of history, Arizpe writes,
“People all around the world do not want to be left without a soul.
This helps explain the extraordinary upsurge of cultural politics
surrounding the loss and transformation of cultural practices,
which evolved over millennia in all regions of the world, and which
have been disappearing at an alarming rate in only 50 years.”41
In order to avert fundamentalism it is necessary, she says, “to
keep a basic cultural coherence, albeit one that does not translate as
cultural hostility.”42 Arizpe argues that recognizing “great cultural
achievements” as intangible heritage would help to “preserv[e] a
certain harmony, a kind of ‘golden cultural proportion’ whereby
people can safeguard intimate cultural roots, whether originally as-
cribed or adopted, while feeling free to embrace whatever they have
reasons to value from other cultures.”43 In other words, as a celebra-
tion of the “deliberate, conscious choices of groups to assume an
identity by defining themselves in certain ways,”44 intangible heri-
tage would help to eradicate fundamentalisms from societies ex-
posed to the psychological challenges of globalization.
Among the problems in Arizpe’s discourse are a positivistic de-
piction of globalization as a threat to mental health, an abstract
characterization of cultural achievements as free choices made by
preconstituted cultural groups, and a rationalistic understanding of
identity formation processes. By counterposing (rational) “free
choices” and (friendly) “great achievements” with fundamental-
isms (or mental illnesses), Arizpe’s discourse actually conceals the
symbolic violence at work in UNESCO’s own activity. While she
recognizes the tendency of all cultural groups to “create a sense of
identity by defining themselves towards other groups,”45 Arizpe
seems to downplay the fact that processes of self-definition emerge
historically within relations of hierarchy and through antagonism
rather than friendly reasoning or smooth cooperation. Given that
current cultural “choices” still occur within relations of hierarchy
and antagonisms, it is not possible to separate, as Arizpe does, the
production of “cultural distinctiveness” from processes that lend
“privileges or disadvantages in given political settings.”46 Given
that in the framework of global capitalism, the profitable potential
of heritage fosters competition and disputes among states and with-
in states around the economic appropriation of culture, the dimen-
sion of power seems inescapable.
Guillermo Bonfil Batalla’s inauguration of the National Museum
of Popular Cultures in Mexico involved a discourse of cultural
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autonomy against cultural imposition. After the “great culture
wars,” the institutional consolidation of “creative diversity” took
the form of Lourdes Arizpe’s cosmopolitan antidote to fundamen-
talism. Intangible cultural heritage was initially conceived in the
hope that it would provide opportunities to interrogate the process
through which something comes to be valued as “heritage” and that
such an interrogation would finally include “local people especially
in the developing countries.”47 At present, researchers of heritage
express skepticism about both the technical and the philosophical
capacity of intangible cultural heritage to address the complexity of
contemporary power relations.
Another participant in the relevant “expert meetings,” Icelandic
delegate Valdimar Hafstein, reports that one of the most controver-
sial issues at the 2003 Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts on the
Preliminary Draft Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage was the purpose of registers of intangible cultural
heritage. Initially, there would be a list of “treasures” or “master-
pieces,” as in the 1997 Proclamation of Masterpieces of Oral and
Intangible Heritage of Humanity. Against this project, some coun-
try delegates argued that selection criteria such as “exceptional val-
ue” would divert the democratizing aims of the new convention by
producing a list as “subjective and elitist” as the World Heritage
List. A universal register, by contrast, would prevent the repetition
of old forms of exclusion. Purely technical requirements such as
adequate documentation, exposition of relevant domestic legisla-
tion, proper identification of the communities concerned and a safe-
guarding plan would be the only conditions states had fulfill to
inscribe their intangible heritages in the universal register.48 While
many delegates agreed with the political arguments in favor of a
universal register, Hafstein reports, most of them did not actually
support it. One Brazilian delegate counterargued pragmatically,
“We cannot safeguard everything, and this means we cannot value
everything equally.”49 After intense confrontations, delegates final-
ly settled on a compromise solution—namely, the Representative
List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. This solution
rejected excellence as a criterion so as to prevent hierarchies and
competition among states. Yet, as Hafstein observes, “representativ-
ity” is rather indeterminate as a criterion of selection and raises the
question of what the listed heritage actually represents. Such a para-
dox illustrates, he concludes, that heritage practices can only work
by “creating casualties,” that is, by giving a seal of approval to some




register of intangible cultural heritage is itself nothing but a list, the
dustbin of history is perhaps the instrument it can least do with-
out.50
Hafstein’s testimony exposes the limitations of Arizpe’s dis-
course by demonstrating that intangible cultural heritage can only
materialize in partial ways within given political contexts. As he
recalls, Southern challenges to authorized heritage discourse in-
cluded from the start a calculation to stake a claim on the benefits of
tourism, which states in the neoliberal era quickly came to regard as
a means to guarantee the survival of places and practices that had
lost their former economic function. In such a conjuncture, intan-
gible heritage is unlikely to operate as a transparent, benign pro-
moter of “friendly” cosmopolitan relations. Rather, it seems to oper-
ate as the performative enactment of a neoliberal “governmental-
ity.” In this vein, anthropologist Regina Bendix describes heritage
as a process through which actors weave authenticity/inauthenticity
arguments in order to present heritage as emanating from one par-
ticular cultural context in order to claim ownership or custodial care
over it.51 While the status of heritage seems to depend on who can
make the biggest moral claim—for example, “great achievements”
as opposed to “fundamentalisms”—there is no way of achieving or
maintaining such a status without articulating it with two mecha-
nisms of the contemporary global economy: competition, which fos-
ters innovation and marketing, and quality control, a central ele-
ment of a highly regulatory “audit” culture.
As the text of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intan-
gible Cultural Heritage suggests, intangible heritage is no longer
about protecting autonomous cultural production; rather it is about
a new educational project based on the concept of “safeguarding.”
The concept belongs to a discursive context in which culture consti-
tutes a resource that, if actively produced and expertly managed,
can allow a country to “survive” globalization. According to the
convention, national state governments must adopt general policies
and designate competent bodies if they are to “ensure the viability”
of local cultures in the face of globalization—as long, however, as
such actions leave current intellectual property rights legislation
untouched. The first step in the direction of “safeguarding” is to
build “greater awareness, especially among the younger genera-
tions,” of the importance of the intangible cultural heritage.52
Governments must first of all teach young people to identify their
local cultures as “intangible cultural heritage” and persuade them
about their capacity to produce, out of such heritage, something




with added value.53 Through specific training programs and “ca-
pacity-building activities” involving “management and scientific re-
search” as well as “non-formal means of transmitting knowl-
edge,”54 governments must harness the participation of commu-
nities, groups and relevant nongovernmental organizations in the
task of identifying and inventorying “elements” of intangible cultu-
ral heritage.55 Thus, although the preservation of heritage continues
to be, nominally speaking, the responsibility of states, the civil soci-
ety, including private companies, is encouraged to increase its par-
ticipation in the active production of intangible cultural heritage.
Calls for “community participation” are commonplace in the
fields of human rights and environmental law. Their appearance is
new, however, in cultural policy discourse, where it is rather diffi-
cult to measure participation, which could range simply from
spreading information to project planning and facilitation.56 At this
point “cultural mediators”—among them independent “experts”
and political activists, as well as entrepreneurs seeking business
opportunities in the cultural terrain—are seen as potentially playing
an important role. Hence the task of “safeguarding” involves the
creation of technoscientific links in the field of culture: links be-
tween government, industry and communities that “participate” in
the generation of knowledge about themselves, which is now also
measured in terms of its economic value. What could Mexican acti-
vists expect from an engagement with intangible cultural heritage
as a means to “safeguard” native maize?
THE PEOPLE OF MAIZE AND THE
NEW TECHNOSCIENCE OF CULTURE
Mexico was the first UN member to request inclusion of its national
cuisine on UNESCO’s intangible cultural heritage list. The idea first
came up two years before the adoption of the 2003 convention,
during the Third Latin American Congress of Gastronomic Patrimo-
ny and Cultural Tourism. At the insistence of anthropologist Yuriria
Iturriaga, a group of academics, government officials, popular
cooks, professional chefs and food writers gathered one year later to
draft an argument for the valorization of Mexican food as a cultural
asset with the potential of “projecting and dynamizing the life of the
country.”57 The resulting dossier, or “nomination file,” titled Pueblo
de maíz: The Ancestral Cuisine of Mexico, was published in 2005 in the




Patrimony, Development and Tourism headed by former diplomat
Gloria López Morales. In that same year, Pueblo de maíz was sent to
compete for inscription in UNESCO’s Third Proclamation of Mas-
terpieces of Oral and Intangible Heritage. Since the representative
list did not supersede the proclamations of masterpieces until 2008,
the practical implementation of the convention initially continued
to consist of the biannual selection of aesthetically defined “treas-
ures” by a group of country delegates rather than professional com-
mittees. After a jury presided over by Jordanian princess Basma
Bint Talal turned down Pueblo de maíz, a second request was pre-
pared over the following five years, this time by the Conservatory
of Mexican Gastronomic Culture (CCGM), a private association pre-
sided over by Gloria López Morales, who had previously coordinat-
ed the preparation and submission of Pueblo de maíz. In collabora-
tion with the National Institute of Anthropology and History, the
CCGM composed a new dossier titled Traditional Mexican Cuisine—
Ancestral, Ongoing Community Culture: The Michoacán Paradigm. This
file finally achieved inscription in UNESCO’s Representative List of
the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2010.
What changed between Pueblo de maíz and Traditional Mexican
Cuisine? Beyond the particular actors and their interests, in what
follows I examine what each dossier says about national identity
and what it would mean and take to safeguard maize-based cuisine
against the threats of globalization, in particular transgenic maize.
Thus, rather than recounting the numerous interesting facts about
Mexican cuisine listed by each dossier, I highlight the political nar-
ratives at work and specifically how each dossier positions the na-
tional project in relation to local communities under the threat of
globalization. I aim to determine whether the appeal to intangible
cultural heritage introduces anything new into the history of Mexi-
can nationalism, and, if so, what that implies for a political engage-
ment with technoscience specifically on the part of the defenders of
native maize.
Social cohesion is the major political theme throughout Pueblo de
maíz, which presents itself as an exercise of “memory, invention and
mechanisms” to preserve an “originary flow of richness” on the
basis of an argument “that can today sustain the sense of its cyclical
transformations.”58 It describes Mexican cuisine as both “ancestral”
and “transcendental,” that is, as originary yet also “diverse” and
“open,” or in flow. It presents the “ancestral indigenous roots” of
Mexican cuisine as undergoing a “continuous process of mestizaje,”
intensified by the conquest and gradually “enriched” by Jewish,
The People of Maize and the Technoscience of CultureDRAFT
[4.35]
[4.36]
Arab and many other cultures from all continents.59 While Pueblo de
maíz affirms the “dynamic, crossborder character” of Mexican cui-
sine, which it exemplifies with the culinary practices of Mexican
migrants, it also argues that a specific culture—namely, milpa cul-
ture, which is rooted in Mesoamerican lands—is at stake. It defines
milpa culture as “an anthropological and philosophical entangle-
ment with cosmogonic foundations still valid in many indigenous
and mestizo communities in Mexico.”60 According to the dossier,
“The historical sustenance of Mexicans corresponds to that piece of
land in which maize, beans and chili interact with one another,
along with a variety of other elements.”61 Hence its “plan of action”
focuses on areas, such as the states of Oaxaca, Puebla and
Michoacán, that are seen as the most “authentic” because for their
rural inhabitants “the act of eating is tightly related to cosmogonic
conceptions” and theirs is a “sacred world” that it is particularly
urgent to safeguard.62 At the same time, the dossier acknowledges
that the convergence of Mexican cuisine with territory and language
“can no longer be understood as a resource within ethnically isolat-
ed circuits,” since globalization pushes “millennial cultures” into an
intercultural space.63 Under this circumstance maize is recreated,
based on its role in the context of milpa agriculture and peasant
cuisine, as “the plant of conviviality, reciprocity and shared solidar-
ity.”64 From this perspective, Oaxaca, Puebla and Michoacán ap-
pear as merely “emblematic examples” that can contribute to an
“exchange of knowledges and experiences” and to “the cohesion of
the national social tissue.”65
More than any other ingredient, maize is presented as giving the
ancestral cuisine of Mexico the power to act, today, as a “vigorous
and efficacious factor of national identity.”66 Maize’s omnipresence
and culinary versatility give Mexican cuisine its “uniqueness and
integrality” in the face of other cuisines and allow it to transcend the
territorial boundaries of the Mexican nation. The dossier depicts
Mexican migrants as remarkably faithful to their “ancestral roots,”
because through their selection of ingredients, they maintain a “ref-
erence to the origin,” a “space of continuity,” a labor option and a
field of knowledge. If they and, presumably, other nonrural Mexi-
cans can still see themselves as a people of maize, that is because,
beyond any particular “ethnic perspective,” Mexicanness is now,
metaphorically rather than literally, associated with the entangle-
ment and dynamic interrelation of multiple elements in the milpa.
The “millennial continuity” of milpa culture is now at risk, Pue-




niques” are displacing traditional knowledges.67 Junk food in par-
ticular has “deformed the unicity of the food system,” “distorted
and supplanted customs,” disrupted nutritional equilibrium and
undermined the precarious economy of the popular classes.68 This
reference to the popular classes makes it clear that the argument of
Pueblo de maíz is far more complex than a plea for recognition of the
aesthetic merit of a national gastronomy. Written during the years
of the worldwide social mobilization against free trade agreements
and GMOs, the dossier argues against “cold economic growth.” In-
dustrial cattle breeding and export-oriented agriculture, environ-
mental degradation, unequal terms of exchange in the global mar-
ketplace, chronic emigration, governmental abandonment of the
countryside and, more recently, GMOs are among the various
threats to the ancestral foundations of Mexican cuisine. Regarding
GMOs, the dossier asserts that they are “unable to give continuity to
autochthonous cultivars and diversity” and points out that they
merely make farmers dependent on seed imports that they cannot
afford.69 GMOs have already contributed, the document states, not
just to food dependency but also to an impoverishment of the na-
tional culture.
Consistently with such a diagnosis, the plan of action in Pueblo de
maíz involves documenting culinary aspects of community celebra-
tions and commerce in traditional markets, formal and informal
educational programs, research projects, and, crucially, supporting
small-scale agriculture oriented to supplying artisanal food busi-
nesses with traditional ingredients. In sum, Pueblo de maíz firmly
asserts, “The future of the country depends on the preservation of
its cultural values.”70 In view of the destructive consequences of
current alternatives to milpa agriculture—migration and organized
crime—the dossier presents the regeneration of food traditions as a
viable response to neoliberal disruption. What it calls preservation,
however, requires first of all a valorization of local foods as “the
foundation of material and spiritual sustenance of a nation.”71 This
call to valorize anew stands in contrast with the constant descrip-
tion of Mexican identity as an accomplished fact rooted in ancestral
traditions.
In a chapter that features various commentaries on Pueblo de
maíz, Mario Riestra refers to maize as “the father of the Mexican
race” and characterizes Mexicans as people who “know themselves
of a divine origin.”72 Chauvinistic exaltation aside, Riestra takes a
strategic position when he says that more than language, dress or
music, cuisine provides “the common root of the Mexican.” As op-
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posed to gratuitously asserting the divinity of “the Mexican race,”
in a striking turn toward Schmittian rationality he argues, “The
identification of man or the group against extraneous cultural pat-
terns will determine the permanence of customs and will annihilate
the threats which weaken or render vulnerable our cultural patri-
mony.”73 As any post-Marxist philosopher would recognize today,
precisely such a threat, rather than any common root, constitutes
the source of an identitarian affirmation such as we find in Pueblo de
maíz. In a turn toward the cosmopolitan celebration of “our creative
diversity,” however, Gloria López Morales invokes, in her own
commentary, the “prodigious force” of UNESCO to “awaken minds
regarding the value of culture in its vast dimensions” and “to trig-
ger preserving and creative actions in all senses.”74 In this regard,
she emphasizes the labor of imagination at work in the Mexican
request for UNESCO’s recognition. The question was, she says, how
to construct a solid argument as opposed to a collection of recipes,
exotic products and “archaic practices.” However extraordinary our
ancestral practices may seem to us, “many other families could pro-
pose their aunts and grandmothers as the best cooks in the
world.”75 Pueblo de maíz had therefore to construct a “scientifically
grounded argument” that could persuade UNESCO about the need
to safeguard Mexican cuisine.
Whereas Pueblo de maíz identifies the need to preserve sacred-
ness, community and milpa culture from global capitalism—that is,
from free trade agreements and GMOs—the argument about the
viability of Mexican cuisine draws on a new understanding of cul-
tural policy as an engine of development. During the launch of
Pueblo de maíz, Sari Bermúdez, director of the National Council for
Culture and the Arts (Conaculta), declared, “Beyond its symbolic
and traditional values, culture is a real factor of development, a
means to create wealth.”76 Therefore, she says, the government
must commit to “a national strategy with a cultural perspective,”
one that includes policies to preserve indigenous and popular cui-
sines through education and research, capacity building in artisanal
production, and even the quest for industrial property rights as well
as controlled origin status for Mexican products.77 Beyond the sa-
credness of ancestral roots, Pueblo de maíz proposes a crusade to
educate the public about the cultural, nutritional and economic val-
ue of traditional cuisine in order to link culinary patrimony with
social and economic development. In this task, it emphasizes con-
sensus among different actors—private business, grassroots organ-





can gastronomy means conserving an important identity trait, an
invaluable legacy in which the coming generations will find a pow-
erful impulse to advance without denying what they are and what
they have been.”78
As the day approached when Mexico would know whether Pue-
blo de maíz had succeeded in obtaining UNESCO’s recognition of
Mexican cuisine as “a masterpiece” of intangible heritage, the au-
thor of the technical justification inside the dossier, food writer Cris-
tina Barros, declared to the press that the whole point of obtaining
such a recognition was to force the Mexican government to under-
take concrete actions such as “a program to defend maize as a fun-
damental food of the Mexican people, a consideration of traditional
cuisine as culturally, socially and economically strategic, the partici-
pation of environmental authorities in the protection of threatened
ecological spaces, the commitment of health and education author-
ities to support traditional foods against industrial, junk foods, and
a long etcetera.”79 Drawing on a radical interpretation of intangible
heritage, Barros warned against conflating traditional cuisine with
gastronomy, which belongs to the realm of pleasure, she says, “not
the realm of cultural expressions that UNESCO has sought to recog-
nize.” Aware that this is an anthropological rather than an aesthetic
question, she argues that no dish should be presented in isolation of
the social and cultural context that gives it meaning and support. As
a society, she says, we must remain vigilant that the benefits of this
proclamation go directly to indigenous communities and are used
to prevent usurpation or corruption of their culture: “Only in this
way shall we fulfill the mandate of UNESCO.”
By remarking that the argument in Pueblo de maíz went far be-
yond a celebration of colorful dishes and exotic flavors, Barros
summed up the political aspirations of the Mexican defenders of
maize. For them, UNESCO’s recognition was instrumental in
counteracting the neoliberal destruction of milpa agriculture and its
historically specific food culture. While the dossier reflects little on
how indigenous communities have been historically sacrificed to
construct the very nationalist discourse that exalts them, it does
make an effort to valorize the practices of those communities, their
knowledges and their techniques, which deserve, says the dossier, a
serious investment of the state, if only because of their potential to
help the nation survive in the context of neoliberal globalization.
As it turned out, Pueblo de maíz did not succeed in obtaining a
place for Mexican cuisine in UNESCO’s “proclamation of master-
pieces.” Although UNESCO did not release an official statement
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explaining this outcome, one reason likely had to do with the com-
plexity of the Mexican candidacy combined with the lack of anthro-
pological experts to deal with its complex outlook. Basma Bint Ta-
lal, president of the jury that rejected the dossier, declared in this
vein that Pueblo de maíz lacked “focalization.”80 Indeed, it presented
maize as a multiplicity of elements—with a corresponding hetero-
geneity of practitioners—rather than as a single, clearly bounded
cultural asset, despite the constant assertions of uniqueness, inte-
grality, millennial continuity and so forth. One can only speculate
that too many issues beyond the actual scope of UNESCO (such as
free trade agreements, property rights in biotechnology and the
very concept of an industrial food system) needed, according to the
dossier’s argument, to be confronted in order to safeguard Mexican
cuisine.
In the same year that UNESCO rejected Pueblo de maíz, Gloria
López Morales was dismissed from her position at Conaculta and
went on to become founder and president of the Conservatory of
Mexican Gastronomic Culture. This organization presents itself as
an expert organization devoted to the preservation of Mexican cui-
sine through research, education and consultancy. López Morales, a
professional writer and diplomat, continued to pursue the inscrip-
tion of Mexican cuisine in the representative list once this super-
seded the proclamations of masterpieces in 2008. In collaboration
with the National Institute of Anthropology and History, she
drafted a nomination file titled Traditional Mexican Cuisine—Ances-
tral, Ongoing Community Culture: The Michoacán Paradigm. Like its
predecessor this document transfers the sacredness of indigenous
food habits to the whole nation and emphasizes the need to safe-
guard the nation by articulating “authentic” food practices with
national development through the novel framework of internation-
al cultural policy. Once again we read that “humankind was made
with maize” and that food plays a “fundamental role in the life of
the group, comprising the most revered local and national heri-
tage.”81 Yet, whereas Pueblo de maíz has the appearance of a long
essay rather than a technical report, Traditional Mexican Cuisine, pre-
sented in a standard format provided by UNESCO, explains point
by point how the proposed “element” of intangible heritage fulfills
the selection criteria established by the 2003 convention. For in-
stance, it again describes Mexican food as ancestral but this time
specifies the meaning of the term in UNESCO’s vocabulary as
something preserved through oral transmission of skills and knowl-




falsify roots, explaining why, despite the invasion of other customs
and the battering of the market, communities still prepare food us-
ing time-tested methods. The formal, boxed definitions and general
stiffness of a text that no longer recreates the complexity of milpa
culture merely anticipate a deeper difference between the two docu-
ments.
Whereas Pueblo de maíz called, however implicitly, for a cultural
exception to free trade agreements and biotech penetration, Tradi-
tional Mexican Cuisine combines the official vision of cultural diver-
sity with the idea of economic viability through technoscientific ar-
ticulation of cultural traditions with productive chains. As we may
recall, the 2003 convention explicitly endorsed such a combination,
recommending the linkage of industry, government and grassroots
organizations dedicated to the production of knowledge in the field
of cultural patrimony. Traditional Mexican Cuisine emphasizes that
its argument evolved over several years through encounters, con-
gresses, courses and other projects organized in conjunction with
numerous public and private institutions. The private CCGM pre-
pared the nomination file itself in collaboration with the public Na-
tional Institute of Anthropology and History and with the sponsor-
ship of Maseca-Gruma, the powerful corporation that commer-
cializes corn flour all over the world and imports transgenic maize
into Mexico, according to Greenpeace. The sponsorship was well
publicized by the company. In an interview for the newspaper La
Jornada, Silvia Hernández, Maseca’s global marketing director, de-
clared, “As leaders in the production of maize and tortilla we were
very interested in taking part in this, as a way of promoting the
consumption of our products. From the beginning we joined the
project. Our culinary expert participated in all gatherings for the
elaboration of the nomination file throughout the year 2010; we had
a chance to support the Conservatory (CCGM) with all the commu-
nication and promotional tools that they required, and which were
forceful and important to achieve the inscription.”82
Traditional Mexican Cuisine argues that in order to ensure the
continuity of Mexican cuisine, it is necessary to revive products,
procedures and techniques “through transfer of knowledge and in-
sertion in circuits of sustainable development.”83 The document
presents nixtamalization, for example, as a revolutionary technique
that “reflects the very birth of Mexican culinary culture” and has
contributed to “a healthy balanced diet for its peoples for thousands
of years.”84 Although nixtamalized corn flour and mechanical mills
have largely displaced manual grinding of maize, the file cites stone
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metates among the “singular utensils” that contribute to the authen-
ticity of Mexican cuisine. Their role is unclear regarding the goal of
reactivation of “productive chains,” which assumes that “increased
production brings more jobs, improved training and education re-
quirements, growth in cultural tourism and, on the whole, better
quality of life to the communities.”85 Since the 2003 convention re-
quires that communities be clearly identified as conscious guar-
dians of their heritage, attached to the nomination file is a map of
the Mexican territory, classifying and ranking communities as
“hubs of culinary knowledge.” On that basis, the file proposes cer-
tain communities as targets for the application of a model that “has
already proven to be efficient.” The model in question is a project
carried out with indigenous communities in the state of Michoacán.
Starting in 2004, the project involved marketing products and
giving training courses to communities along culinary routes that
made a living from tourism. Cooks worked in teams made up of
mothers, grandmothers, daughters and granddaughters. In order to
present their dishes to the public, the project asked them to build a
traditional hearth kitchen, decorate their stalls, and dress in tradi-
tional outfits. Traditional Mexican Cuisine explains that this kind of
intervention enabled communities to “respond to tourism without
altering the cultural context characterized by adherence to customs
and working as a community.”86 Furthermore, and in accordance
with the convention’s informed-consent requirement, the nomina-
tion file assures that the Michoacán project met with convincing
community support for courses on sanitary food handling, oral
transmission of dietary culture or know-how, discussion of prob-
lems faced while “defending the purity of their traditions” and find-
ing ways to overcome their “isolation and paralysis of activities,
which are in need of greater spaces to expand and develop.”87 In
particular, the nomination file presents the Don Vasco tour project
as “a showcase.” The tour covers the towns in which Vasco de
Quiroga, a sixteenth-century Spanish cleric inspired by Thomas
More’s Utopia, organized indigenous communities in Michoacán
around guilds and trades. The communities are still organized
around handicrafts, so handicraft tourism should provide them
with a “viable” living, according to Traditional Mexican Cuisine. Be-
fore opening the route to tourism, the project provided “informa-
tion” to cooks, tourist operators and students “so as not to belittle
the authentic native traits of the communities.” Since traditional
cuisine is a major aspect of the cultural tour, the project’s interven-




where cooks learn to improve their services “without affecting their
authenticity.” Traditional Mexican Cuisine concludes thus: “This is
not a utopian pipedream: the already fruitful Michoacán model
must be applied to other regions. Inscribing Mexico’s traditional
culture on the Representative List will push that purpose forward
tremendously via an action plan founded on the premises ex-
pounded throughout this document. The goal is to make the most of
that element of intangible heritage inclined like few others to
strengthen dialog across the culturally diverse map.”88
The global spread of corporate capitalism has drawn attention to
the fact that food production and consumption everywhere are
linked to imaginaries of place and tradition that must negotiate
with technoscientific discourses and production processes. Cultural
anthropologists have examined the paradoxes of this negotiation
through a number of case studies, including American foie gras,
French cheeses, and Georgian beer.89 Despite a widespread tenden-
cy to oppose local or traditional ingredients and techniques on the
one hand and technoscientific risk control and food safety measure-
ments for mass-produced food commodities on the other, in reality
most traditional foods are deeply imbricated in global industrial
production discourses. In the case of Traditional Mexican Cuisine,
business administration, marketing lessons and hygiene-training
courses are presented as instrumental to the preservation of cultural
authenticity. The argument itself is technoscientific in presenting
cuisine as a matter of knowledges and techniques that must be
linked to socioeconomic development via knowledge transfer and
the production of self-reliant, managerial subjectivities—popular
cooks joining urban chefs and tourist operators in a big society ded-
icated to the preservation of cultural patrimony. In sum, Traditional
Mexican Cuisine differs from Pueblo de maíz in its proposal “to con-
tinue setting up small enterprises and providing training in busi-
ness administration, hygiene and marketing.”90 Alongside the gas-
tronomic cuisine of France and the Mediterranean diet, traditional
Mexican cuisine was inscribed in the Representative List of the In-
tangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity on November 16, 2010. In
the months leading up to the event, and during the days that fol-
lowed it, a series of disagreements among the original promoters of
the Mexican candidacy unfolded in the press—as if maize, instead
of giving its defenders the desired social cohesion, managed only to
underscore their differences.
According to the anthropological perspectives that originally in-
formed intangible heritage discourse, which were critical of previ-
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ous modernizing narratives and in that sense “postmodern,” safe-
guarding Mexican cuisine would require fostering the living condi-
tions of rural Mexicans, particularly those who engage in milpa
agriculture. Neoliberal discourses that attempted to articulate heri-
tage preservation with the capitalist economy ended up contami-
nating such perspectives, however. When UNESCO accepted Tradi-
tional Mexican Cuisine, the earlier promoters of maize-based cuisine
protested against its technoscientific rationality. Cristina Barros, au-
thor of the “technical justification” of Pueblo de maíz, called into
question the fact that the CCGM, a private rather than a public
organization, would administer the safeguarding of Mexican cui-
sine. There was little to expect from this, Barros lamented alongside
other disappointed activists, beyond a gentrification of traditional
cuisine by elite gastronomy and tourism. It was crucial, in her view,
to distinguish the nation’s culinary heritage from mere gastronomy.
Mexican culinary heritage was, for her, a complex interdisciplinary
field, involving anthropology, philosophy, biology and history,
“even more so in our country where food, particularly maize, is
sacred.”
Barros was not the only one to react against the discourse of
Traditional Mexican Cuisine. Anthropologist Yuriria Iturriaga, whom
Pueblo de maíz credits with having introduced the idea of seeking
UNESCO’s recognition for Mexican food, also took exception. On
November 17, 2010, in an opinion piece published by La Jornada,
Iturriaga decried the outcome of the process that she had started
eight years before.91 First, she complained that CCGM had present-
ed safeguarding measures not as legal obligations for the Mexican
government but rather as proposals to be administered by a private
organization. Second, she criticized the strategy of “taking cooks
out of their communities to teach them hygiene, techniques, busi-
ness administration and marketing,” so that their “mini-enterprises
can be planted along touristic routes (that is, planted among restau-
rants of Mexican nouvelle cuisine that those who wrote up the nom-
ination file will set up with the benefits deriving from it).” Third,
Iturriaga condemned the fact that the safeguarding plan was ac-
cepted as a local project, whereas she had insisted that Mexican
cuisine coincides with the territorial boundaries of the Mexican na-
tion as a whole. Iturriaga believed that UNESCO should instead
have “ordered” the Mexican nation to “integrate all traditional cui-
sines of the country” as an absolute responsibility of the state. She
concluded that Mexico would have a reason to celebrate only if
UNESCO had bound the Mexican authorities to safeguard the mil-
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pa, “a food system that is nearly extinct today due to predatory
agrarian policies.” UNESCO would have thereby contributed to es-
tablishing a “cultural exception” that exempted local maize agricul-
ture from the North American Free Trade Agreement “so the people
would again eat in a healthy way.” Instead, UNESCO lent its seal to
“private agents who would never share their table with an indige-
nous woman, perhaps because they prefer to present mole poblano [a
dark, thick sauce typical of Puebla] in little drops over huge plates
in order to ‘raise its category.’”
Iturriaga is, of course, right to point out that Traditional Mexican
Cuisine positions Mexican rural women as ignorant and needy—
that is, as people who must be civilized through information and
training. At the same time, Iturriaga does not go very far in differen-
tiating her own discourse from that of Traditional Mexican Cuisine. In
another opinion piece, published in February 2010, she had accused
López Morales of “forgetting” that Iturriaga herself had first pro-
posed the heritagization of Mexican cuisine “with the noble end of
engaging the Mexican government in a crusade to rescue a people
under threat: countryside workers, cooks and artisans.”92 In that
piece she anticipated a new failure of the Mexican request, which
she would explain by the fact that López Morales had “turned her
back” on the “true pioneers.” While both Iturriaga and Barros have
arguments against the second nomination file, their conclusions fo-
cus on the more superficial aspects of the problem—namely, Gloria
López Morales and the CCGM. They figure these particular agents
as the cause of the failure of the original project—that is, the failure
to “force” the Mexican government to protect maize. Disappoint-
ment and frustration are understandable first reactions in light of all
that I have recounted above. However, the episode calls for reflec-
tion beyond individual actors, around the transnational cultural
politics of intangible heritage and what that implies for heritage
activism as a potential site of critical political engagement with tech-
noscience, in the broad sense of “a form of life, a generative ma-
trix.”93 As philosopher Wendy Brown has put it in a different but
related context, the disappointed discourse of activists “conveys at
best naive political expectations and at worst, patently confused
ones.”94 That is, moral outrage implicitly figures a mainstream insti-
tution such as UNESCO as if it were not “the codification of various
dominant social powers, but was, rather, a momentarily misguided
parent who forgot her promise to treat all her children all in the
same way.”95 Correspondingly, the Mexican defense of maize is in
turn positioned as if it did not represent “a significant political chal-
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lenge to the norms of the regime.”96 In Brown’s incisive argument,
such implicit figurations signal a rejection of politics as a domain of
power and lead nowhere but to a backward-looking melancholia
premised on disavowed attachments to oppressive regimes.
Intangible cultural heritage itself emerged from the world of
technoscience with the ambiguous purpose of preserving cultural
diversity and harnessing it as an economic resource. Through trans-
national cultural policy, intangible cultural heritage itself promotes
managerial attitudes toward cultural legacies and seeks, implicitly
or explicitly, to achieve their productive articulation with the global
economy. In view of this, the ideological pitfall of intangible heri-
tage discourse appears to be precisely the intimation that it will put
an end to antagonism, hostility and indeed politics itself, as defined
by post-Marxist theorist Chantal Mouffe. The rationalist, universal-
ist and individualistic rhetoric at work in UNESCO’s intangible her-
itage discourse is as much a problem as the unrealistic expectation,
on the part of some Mexican defenders of maize, that UNESCO
itself would be forceful enough to settle the conflict between biotech
corporations and peasant agriculture in Mexico and between Mexi-
cans themselves as those responsible for the future of Mesoameri-
can maize agriculture. Like historian Jeffrey Pilcher, who views
middle-class gastronomic organizations as bringing an apocalypse
to Mexico’s “peasant cuisines,” the original promoters of the heri-
tagization of such cuisines react melancholically, trying to make
whole what has been smashed, the nation itself as a unitarian sym-
bolic force.
Back in 2002, when Iturriaga first shared her idea of pursuing
UNESCO’s recognition, she wrote a lengthy piece on Mexican cui-
sine as a “factor of identity and unity.” There, she had argued that
“Mexican gastronomy does exist,” that it is a “harmonious sensual
structure,” and that it does not have to exclude an economic strate-
gy of higher yields. Her only condition was that the strategy should
reverse “the perverse side of the globalization process” by drawing
on “the cultures of the people” so as to oppose “imperial hegemo-
ny.” Iturriaga explained the aims of promoting Mexican cuisine as a
world heritage. She wrote that by means of heritagization, it would
become possible “1) to stop the deformation and degradation of
regional cuisines that are caused by the junk food industry by pre-
serving and obtaining a better price for vernacular products in the
local, national and international markets; 2) to create employment
in the agricultural sector and related industries, on the basis of their





self-devaluation of the Mexican people in relation to their cuisine
and 4) to benefit the palate of humanity.”97
Iturriaga’s final outrage came perhaps from the fact that a mem-
ber of the diplomatic elite and a gastronomic entrepreneur, rather
than a public anthropologist like herself, had finally achieved
UNESCO’s recognition for Mexican food. This is in fact how she
interpreted the ultimate success of Traditional Mexican Cuisine: “Per-
haps they do not know what intangible heritage is, perhaps because
they are not anthropologists but rather politicians sent by state
governments?”98 At any rate, the success of Traditional Mexican Cui-
sine depended on a “contamination” of radical anthropological dis-
course by the economic discourse of intangible heritage. Culinary
heritage activists sought a strategic platform when they resorted to
international cultural policy; their disappointment stemmed partly
from the fact that they had formulated their expectations and de-
mands in a literal and moral dimension, as distinct from a political
dimension that would have allowed them to relate to cultural policy
in a more realistic way. It would be useful, perhaps, to undertake a
more open-minded reflection of the political productivity of “con-
tamination” as an inescapable condition in technoscience.
SEED OF UNITY, SEED OF DISCORD OR SEED OF CHANGE?
Writing at a time when Mexico was about to undergo the neoliberal
acculturation that accompanied the transgenic disruption of Mexi-
can maize markets, Néstor García Canclini proposed to undertake a
radical “desubstantialization of the concept of national patrimony.”
With the new generations of cultural producers in mind, he firmly
asserted that traditionalism was a false solution to Mexico’s predic-
ament in the global conjuncture. In a similar argument, Stuart Hall
exhorted British citizens to reimagine their “Britishness” in a more
inclusive manner so as “to prepare their own people for success in a
global de-centred world.” Their failure to do so by insisting on a
defensive narrative of “Britain” as a tight little island would “fatally
disable them.”99 The defense of Mexican maize is of course more
complex and critical than earlier state-led projects regarding the
national patrimony. It belongs to the age of transnational cultural
politics, which it nevertheless fails to understand beyond the liberal,
cosmopolitan, well-meaning and yet naive framework drawn by
Lourdes Arizpe, the Mexican anthropologist who defined the con-
cept of intangible heritage. Such a cosmopolitan framework admits
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cultural essentialism, which still resonates with the anthropological
version of “living cultures” that informs much of the Mexican de-
fense of maize since Guillermo Bonfil Batalla.
Yet the defense of maize also belongs to an age of extreme vul-
nerability and impending environmental and economic collapse,
wherein traditionalism is a matter less of choice than of survival. Is
there any sense in which a radical desubstantialization of the na-
tional patrimony, a political disruption of maize, is still due?
Anthropologist Richard Wilk wisely advises against describing
food culture through linear narratives leading up to a single point
in the present. In a post-Marxist spirit, he tries to think not of a
single unitary capitalism but rather of multiple sites at which capi-
talism is negotiated in singular ways. People, he says, do often find
ways to decommodify even industrial food, “to make it personal,
meaningful, cultural, and social.”100 Recognizing such an agency
need not render us blind to the paradoxical ways in which the very
acts that decommodify food (such as making it heritage) recom-
modify it again for “high-end gourmets and cultural theorists.”101 I
share the affirmation of the pluralistic, paradoxical and impure log-
ics of decommodification and further suggest, on that same basis,
the possibility that heritage activism in the fields of food and agri-
culture has the potential to unsettle postrevolutionary stereotypes
of Mexican identity as “a cage of melancholy,” that is, as a static
limbo between modernity and tradition. For instance, it promises to
become a creative practice similar to what Lyotard called “post-
modern knowledge”: “Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool
of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and rein-
forces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is
not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s paralogy.”102
Of course, in recommending “postmodern knowledge” as a stra-
tegic operation within the technoscience of culture I do not mean to
exclude further empirical investigation of whether Traditional Mexi-
can Cuisine actually achieves anything besides the gentrification of
peasant cuisines. Rather I have aimed to introduce a more nuanced
analysis of the ideological pitfalls of an identitarian defense of Mex-
ican maize under the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, the latter
conceived in political rather than purely economic terms. At the risk
of playing the devil’s advocate, I suggest welcoming the inauthen-
ticity of heritage, its ongoing politicization as a technoscientific field
that already gathers (certainly unequal) Mexicans in the urgent task
of building alliances that divert and overturn the common threats











demand consistency from the Mexican state: “The Mexican state has
struggled for Mexican gastronomy to be recognized as human heri-
tage. If the basis for this rich heritage is native maize as it has been
diversified within the nation’s ecosystems, it is then a responsibility
of the government to protect it juridically and technically.”103
Besides demanding, with the activists, a seemingly impossible
reconstitution of the national state as an effective guarantor of food
and agricultural rights—a desperately needed yet unlikely scenario
in the short term104 —we may stay attentive to the technoscientific
mutations in the Mexican national imaginary. A postmodern sensi-
tivity to differences and a tolerance of the incommensurable may be
more effective, in heritage as in other knowledge-intensive prac-
tices, than moral recriminations and apocalyptic mind-sets. When
there is nothing to be done, everything remains to be invented. The
principle of postmodern knowledge “is not the expert’s homology,
but the inventor’s paralogy,”105 according to which unexpected
moves may end up changing the rules of a game. In the story of
Traditional Mexican Cuisine, precisely at the moment when every-
body seemed to converge around the urgency of preserving maize
as the essence of Mexican identity, multiple disagreements cropped
up regarding what exactly the preservation should involve. These
disagreements precluded the desired totalization of the national
text. Postmodern knowledge is all about coming to terms with the
impossibility of totalization. It is not an apocalypse, and it continues
to be vital for activists to deploy it subversively within—rather than
against—the ongoing gastronomification and heritagization of Mex-
ican peasant cuisines.
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A TEXTUAL CONTAMINATION OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY DEBATES
In their introduction to New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Poli-
tics, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost explain what they see as a
widespread dissatisfaction with “the more textual approaches asso-
ciated with the so-called cultural turn.”1 Textual approaches, they
say, are increasingly deemed inadequate for addressing political
issues such as environmental disaster and climate change. In view
of the obvious materiality of these phenomena, Coole and Frost ask:
How can we be other than materialist? They answer that “radical
constructivism” has dominated the theoretical scene since the 1970s
and resulted in a generalized inability to give material factors “their
due in shaping society and circumscribing human prospects.”2
From this, Coole and Frost go on to assert that textual approaches
are “allergic to matter” and dissuade young researchers “from the
more empirical kinds of investigation that material processes re-
quire.”3 In order to rectify the atrocities of Cartesian dualism, Coole
and Frost posit, new materialisms pursue “a creative affirmation of
a new ontology, a project that is in turn consistent with the produc-
tive, inventive capacities they ascribe to materiality itself.”4 By sug-
gesting that textual approaches are unsuitable to the task, Coole and
Frost seem to overlook the decisive role that the critique of meta-
physics, and deconstruction in particular, has played in the very
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formulation of the new materialist project. In this chapter I take
issue with the straw oppositions between textuality and materiality
set up in Coole and Frost’s justification of the so-called new materi-
alisms. The latter take the form, as recently suggested by Dennis
Bruining, of a revival of foundationalism motivated by a moralistic
response to the political challenges of the day.5 Although I think
that Bruining’s critique does apply to Coole and Frost’s particular
version of new materialisms, here I focus on demonstrating the con-
tinuing relevance of textuality for contemporary materialist think-
ing.
Beyond Coole and Frost’s introduction, New Materialisms is actu-
ally a pluralistic volume in which more than one contributor takes
care to foreground the continuing relevance of textuality for think-
ing materialism today. Rey Chow, for example, argues that post-
structuralist theories of the text were never about “a simple swap-
ping of places between materialism and idealism.”6 Rather, they
aimed to give up a dogmatic conception of matter as a preexisting
concrete ground in order to think it politically as “a destabilizable
chain of signification, the certitude of which is at best provisional
and subject to slippage.”7 By exposing the metaphysical structure of
economicist materialism, for example, poststructuralism cleared the
ground for “a revamped materialism defined primarily as significa-
tion and subjectivity-in-process.”8 In another contribution, Pheng
Cheah argues that if we ever mistook deconstruction for a kind of
linguistic constructionism, this was because we failed to frame it
through the philosophical problem of time. For Jacques Derrida, the
presence of matter is made possible by “a true gift of time . . . a pure
event.”9 The gift of time destabilizes presence by subjecting it to a
law of radical contamination, which means that any form of pres-
ence is inherently “riven by a radical alterity that makes it impos-
sible even as it makes it possible.”10 Cheah argues that in such a
framework time is itself more material than matter, since time
makes matter possible in the first place. If, as Chow and Cheah
contend, poststructuralism and deconstruction already pushed a re-
thinking of materiality beyond the terms of Cartesian dualism, why
do Coole and Frost seem so keen to exclude textual approaches
from the ontological project of so-called new materialisms? More-
over, in the context of a neoempiricist backlash against textual ap-
proaches, I want to pose the following question: Why would it be
important to think of “biotechnological disruption” or “transgenic
contamination” of native maize in nonempiricist, nonmoralistic
ways, and what form would such a discourse take?




In “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sci-
ences,” Derrida describes metaphysical thinking as an attempt to
neutralize time through the postulation of concepts above and be-
yond “the slowness, the process of maturing, the continuous toil of
factual transformations, history.”11 He argues the impossibility of
destroying such a metaphysical tendency, since it operates structu-
rally as a condition for thinking. However, it can be interrupted and
criticized in more or less consequential ways. Derrida presents
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural analysis of myths as an example of
critique by means of conceptual recycling or bricolage. Lévi-Strauss
realized that “the focus or the source of the myth are always shad-
ows and virtualities which are elusive, unactualizable, and nonexis-
tent in the first place.”12 Having understood the supplementary
function of certain mythological notions, he went on to emulate
myths, his own work taking the shape of that of which it spoke and
becoming itself “mythomorphic” and “mythopoetic.” Derrida sug-
gests that this is in fact the best way to interrupt the totalizing logic
of metaphysical thinking, because it makes metaphysics appear as
mythological, “that is to say, as a historical illusion.”13
Yet mythopoetic discourse can always relapse into totalization.
Lévi-Strauss ended up presenting his work as a set of hypotheses
“resulting from a finite quantity of information and which are sub-
jected to the proof of experience.”14 This is empiricism: the source of
all faults menacing a discourse that continues to regard itself as
scientific.15 In other words, empiricism is the metaphysical trap of
believing that the failure to achieve intellectual totalization is a mat-
ter of incomplete information, such that, for example, “more empiri-
cal approaches” would allow us to grasp the essence of materiality
much better than “merely textual ones.”
Derrida attributes empiricism to an ethic of nostalgia for the
origin. In the case of Lévi-Strauss, nostalgia manifested itself as a
remorse about certain “archaic” societies. Yet such societies are, for
Derrida, “always already lost” in the sense that they were always
subject to the law of time. The same would have to be acknowl-
edged about matter and materiality and about life in general. Yet it
is possible to regard the law of time as other than loss through an
ethic that affirms language as “a world of signs without fault, with-
out truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpre-
tation.”16 Derrida sees nostalgia and affirmation as two ethical
interpretations of textuality that are “absolutely irreconcilable even





the other, he advocates a thinking of their mutual composition “in
the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.”
Eschewing the nostalgic relapse into empiricism that Coole and
Frost seem to have in common with Lévi-Strauss, feminist scholars
of technoscience such as Donna Haraway, Rosi Braidotti and Karen
Barad have affirmed the paradoxical materiality of language. More-
over, they have deployed mythopoetic writing as a form of political
intervention in the technoscientific world. Despite their critical dis-
tance with respect to Derrida, I would suggest that they all pursue a
deconstructive kind of materialism in the sense that for them, mate-
riality is not a fixed essence; rather it is the condition of possibility
(a generative source) and of impossibility (a dynamic process) of
thinking and acting as part of life in general. Like that of Lévi-
Strauss, their work illustrates both the possibility of critique
through linguistic play and the impossibility of destroying meta-
physical thinking as a whole, once and for all.
In their introduction to New Materialisms, Coole and Frost men-
tion Donna Haraway as one of the “more textual” inquirers whose
work is no longer adequate fir either the understanding or the trans-
formation of the world. They reduce Haraway’s contribution to a
single image, that of the cyborg as a “fusion of human and technolo-
gy,” which Coole and Frost regard as less sophisticated than Kathe-
rine Hayles’s more recent theorization of the posthuman as infor-
mational pattern. There is, however, much more in Haraway’s work
than the image of a human-machine hybrid. In Haraway’s own
words, figurations such as the cyborg are “performative images that
can be inhabited” as “condensed maps of contestable worlds.”18
Indeed, a complex map of the technoscientific world in her “A Cy-
borg Manifesto” continues to stimulate a posthumanist disposition
to intervene responsibly—that is, otherwise than through moralistic
condemnation or empiricist demands.
Even though Haraway distances herself from Derrida’s thinking
about animals because of its masculine “lack of curiosity,”19 I would
stress that there is a fundamental affinity between her own feminist
thinking about tropes and the deconstructive materialism that
Cheah finds in Derrida’s conception of textuality. In a 2006 inter-
view with Nicholas Gane, Haraway explains her position on the
persistent ideological belief that “intercourse, communication, con-
versation, semiotic engagement is trope-free or immaterial.”20 On
the contrary, Haraway understands semiotic engagement as
thoroughly material and the materiality of semiosis as being subject
to stutterings, trippings or breakdowns.21 Figures and tropes such
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as the cyborg emerge from breakdowns in signification that are not
determined as a loss of empirical reality but are rather affirmed as a
condition for change. Indeed, figuration is all about change for Har-
away, who deploys figures as mythopoetic antidotes to the apoca-
lyptic thinking and melancholia that threaten to swallow radical
politics in the technoscientific world. She celebrated the cyborg in-
sofar as it involved, like all figures, “at least some kind of displace-
ment that can trouble identifications and certainties.”22 In other
words, the legendary cyborg trope emerged as a strategy for “in-
habiting the despised place,” which at the time was technology it-
self conceived in anthropocentric and instrumentalist ways. While
Haraway does acknowledge the temporal limits of her cyborg
trope, I find it crucial to remember today that the original point of it
was to refigure technology “beyond function and purpose to some-
thing open, something not yet.”23
This project clearly has an ethical dimension, but I want to look
briefly at its more strategic side, which becomes apparent if we
compare Haraway’s argument about tropes with post-Marxist argu-
mentation about politics in a so-called postmodern age. Haraway’s
style of intervention resonates strongly with Laclauian post-Marx-
ism. Ernesto Laclau argues in Emancipation(s) that “if the term
‘emancipation’ is to remain meaningful, it is impossible to renounce
any of its incompatible sides. Rather, we have to play one against
the other in ways which have to be specified.”24 Prefiguring this
argument, Haraway explains that the cyborg operates through “the
tension of holding incompatible things together.”25 Echoing La-
clau’s psychoanalytic theory of radical democracy, she presents the
cyborg as a strategy for fractured identities that are not afraid of
holding contradictory standpoints. It is postmodern precisely in the
sense that it is not seduced by “organic wholeness through a final
appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity.”26
At the same time, the cyborg speaks from within the modern tradi-
tion of socialist feminism, and from there it continues to pursue
radical emancipation—that is, a free society in which all hierarchies
have been eliminated. The cyborg can only be an ironic myth be-
cause there is a sense in which its postmodern side makes its mod-
ern side impossible yet necessary. Since, in a postmodern world,
“the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an opti-
cal illusion,”27 there is no ultimate, transparent ground for the cy-
borg. Nevertheless the cyborg needs some sort of grounding, situat-






mense human pain” that becomes increasingly hard to see, political-
ly and materially.28
Like the post-Communist world analyzed by post-Marxist and
cultural studies, Haraway’s technoscientific world is one of dis-
rupted unities in which there is “confusion of boundaries and moral
pollution”29 Disruption in this sense can be apprehended, Haraway
suggests, from either a managerial point of view or a critical per-
spective.30 Admittedly, Haraway does not associate the critical per-
spective with “more empirical approaches.” Rather, she advocates
“a slightly perverse shift of perspective.”31 Critique, in other words,
has to do in her project with textual engagements that disrupt “the
systems of myth and meaning structuring our imaginations.”32 By
contrast, Coole and Frost seem to leave room only for managerial
perspectives when they mention genetic engineering as a mere tech-
nology that “seems destined to change forms of agricultural pro-
duction and energy use irrevocably.”33 Their language tends to
downplay the ongoing cultural and political struggles around the
seemingly irrevocable “destiny” of agricultural production and en-
ergy use. The Mexican defense of maize is of course one such strug-
gle, and in this chapter I intend to demonstrate how textuality mat-
ters for those engaged in it.
SCIENTISTS BEFORE THE (BIOSAFETY) LAW:
IN SEARCH OF THE ORIGIN OF MAIZE
In “Before the Law,” Derrida demonstrates how Franz Kafka’s work
suspends the conventions of the literary institution by foreground-
ing the Law of the text itself. In Kafka’s story of the same title, a man
from the country waits for a gatekeeper’s permission to enter the
premises of the Law. Permission is never denied to him; rather the
gatekeeper repeatedly defers it, warning the man that once inside
the gate he will encounter other gatekeepers like himself. The man
chooses to wait, grows old and dies without ever entering the prem-
ises of the Law. As he dies, the gatekeeper approaches to inform
him that the gate will now close, since it was made only for this
particular man. Perhaps, Derrida says, the man from the country
did not know that “the law is not to be seen or touched but deci-
phered.”34
The literary operation of the Kafkian story has nothing to do
with literature as “a field, a domain, a region whose frontiers would
be pure and whose titles indivisible.”35 Rather, Kafka’s text is an act
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of literature because not just the man in the story but also the reader
is brought before the Law. Whereas initially the Law insinuates
itself “as a kind of personal identity entitled to absolute respect,” by
the end of the story we come up against the Law of the text itself,
which is to “guard itself, maintain itself—like the law, speaking
only of itself, that is to say, of its non-identity with itself.”36 What
must be deciphered here is the operation of the Law that fuels de-
sire for the origin and that makes particular laws appear as “beyond
history, genesis, or any possible derivation.”37 Desire for the origin
has to do with letting oneself be “tempted by the impossible,” as
Sigmund Freud did when he conceived a theory about the origin of
the moral law. Since, according to Derrida, the law is not to be seen
or touched but deciphered, the improbability of Freud’s tale of par-
ricide in Totem and Taboo in no way diminishes “the imperious ne-
cessity of what it tells, its law.”38 As a text, psychoanalysis operates
in “the simulacrum of narration” rather than in the narration of
imaginary histories. Psychoanalysis can neither prove nor disprove
parricide and yet remains constitutive of it.
Mexican scientists seem to have let themselves be tempted by
the impossible in their defense of Mexican maize biodiversity. The
Origin and Diversification of Maize: An Analytical Review is a scientific
report commissioned by the Mexican government in the context of
disputes around biosafety legislation. Its authors position their as-
sessment of scientific theories about the origin and diversification of
maize as a contribution of scientific information for decision makers
to consider while discerning the safety of transgenic maize. In my
reading of this contribution, I pay attention to how scientists reartic-
ulate a national myth by interweaving scientific stories with nation-
al stories and, more precisely, making the origin of maize coincide
with the origin of the nation. I suggest that such a textual mobiliza-
tion on the part of scientists injects into the cultural politics of bio-
technology in Mexico a paradox that has to do with the impossibil-
ity of fixing the origin. From this perspective, which is certainly not
the one most scientists embrace, no evidence about the true origin
of maize could ever guarantee the closure of the national text, and
yet the search for the origin would remain constitutive of maize
nationalism.
José Sarukhán, president of the National Commission for Biodi-
versity, introduces The Origin and Diversification of Maize. He begins
by invoking the familiar contrast between the Mexican meanings of
maize and its more utilitarian uses in the rest of the world. Even




maize as the grain of humanity, the origin of maize resides in Mexi-
co, and in the report the representatives of science seek to illuminate
the link between that origin and the Mexican nation.39 While ac-
knowledging that the origin of maize cannot be known with abso-
lute precision, Sarukhán anticipates the argument of such scientific
representatives, based on the theory that the origin of maize “oc-
curred simultaneously in several regions and extended to all the
national territory, which was inhabited by hundreds of indigenous
groups who have constituted the historical roots of that which our
country is today.”40 He concludes by exhorting Mexican authorities
to make decisions on the basis of two simultaneous considerations:
scientific evidence on the one hand and the status of biodiversity as
national and international heritage on the other hand.
In the preface to the actual scientific report, ethnobiologist Dr.
Robert Arthur Bye Boettler laments the fact that Mexican maize has
fallen victim to development policies rooted in complacency, ignor-
ance and disregard for critical issues.41 Such issues, he argues,
should be considered within the dynamics of scientific knowledge,
in which error and disagreement play a central role. Bye reflects on
the heterogeneity and incommensurability of the available evidence
on the origin of maize. While archaeological information seems too
heterogeneous to give us a precise image of such an event, the tech-
niques and methods of molecular genetics seem incommensurable
with archaeological data. In his view, it is necessary to overcome
heterogeneity and incommensurability through systematic monitor-
ing and standard methodologies in order to fill the gaps in our
knowledge about the origin and diversification of maize. Could this
scientific call for overcoming heterogeneity and incommensurabil-
ity be seen in reality as a call for national unification? In his conclu-
sion, Bye calls for the authorities (including researchers) to adopt a
commitment based on the economic and strategic importance of
maize as a national resource, a vision in which farmers appear (one
again) as instrumental to the conservation of genetic information
that is represented as a cultural and historical gift from Mesoameri-
ca to the whole of humanity.
In the chapter “Theories about the Origin of Maize,” maize cy-
togeneticist Takeo Angel Kato reviews the scientific search for the
origin of maize in the context of twentieth-century biological para-
digms. Despite its impersonal style and highly technical vocabu-
lary, Kato’s review unfolds like an adventure story. Once upon a
time in the nineteenth century a certain Ascherson suggested that
the wild grass teocintle might be the direct ancestor of maize. Ever
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since, scientists have restlessly searched for a complete explanation
of the “mysterious” relation between maize and teocintle. In order to
explain the morphological differences between these two plants,
Paul Mangelsdorf and his colleague Robert Reeves postulated in
1938 that maize had a complicated hybrid origin. According to their
tripartite hypothesis, teocintle is not the direct ancestor of maize but
rather the descendant of an ancient variety of wild maize that spon-
taneously crossed with Tripsacum. Via teocintle, genes from Tripsa-
cum were incorporated into wild maize, detonating the genetic vari-
ability that was a precondition of human domestication of teocintle.
The role of Tripsacum as represented in this theory eventually met
with many objections, in response to which Mangelsdorf and
Reeves dropped the Tripsacum hypothesis out of the theory. Yet
they stuck to the hypothesis of a hybridization event protagonized
by ancestral maize. In Kato’s interpretation, at any rate, the tripar-
tite hypothesis was never a theory about the origin of maize; rather
it was about the origin of teocintle.
For all of Kato’s rational style of presentation and argument, his
search for a mysterious origin of maize has a literary resonance and
even echoes debates about the origin of writing. In Proust and the
Squid, a neuroscientific review of the scientific debates around the
development of writing, Maryanne Wolf observes with amusement
the anthropocentric tone of the discussion that figures the Greek
alphabet as either the “sister” or the “daughter” of a previous writ-
ing system. Either the origin of the Greek alphabet must be fixed in
a single most likely “parent” or the search must continue until an-
other “missing ancestor” is found that accounts for the origin of all
the “relatives” acknowledged so far. As far as neuroscience is con-
cerned, these disputes about where to fix the origin may continue
forever and have little or no impact on current pedagogical issues,
such as how to develop a reading brain in the fast-paced world of
digital media. Like the origin of the Greek alphabet, the origin of
maize has involved human-centered genealogical disputes.
In the late 1960s molecular biologist George Beadle argued that
the morphological differences between maize and teocintle were not
so large as to require an extinct ancestor. He proposed that maize
was simply a form of teocintle arrived at through the human selec-
tion of several major genes, each of which would control a single
difference between the two plants. Humans may have noticed
promising mutations, such as a softer glume in some teocintle plants,
and may have started selecting them for cultivation.42 The ascent of




Beadle’s theory. Over the decades, however, Beadle’s theory had to
be reelaborated on the basis of a nonreductionistic understanding of
the complex, uncertain interaction between genetic elements, the
cytological environment and morphological expression.
According to Kato, it seems clear enough today from taxonomi-
cal, morphological, cytological and genetic perspectives that teocin-
tle alone is the closest relative of maize. Contemporary proponents
of Beadle’s theory argue that maize was developed through human
selection of specific traits of one particular teocintle, Z. mays parvig-
lumis.43 Importantly, the differences between teocintle and maize are
now seen as affected by multiple genetic interactions rather than
being determined simply by individual genes. Since most genes in
fact have modest effects, even Beadle came to recognize that per-
haps hundreds or thousands of additional modifier genes, as well as
environmental factors, would be necessary to achieve transforma-
tion. Ironically, given that the interplay between genetic and envi-
ronmental factors remains mysterious and unpredictable, science
has kept the door open to the investigation of events other than
human selection that supposedly triggered the origin of maize. In a
modern version of the tripartite theory, Mary Eubanks argues that
Tripsacum introgression into teocintle could have provided the “mu-
tagenic action” leading to an “explosive” origin and diversification
of maize.44 Kato also mentions Hugh Iltis’s 1983 theory of a “catas-
trophic sexual transmutation,” according to which environmental
factors induced a “feminization” of male organs and their substitu-
tion for the small teocintle fruits. The maize cob would have origi-
nated not through genetic mutation but rather through “genetic
assimilation” of an acquired trait. While the theory was mostly criti-
cized as “pure and simple Lamarckism,” Kato argues that the
morphological changes it describes would be insufficient anyway to
bring about the effects that Iltis attributes to them. According to
Kato’s own cytogenetic research, the maize cob has an explanation
directly at the genetic level.
Under the dominant teocintle hypothesis of human domestica-
tion as the origin of maize, the debate among scientists shifted to-
ward the question of the origin’s location. Significantly, both theo-
ries depend on the excavation of further fossil evidence from ar-
chaeological sites. In the penultimate chapter of the report, José
Antonio Serratos departs from Kato’s conclusion that there is a lack
of definitive evidence for current theories about the geographical
origin of maize. The “unicentric” and “multicentric” theories each
give a particular answer to the question about where and how do-
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mestication took place. The former holds that maize was domesti-
cated in a single event in the Balsas River basin in Mexico, after
which it spread out to the whole American continent. The multicen-
tric theory claims that maize was domesticated in different areas at
the same time, drawing support from cytogenetic research describ-
ing correlations between chromosomal nodes and geographic distri-
bution of “landraces.” As Serratos explains, assuming the correct-
ness of the unicentric theory has huge implications for the definition
of the center of origin. If maize originated through a single event of
domestication, its center of origin must be located at one specific
point along the basin of the Balsas River. Yet, if maize had a multi-
centric origin, determination of its center of origin and genetic di-
versity would have to include many other regions, “practically . . .
the whole country.”45 Serratos concludes that as long as we lack
definitive evidence for the unicentric theory, the most conservative
position must prevail.
Article 3 of the Mexican Biosafety Law defines “center of origin”
as a geographic area where the domestication of a given species
took place. It defines “center of diversity” separately as a geograph-
ic area with genetic or morphological diversity of a given species, a
population of wild ancestors, and a “genetic reservoir.”46 These def-
initions are problematic, Serratos argues, in that they separate the
human and biological factors that Nikolai Vavilov’s classical under-
standing of origin and diversity joins. In his view, it is also impor-
tant to consider biological, human and social aspects of the domesti-
cation process that impinge on the definition of the center of origin
and diversity of maize. Human labor, Serratos points out, cannot be
dissociated from the origin of maize if the origin is understood as a
process of diversification. Since crop diversification occurs when
human beings orientate natural selection toward their own pur-
poses, Vavilov had included the persistence of widespread cultiva-
tion in the definition of the crop’s center of origin. The law, howev-
er, “breaks the unity” of origin, domestication and diversity by re-
ducing origin to a geographical area and separating domestication
from genetic diversity. Moreover, it contains “unnecessary and in-
correct restrictions” within the definition of the center of diversity.
To be regarded legally as the center of diversity, a geographical area
must not only host a population of wild relatives but also be clas-
sified as a genetic reservoir. Both of these conditions exclude large
areas of Mexico in which maize agriculture is widespread. On the
one hand, the presence of wild relatives is in fact much more local-




status of genetic reservoir implies confinement, which is both incon-
sistent with diversification and impossible without adequate infor-
mation and operational measures. By reducing and impoverishing
the concepts of origin, domestication and diversity, the law exposes
the nation’s genetic resources to all the threats posed by genetically
modified organisms (GMOs). As an alternative, Serratos proposes
to reunify the concepts of center of origin and center of diversity
and to incorporate archaeological, ecological and cultural consider-
ations into their definition. On this basis, Serratos proposes new
definitions for the law, formulated as follows: “Centers of origin are
those geographical areas within the national territory where the
ancestors and wild relatives of a crop are found today or were once
found, as well as those in which a crop’s domestication took place in
association with specific cultural trajectories. Likewise, centers of
origin include those areas in which there is either or both morpho-
logical and genetic diversity that might constitute a genetic reser-
voir.”47
This scientific definition promises to satisfy the activist demand
that all of the Mexican territory be considered as a center of origin of
maize, since there is no geographical area within the national terri-
tory where native maize was never found, cultivated or consumed.
Very subtly, the definition makes the theoretical boundaries of a
Vavilov center of origin coincide with the territorial boundaries of
the Mexican nation-state. At the same time, Serratos points out the
need for a new characterization of the existing maize diversity that
takes into account changes in land use and economic activity since
the last samples were taken several decades ago. An accurate char-
acterization would have to rely on new physical explorations across
the Mexican territory and then on “risk maps” for the “vigilance of
native maize.” What sounds like a project to maintain the boundar-
ies of the nation through the scientific protection of maize diversity
is accompanied, in other words, by an acknowledgment that such a
diversity cannot be determined or even approached in isolation
from the complex processes of social and technical transformation
that have already taken place. Thus, while Serratos reasserts the
national boundaries through his defense of maize biodiversity, he
also gives up any guarantee that the latter can be described as
“pure” or uncontaminated.
Joel Wainwright and Kristin Mercer have observed that the acti-
vist demand for decontamination gives rise to a political dilemma
consisting in the fact that such a task exceeds the capacity of scien-
tists as the hegemonic group in the dispute. While ecological scien-
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tists such as Bye, Kato and Serratos can mobilize uncertainty about
the actual origin of maize, and thereby about the actual risk of con-
tamination, they cannot actually produce “decontaminated
maize.”48 The Origin and Diversification of Maize foregrounds a para-
dox that has to do with the actual impossibility of closing the na-
tional text by fixing the origin of maize. Even though the search for
the origin of maize appears necessary for a debate around the na-
tion’s response to biotechnology, no empirical evidence about the
origin or diversity of maize could guarantee the purity and integrity
of any national response to the threat of contamination. In fact, I
would suggest that the scientists’ search for the origin of maize is
itself disruptive in the sense that, on a second plane, it subverts the
founding narratives of the nation that the scientists themselves
seem to embrace—namely, that maize is a given entity, which the
nation can fully identify, control and protect through scientific ex-
pertise. I am thus suggesting that The Origin and Diversification of
Maize produces something very different from what it attempts to
represent. If, as Kato’s scientific review implies, an undisputed ori-
gin of maize is irretrievable, and if, as Serratos wants, the center of
origin of maize is seen to coincide with the boundaries of the Mexi-
can nation, those boundaries appear as more unstable and question-
able than is usually assumed. It is as if the biological history of
maize has disrupted the history of the Mexican nation-state, which
is paradoxical considering that the biological history of maize is in
fact a cultural/technical history; that is, it is a history of theoretical
and empirical disputes that can reach no closure unless closed in an
authoritarian way.
In his early analysis of the Mexican defense of maize, Gerard
Verschoor concluded that the anti-GMO movement could be pro-
foundly political if it mobilized uncertainties, rather than moral
truths, concerning the relationship between means and ends, be-
tween technology and the human being. Uncertainties need not
crystallize as technophobia but rather can give rise to an awareness
of “the interrelatedness between all humans and non-human partic-
ipants in the discourse.”49 Verschoor was calling activists to devel-
op a posthumanist attitude in the face of important questions such
as “What is the meaning of the relationship between means and
ends when one is talking about maize in a Vavilov centre of diver-
sity? What if genetic diversity erodes as a result of the introgression
of transgenes? Will Monarch butterflies, which feed on maize pol-
len, still have a place to live, or will they have to succumb to Bt




pens if travel-happy transgenes cross over and affect teocintles, the
wild relatives of maize? How to deal with super weeds that have
become resistant to Roundup herbicide?”50
The uncertainties mobilized by these questions for the first time
introduce the issue of nonhuman participants in a human debate,
and here we may begin to see how technology, in the sense of
interrelatedness of the human and the nonhuman, becomes a matter
of political subjectivity in the case of the anti-GMO movement in
Mexico. Maize, monarch butterflies, and transgenic crops entangle
with questions like “What to do with the legacy of the Revolution
once its ideals—land and liberty—were betrayed?” and, among oth-
ers, “What about democracy?”51 Verschoor emphasizes uncertainty,
open-endedness, and the “inability to differentiate between subjec-
tive and objective” not as ethereal virtues of the anti-GMO move-
ment but as an effective political force. The anti-GMO movement in
Mexico can be politically effective, he thinks, to the extent that it
creatively mobilizes uncertainty, for this is the only way to perform
democracy as contestation of the dominant liberal, humanist, tech-
noscientific and capitalist rationality. He concludes, “By attaching
their destiny to the principle of uncertainty, the repressed may be
able to construct for themselves a new collective identity. In the
process they may achieve a complete metamorphosis, and evolve
from what had to be given up to what has to be cherished and
respected on its own terms. The repressed have returned, and they
are here to recover their future.”52
John Hartigan has recently highlighted the productivity of such
a paradox, although from a different disciplinary vantage point. His
research is empirical; yet its consequences are, in his own words,
“speculative.” In the course of a comparative ethnographic study of
two projects, one dealing with human genomic medicine and the
other dealing with native maize biodiversity, Hartigan confronted
the particularities of Mexican nationalism and the uses of “race” on
nonhumans. Established in 2004, the Instituto Nacional de Medicina
Genómica (INMEGEN) is part of the Mexican government’s efforts
to improve the country’s technoscientific competitiveness. Geneti-
cists with INMEGEN argued that, to attract the interest and invest-
ment of global pharmaceutical companies, as well as to pursue ge-
netic research in terms of the nation at large, Mexico needed to
produce a haplotype map of its own.53 Whereas the emphasis on
sampling the “mestizo population” is racial in the sense that it as-
sumes a biological basis for the “mestizo” category, such a racial-
ism, Hartigan says, contrasts significantly with that of geneticists in




the United States.54 The more obvious difference is that “admix-
ture” was the starting point and founding assumption of mestizo
genomics, whereas in the United States it is construed as something
to control or avoid. Additionally, in Mexico there is no polar oppo-
sition of white and black construed as static categories. The “mesti-
zo” category is dynamic, always in a state of derivation from the
“indigenous” mixed with something else.
While the project aimed to establish the existence of a sufficient
basis to speak of a common national genetic structure, it was also
designed to consider and account for regional variations that reflect
distinct cultural and historical processes. Rather than view “the ge-
nome” as an independent entity, INMEGEN construes the contem-
porary genetic structure of Mexicans as an outgrowth of historical
processes that unfolded distinctly across a geographically varied
country, in which cultural formations played a substantive role in
shaping “genetic heterogeneity” across the nation. Moreover, in
stark contrast to what geneticists assume in the United States, they
make careful note that current identifiers of states should not be
taken as an “unchanging” locus of identity.55 Moreover, since very
little is fixed about genomes, genomics can even be seen as provid-
ing a basis for characterizing identities as fluid and plastic.
Established in 2005, the Laboratorio Nacional de Genómica para
la Biodiversidad (LANGEBIO) is in charge of the nation’s genetic
biodiversity, and its founding responded specifically to a US-based
project to sequence the “maize genome.” LANGEBIO director Luis
Herrera-Estrella explained to Hartigan, “It was embarrassing
enough to be ignored by the International HapMap, but to have
been left behind while ‘gringos’ sequenced the ‘maize genome’
would have been humiliating and intolerable.”56 Where the US ef-
fort trumpeted the discovery of the singular “genome of maize” and
“the maize HapMap,” LANGEBIO’s account promised “insight into
maize genomic diversity” via an ancestral population cultivated
into a variety of distinct razas or “landraces.” It aimed, that is, at
better understanding the process of artificial selection that led to the
domestication of maize varieties. The US effort presented “the ge-
nome” of B73 as if it were an independent, natural entity rather than
the highly selected-for agricultural staple that it is today.
As Hartigan observes, there are two sides to the maize ge-
nome—one millions of years old, the other, which we are most fa-
miliar with and dependent upon, the product of human tinkering
over the last nine thousand years. US researchers strained to look




ploid ancestor” of some 70 million years ago.57 When plants are
linked with race, cultural anthropologists tend to assume that link-
age is really about people and thus opt for an ideological analysis of
how the link is made so as to naturalize social categories. This ap-
proach, says Hartigan, assumes that talk about plants is principally
about human affairs, whereas the case of maize “landraces” sug-
gests to him otherwise.58 This use of raza to describe maize biodi-
versity fits in, he says, with the most common form of usage of the
term in Mexico, which is to characterize nonhumans. The key com-
monality among animal and plant breeds is that they are all domes-
ticates and, as such, participate in complex companion-species rela-
tions. Domestication thus challenges, in Hartigan’s view, the very
idea that naturalization is a key component of racial thinking; more-
over, biocultural constructions such as maize are plastic and suscep-
tible to losing their characteristics within a generation if they are not
bred properly. As a companion species, maize throws the natural-
ness of both the human and the nonhuman into question in an
ongoing, speculative manner because of the plasticity and instabil-
ity of these biocultural entities.59 Thus, whereas The Origin and Di-
versification of Maize illustrates the power of scientific textuality to
produce “at least some kind of displacement that can trouble iden-
tifications and certainties,”60 Hartigan’s work illustrates the pos-
sibility of turning displacement itself into a myth, yet a nonhuman-
ist or posthuman myth of maize, so that, by virtue of it, Mesoameri-
cans or Mexicans emerge “without qualities, without predestina-
tion: they must invent, realize, produce qualities, [but] nothing indi-
cates that, once produced, these qualities will bring about human-
ity. . . . [T]hey may rather become those of technics.”61
BECOMING SUBJECTS, BECOMING MYTHS:
ALWAYS ALREADY MATERIAL
A key argument in this chapter is that textual entities, such as
tropes, myths and figurations, are part and parcel of a critical mate-
rialist engagement with the technoscientific world. On this basis, I
attempt to perform a textual intervention in the Mexican biotechnol-
ogy debates along the ethico-political lines of a deconstructive kind
of materialism. The reconceptualization of technics carried out by
Bernard Stiegler in the first volume of his Technics and Time initially
inspired this project. Drawing on the empirical work of André Le-
roi-Gourhan, Stiegler elaborates a philosophical understanding of
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technics as an evolving, nondeterministic relationship between the
living and the nonliving. He explains that the archaeological finding
of the Zinjanthropian, a tool manipulator with a very small brain,
suggested to Leroi-Gourhan that brain development had not been
the leading cause of hominization. Hominization instead flowed
from a cofunctioning of body and tool, which Stiegler interprets
philosophically as a mirror-effect process “whereby one, looking at
itself in the other, is both deformed and formed.”62 By including
thinking itself in this process, Stiegler radically challenges the dua-
listic terms imposed on the thinking of technics by the metaphysical
tradition. No longer a mere instrument of a priori humanity, tech-
nics stands in his work for life in general understood as a technical
process from which humanity emerges contingently—that is, as de-
pendent on specific material conditions. Stiegler’s intense engage-
ment with physical anthropology already seems remarkable from a
materialist perspective; however, his mythological elaboration of
Leroi Gouhran’s work actually inspired this project. I find this my-
thopoetic gesture more valuable for my own attempt to rethink the
biotechnological disruption of the nation’s genetic archives,63 as the
scientific leaders of the Mexican defense of maize have literally put
it.
In his philosophical reading of the Greek myth of Prometheus,
Stiegler suggests that humans emerged as technical beings in more
than an empirical sense. There he foregrounds a fault committed in
the first place by Epimetheus, who forgot to assign qualities to hu-
man beings as the gods had instructed his brother Prometheus.
After the fault Prometheus performed his famous deed—namely,
the theft of “the gift of skill in the arts” (technicity) and fire in order
to help human beings survive. As we know, Zeus allowed humans
to keep the Promethean gift, if only because it already included his
revenge: the condition of mortality. As Stiegler says, “trepidation at
the condition of technicity (its power, implying equally the power-
lessness of mortals)” would haunt humans forever.64 This explains
the notion of “originary technicity,” or Stiegler’s own “myth of the
absence of foundation,”65 according to which human beings
emerged “without qualities, without predestination: they must in-
vent, realize, produce qualities, [but] nothing indicates that, once
produced, these qualities will bring about humanity. . . . [T]hey may
rather become those of technics.”66 What relevance does Stiegler’s
philosophical elaboration of the Promethean myth have in the con-
text of a confrontation between agricultural activism and corporate
biotechnology?
Chapter 5 DRAFT
[5.34]Rosi Braidotti has drawn attention to the dangers of traditional
philosophy as a machine with a tendency to cannibalize or assimi-
late “all new and even alien bodies.”67 As an alternative to the
disciplinary workings of institutionalized philosophy, Braidotti
proposes a nomadic style of thinking that consists of “crossing dis-
ciplinary boundaries, extensive borrowing of notions and concepts
that are deliberately used out of context and derouted from their
initial purpose.”68 In such a nomadic spirit, I want to borrow origi-
nary technicity from Stiegler’s deconstructive framework, as a pre-
liminary step in the project of rethinking biotechnological disrup-
tion in ethico-political terms. Such a rethinking or repurposing
seems indispensable in this case because, as Oliver Marchart recent-
ly pointed out, Stiegler’s technical focus has led him to overlook the
ontological specificity of the political—which, by contrast, post-
Marxist philosophers Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau theorized
rigorously in terms of antagonism. For Stiegler, politics is needed to
regulate disagreements around the threats posed by technics,
among which he finds of particular concern an apparent decline in
cognitive and affective dispositions under capitalist media indus-
tries. Echoing the feminist criticism of institutional philosophy,
Marchart concludes quite forcefully that the generalizing tone with
which Stiegler pathologizes the social has the function of absolving
the philosopher from analyzing the concrete circumstances that
contribute to the emergence of politics in particular contexts.69 By
failing to grant any constitutive role to antagonism as such, Stiegler
ends up precluding radical politics in favor of bland reformist ap-
peals to regulate the media and teach the youth to “take care” of
themselves and others.70 Moreover, through his constant use of
medical language, Stiegler transforms sociopolitical analysis into a
pathologizing discourse that reinscribes metaphysics by presuppos-
ing a nonpathological state of origin (such as a “natural” libidinal
economy that can be “destroyed” by consumer capitalism). In a
similar vein, Richard Beardsworth accuses Stiegler of overlooking
the contextual specificities of the economic domain. Whereas for
Stiegler the question of technics is a Greek one, contemporary eco-
nomic alienation needs to be thought, Beardsworth argues, beyond
Greek philosophy and in terms of what kind of regulation of capi-
talism is possible today for the world as a whole. As Beardsworth
says, generalizing, deterministic arguments cannot adequately han-
dle such a vast and difficult question.71 I conclude not that philo-
sophical reflection should be regarded as useless in the face of com-
plex material realities or that we should abandon, as Coole and
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Frost demand, textual approaches in favor of more empirical ones.
Rather, I argue in this chapter that the philosophical framework of
originary technicity can be deployed in more critical ways, with due
attention to the contextual specificities of an event in technics such
as the Mexican defense of maize agriculture.
Like Haraway’s cyborg trope, Rosi Braidotti’s trope of nomadic
subjectivity is meant to do otherwise than describe reality. It seeks
to enact a “politically informed account of an alternative subjectiv-
ity.”72 Braidotti develops a vision of subjectivity as “a multilayered
and dynamic entity” that can create alternatives to the Eurocentric
and patriarchal legacy of metaphysics, first of all by reinventing
philosophy as a pursuit of the singular in all its complexity and
diversity.73 In such a task, figures and tropes are deployed so as to
“think through and move across established categories and levels of
experience.”74 This critical practice resists settling into socially
coded modes of thought and behavior, and so it cannot be innocent
of violence.75 The sacking and looting of cities, Braidotti says, and
even the killing of sedentary populations have historically marked
the nomad’s answer to agriculture.76 Yet the point of Braidotti’s
philosophical nomadism is not to celebrate violence but rather to
“open up in-between spaces where new forms of political subjectiv-
ity can be explored.”77 What kind of alternative subjectivity may
emerge through a refiguration of disruption as a cyborg and no-
madic trope? The violent kind of nomadism currently enacted by
transnational capitalism is ideologically framed, says Braidotti, as a
threat of ecological disaster, genetic mutation and immunity break-
down.78 As an alternative to our culture’s manic-depressive re-
sponse, she calls for figurations that “enable us to account in em-
powering and positive terms for the changes and transformations
currently on the way.”79
In this spirit, Braidotti draws on Barbara McClintock’s theory of
the nonlinear behavior of certain genetic elements and emulates its
central notion of jumping genes or transposons so as to perform “a
creative leap that produces a prolific in-between space.”80 Braidot-
ti’s textual transpositions enact “mobility and cross-referencing be-
tween disciplines and discursive levels” so as to allow for “a crucial
shift in the process of becoming subjects.”81 Rather than getting
stuck in the pain and despair that a technological invasion of the
body may inflict, Braidotti proposes to explore the idea that the
body (hence subjectivity) is by definition embedded in a complex
environment of “mutual flows and data transfer” and best under-




connectedness.”82 In this context tropes themselves may operate as
transpositions, and so the placenta, the parasite, the cloned animal,
the gene and hybrid complexity all become ways of enacting critical
and creative leaps in the world. Do such creative leaps conflict in
any way with the defense of Mexican agriculture? After all, this is a
defense of territory, of sedentary forms of existence, of identity as a
right to inhabit the world according to socially coded modes of
thought and behavior. It may therefore appear as unrealistic (and
downright offensive to some) to suggest that a nomadic trope could
perform better than “nation” or “milpa culture” in the project of
confronting the assaults of transnational capitalism.
A dialogue around the critical need to articulate nomadic tropes
with grassroots politics has already started to take place. Exemplary
in this regard is Braidotti’s engagement, in Transpositions, with the
militant discourse of Vandana Shiva, a guru of anti-GMO move-
ments worldwide, including the Mexican one. Braidotti engages
with Shiva’s discourse as part of her own call for “grounded, histor-
icized accounts for the multiply positioned subjects of postmoder-
nity.”83 In her own self-consciously European vision, activism must
eschew a reassertion of humanist dichotomies and focus on disrupt-
ing their social status. For instance, it must disrupt “the notion of
purity of the lineage and of direct genetic inheritance” conveyed by
the European notion of “seed.” The seed is not a natural given but
rather a material-semiotic construction. For Braidotti, this implies
that biotechnology cannot simply vampirize life. Rather, as a result
of biotechnology’s material and discursive practices, “‘life as bios/
zoe’ produces ever-growing new areas of activity and interven-
tion.”84 As Braidotti knows very well, the problem is that such new
areas are increasingly coextensive with neocolonial capitalism,
which poses a common threat in European and non-European loca-
tions. Thus, even if Shiva takes for granted that the life of seeds is
“an externally constituted ‘other’ which gets invested or taken over
by the powers-that-be,”85 rather than condemning her neohuman-
ism, Braidotti regards it as “a sort of travelling companion.”86 What
kind of solution is this?
Braidotti’s solution to the theoretical disagreement with Shiva
illustrates a crucial feature of feminist figuration. The solution in-
vokes the task of the social critic understood as a contestation of
narratives and categories. Precisely from this vantage point it seems
odd to find Braidotti suddenly opposed to “the linguistic turn in the
sense of the postmodernist over-emphasis on textuality, representa-
tion, interpretation and the power of the signifier.”87 In her more
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recent work, she has continued to oppose the power of the signifier
by proposing the posthuman as a new kind of subjectivity that
moves “altogether beyond the postmodern critique of modernity
and is especially opposed to the hegemony gained by linguistic
mediation within postmodernist theory.”88 Thus, in her search for
“a neo-materialist, embodied and embedded approach,”89 Braidotti
ends up rejecting the poststructuralist legacy she initially claimed to
embrace and now describes as an extension of representational
thinking. It seems clear, however, that her practice of figuration
cannot do without textuality, representation, interpretation and the
power of the signifier, and it is at least doubtful that nomadic sub-
jects and transpositions can take us to another world that is free of
such things. Yet Braidotti implies that we can at least imagine such
a world when she claims that it is possible to overemphasize lan-
guage to the detriment of material and bodily forces. Like Coole
and Frost, she seems to underestimate the generative and open-
ended characteristics of textual materiality. Braidotti’s impatience
with signification may signal a metaphysical yearning for some
kind of unpolluted signified. Alongside Derrida’s view of the mutu-
al composition of negativity and affirmation, however, it is possible
to read Braidotti’s fundamental motivation as ethical.
Braidotti detects too much negativity in strands of poststructu-
ralism such as Lacanian psychoanalysis, Derridean deconstruction
and neo-Heideggerian meditations on bare life. Following Gilles
Deleuze, she advocates generative desire and an open-ended, web-
like subject as promising alternatives to structural lack and constitu-
tive outsides. On that basis, she embraces “a dynamic view of all
affects, even those that freeze us in pain, horror or mourning.”90
Beyond a rigorous intellectual framework, an active engagement
with technological invasion requires a capacity to “live with the
open wound.”91 Thus, even if she cannot prove that a figurative
affirmation of “the power of life itself” will bring about a world free
of lack, constitutive outsides, and linguistic mediation, Braidotti
will insist that it promises a more ethical being-in-the-world. In this
sense, and coming back to Braidotti’s nontheoretical solidarity with
Vandana Shiva, what matters here, I propose, is “the synchroniza-
tion of the different elements, their affective dimension, the affinity,
not the political or theoretical correctness.”92 Rather than theoretical
agreement, Braidotti invokes an “openness to others, in the positive
sense of affecting and being affected by others, through couples and
mutually dependent co-realities.”93 For my own intervention in




critical refiguration of disruption and contamination need not be
read in dialectical opposition to activism. Moreover, it suggests that
beyond strategic political alliances as they are played out on the
juridical front, for instance, there is politics in another sense, or
rather nonsense, yet to come.
This is further suggested by the work of María Josefina Saldaña-
Portillo, who has theorized the politics of Zapatismo within the
tension between politics as hegemony and as generative “silence.”
In the same gesture Saldaña-Portillo’s reading illustrates the critical
power of textual approaches and their limitations as well. Latin
American revolutionary texts from the 1950s and 1960s—which in
her view were captured by the discourse of development, a regime
of subjection that rearticulated and redeployed the logic of Euro-
pean colonialism—form the backdrop of her analysis. Simply escap-
ing developmental metaphysics is not possible, but subverting it
through “performative acts” is. Drawing on Laclau’s theory of heg-
emony, Saldaña-Portillo argues that the Zapatistas were able to dis-
rupt the semiotic chain of national meanings through a resignifica-
tion of Indian difference. By locating the reason for their rebellion in
the lack of democracy and in the government’s betrayal of the Mexi-
can Revolution, the Zapatistas generalized their situation in order to
include millions of Mexicans who would otherwise not regard
themselves as Indian.94 In other words, they “stretched” indigeneity
beyond its role as folkloric origin and abject residuality and trans-
formed it into a new ground for multiple democratic identifications
at the national (and, in fact, international) level. This analysis cer-
tainly focuses on the narrative strategies deployed by Zapatismo in
its revolutionary struggle against neoliberalism, and yet it would be
unfair to qualify Saldaña-Portillo’s textual approach as forgetful of
material factors.
Zapatismo did not emerge spontaneously from anything like
“Indian culture” but was instead a contingent outcome of the boom
and boost of an oil-based economy.95 During the boom, indigenous
peasants from the highlands of Chiapas migrated to construction
sites in the jungle, where jobs and wages depended on international
oil prices. Those who continued farming became increasingly de-
pendent on rural development programs, which allowed them to
sell maize at the local markets. When international oil prices fell and
development programs stopped, many farmers were caught in a
cycle of debt and poverty. Zapatismo emerged in this economic
conjuncture as an “active reconstruction” and “collective investiga-
tion by mediating, self-reflective subjects.”96 Saldaña-Portillo is thus
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careful to materially circumscribe the agency of these subjects, but
not without a caveat that “economic changes alone cannot explain
what occurred in Chiapas.”97 Saldaña-Portillo foregrounds the po-
litical specificity of events in the jungle during the oil boom. Activ-
ities such as clearing the jungle, establishing towns and petitioning
the state for land grants and services demanded an unprecedented
amount of organization and cooperation among previously isolated
communities. They rearticulated traditional hierarchies by favoring
more horizontal structures of community governance.98
In foregrounding contingency and rearticulation of nationalist
narratives, Saldaña-Portillo does not merely “apply” (in cannibalis-
tic fashion) the formulae of Laclauian post-Marxism. Rather, she
attempts to subvert the post-Marxist theorization of the political
precisely by taking the form of that of which she speaks—namely,
Zapatista mythmaking. As I have explored in previous chapters, the
post-Marxist agenda involves a critique of “the objectivist prejudice
that social forces are something” so as to carefully examine what
such forces do not manage to be.99 Sociopolitical processes do not
manage to be exclusion-free and violence-free, since “the constitu-
tion of a social identity is an act of power and that identity as such is
power.”100 As an act of power, any identity will tend to become
sedimented and thereby appear as an objective presence. In other
words, it will tend to conceal the traces of the exclusion, power and
antagonism on which it is necessarily based. Such is the basis of
Laclau’s neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, in which the exercise
of political power is understood not as coercion or repression but
rather as persuasion and leadership through mythmaking.
Saldaña-Portillo argues that Zapatista discourse both enacts the
Laclauian formula of hegemony and transcends its roots in antago-
nism through “a counterpunctual discourse emerging from si-
lence.”101 She narrates an activist meeting in which Zapatistas re-
quested that foreign attendants remain absolutely silent for at least
ten minutes, in the course of which their hosts would slowly and
silently surround them. That night in Oventic, Saldaña-Portillo says,
the Zapatistas “brought all of us into a relationship of abstract and
temporary parity” “through our identification with their silence.”102
At the same time, silence recreated the ontological conditions for a
positive achievement of radical democracy. She writes, “Silence is
the clearing that makes speech possible, not because it stands in a
dichotomous relation to speech, as contentless space, but precisely
because it is in the fullness of silence where differences take shape:




As opposed to the lack that a Laclauian realistic analysis would
detect in Zapatista discourse, Saldaña-Portillo’s mythomorphic ac-
count alludes to “fullness” in the nonverbal aspects of Zapatista
political performance. Her figuration of silence as an infinite, gener-
ative process that exceeds the boundaries of the human world
promises to subvert the humanism implicit in post-Marxist political
theory. Concerned as he is with human identities, Laclau associates
democracy with the recognition of “the purely human and discur-
sive nature of truth.”104 Unfortunately, Saldaña-Portillo ends up re-
inscribing such a humanism in a particularistic form. That is, she
rehumanizes silence by associating it with the communitarian poli-
tics of indigenous Zapatista communities. She explains that the
Zapatistas are proposing a new form of government that is in direct
contradiction with the party system. Whereas the party system is
based on the idea of irreconcilable differences or antagonism, the
indigenous proposal rests on the belief that “you can reach consen-
sus as a community.”105 Even if disagreements persist among the
Zapatistas over the kind of autonomy they want to have, Saldaña-
Portillo insists that they have finally achieved fullness; that is, they
have transcended the antagonistic logic of signification as theorized
by post-Marxist political philosophers such as Laclau. In this vein,
she writes, “I am suggesting that the empty signifier is no longer
empty. The Zapatistas twice challenge Laclau’s antagonistic formu-
lation of hegemonic politics when they fill the “empty” signifier of
Indian difference with their own particularity even as they univer-
salize this particularity to represent the fullness of the Mexican
community. They fill Indian difference with a specificity—with the
aesthetics of silence and the politics of the comón—capable of en-
compassing the abstract national community in struggle and in dif-
ference.”106
By postulating that Zapatistas are above and beyond the dynam-
ics of power and antagonism that define post-Marxist politics,
Saldaña-Portillo echoes the modern utopian vision that a free soci-
ety is one that has totally eliminated power. Perhaps Zapatista poli-
tics does indeed include something radically new and important;
yet to say that Zapatistas have overcome antagonism (understood
as the threat of temporality itself) and finally achieved a power-free
society risks a reinscription of metaphysical thinking, which is also
to depoliticize Zapatismo. To say, with the post-Marxists, that an-
tagonism is ineradicable is not to recommend exclusion and vio-
lence but rather to acknowledge the relational dynamics of identity
in order to understand why, historically, emancipatory projects
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have often disappointed and continue to disappoint humankind. As
Wendy Brown cautions, “Silence calls for speech, yet speech, be-
cause it is always particular speech, vanquishes other possible
speech, thus canceling the promise of full representation heralded
by silence. Silence, both constituted and broken by particular
speech, is neither more nor less “truthful” than speech is, and nei-
ther more nor less regulatory.”107
While Saldaña-Portillo’s “silence” echoes Braidotti’s affirmation
of generative desire as opposed to psychoanalytic lack, the fullness
she attributes to silence might benefit from some contamination
with Braidotti’s earlier philosophical nomadism—that is, from the
search for a “critical consciousness that resists settling into socially
coded modes of thought and behavior.”108 With a careful dose of
nomadic contamination, Saldaña-Portillo’s trope of silence may be-
come, alongside Haraway’s cyborg, an ironic myth for disrupted
identities.109 When Haraway asks what might be learned from per-
sonal and political pollution,110 she fully acknowledges that, as un-
equally positioned inhabitants of technoscience, we are traversed by
power relations and contradictory attachments that we must nego-
tiate in a critical and responsible way. In this vein, Haraway re-
minds us, “Believing that somehow there is this seamless, friction-
free becoming is an ideological mistake that we ought to be aston-
ished that we can still make. If we’re going to get at why we still
make it, we need psychoanalytic mechanisms. We need to under-
stand how our investment in these fantasies works.”111
In a slightly perverse way, my understanding of biotechnologi-
cal disruption tries to remain attentive to the mutual composition of
negativity and affirmation, lack and generative desire, critique and
creativity, political violence and an ethical openness to the other,
death and life. By holding such incompatible things together “in the
formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity,” I deploy
biotechnological disruption here as a nonempiricist reading of the
Mexican defense of maize. Contamination is no longer the despised
place in a particular political program but figures positively as “a






NOT A THING BUT A MYTH:
AUTONOMY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
In a recent issue of New Formations, cultural theorist Jeremy Gilbert
seems to agree with Coole and Frost that media and cultural studies
have tended to retreat from ecological issues out of “scepticism re-
garding anything that might smell of naturalism.”113 Unlike Coole
and Frost, however, Gilbert argues that such a retreat is unneces-
sary, since ecological issues take place in a cultural terrain. Impor-
tantly, a cultural terrain is for Gilbert not one sphere among many,
but rather a complex (we may perhaps say ecological) field in which
the political, the economic and the natural form an inseparable dy-
namic. In other words, “culture” is a complex material affair. More-
over, critical textual approaches do not claim to exhaust or displace
matter but rather call into question all kinds of authoritative ac-
counts of material reality. From this perspective, even “new materi-
alism” is seen as a cultural approach, something that becomes evi-
dent when Coole and Frost explain that materialism is not so much
about an immediate access to matter itself as about a critical engage-
ment with “underlying beliefs about existence that shape our every-
day relationships to ourselves, to others, and to the world.”114
Cultural anthropologist Arturo Escobar has argued that we must
take seriously the politics of a cultural affirmation of peasant
worlds, which he describes as worlds of caring, of “intimate and
ongoing dialogue between all living beings.”115 The peasant strug-
gle is “above all a struggle over symbols and meanings, a cultural
struggle.”116 In the milpa maize is not a resource used to top up the
energies of laboring individuals but a communal activity that pro-
duces communal life according to local customs and traditions.
Such an activity cannot be reduced to a commercial contract be-
tween a single plant and an abstract human being, because a wider
biocultural context in which multiple reciprocities take place en-
ables and constrains both plant and human being. A bioethically
oriented media and cultural studies can stress this point while
pushing for recognition of the fact that technicity is “the condition
and foundation of culture, not its opponent.”117 Biotechnical prac-
tices such as milpa agriculture gave Mesoamerican societies and
their descendants healthy and diverse diets, allowing them to sur-
vive centuries of colonial and neocolonial exploitation. Contempo-
rary environmental concerns have implied a revalorization of prein-
dustrial biotechnology; yet I think it is important to remember that
maize agriculture always existed technically and politically rather











than in an uncontaminated state of cultural purity. This is impor-
tant, I argue, in order to consider them seriously outside the straw
oppositions between “hard” political economy and “mere” culture
and, at the level of theory, between empirical and textual ap-
proaches.
On March 2009, when a presidential decree ended the ten-year
moratorium on the experimental sowing of transgenic crops in
Mexico, the activist Network in Defense of Maize—which counts
numerous scientists among its prominent members—launched a se-
ries of public protests denouncing the government’s decision as a
“historical crime” and a “wound to the identity of Mesoamerican
peoples.” I now turn to the network’s argument that maize is not a
thing but “a complex entanglement of relations, a civilizational pro-
cess.”118 A two-volume book develops this argument, chronicling
and reflecting on the network’s ten-year struggle. In the following
section, I interrogate the political program of the network from the
standpoint of biotechnological disruption. How does the network’s
figuration of the origin simultaneously open up and close down the
future of maize?
In the first of several prologues to Maize Is Not a Thing, late
Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla reminds readers
that maize is more than a human creation; it is an active agent that
organizes human life according to its own rhythms, demanding
from human beings both cultural and technological creativity. In
Mexico, Bonfil Batalla declares, maize has sustained a popular pro-
ject based on community and directly opposed to the abstraction
and commodification of crops under capitalism.119
A list of eighteen “inescapable points” about transgenic contami-
nation follows Bonfil Batalla’s founding statements:120
1. Transgenic seeds belong to a legal system that criminalizes
the victims of contamination.
2. Transgenic seeds benefit companies rather than farmers.
3. Contamination of nontransgenic crops is inevitable.
4. Transgenic foods are dangerous to humans.
5. Transgenic seeds are an attack on small-scale, independent
food production.
6. In Mexico, this attack is a historical crime because Mexico is
the center of origin of maize.















8. Health risks are higher in Mexico because Mexicans eat a lot
of maize.
9. Contamination is destruction of a genetic reservoir that is
indispensable to confront climate change.
10. Contamination is an attack on Mexican campesinos.
11. Contamination may cause deformity and sterility of Mexican
maize.
12. Biosafety laws pave the way to large-scale cultivation of
transgenic maize.
13. Contamination has been detected in Mexican fields since
2001.
14. Independent civil organizations have protested against con-
tamination.
15. Thousands of scientists have publicly stated their disagree-
ment with the end of the 1998 moratorium on transgenic
maize.
16. The government has systematically dismissed the legal re-
sources mobilized by civil organizations and has even
changed the law in order to proceed with the release of trans-
genic seeds.
17. The government has been violating laws in order to promote
the release of transgenic maize.
18. International organizations, such as the United Nations, have
also ignored civil organizations when these have requested
their support.
From the list emerges the network’s current position that contami-
nation does not amount to, as activists themselves had initially
thought, accidental gene spilling. Rather, contamination is a deliber-
ate attack on agriculture understood as a project of taking care of
the world by taking care of the natural and social environments.
According to the network, accomplishing this “grounds autonomy,
history, a present and a future of [one’s] own.”121 The network in-
deed presents autonomy as the whole point of agriculture and as
the road that many of its members have decided to take in response
to the abandonment and contempt of all kinds of institutions, which
made them understand that “the whole world can be seen from the
milpa.”122 After ten years of struggle, the network seems to have
gained a realistic picture of, as well as a historical perspective on,
what is going on with Mexican laws and institutions. From its be-
ginnings in the European Renaissance, they explain, capitalism set
out to “kill agriculture” through land theft, enclosure and forced
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migration to the cities. The Green Revolution continued the killing
by expelling farmers’ knowledge from the countryside. More re-
cently transgenic seeds were invented in order to “disfigure crops,”
exhaust farmers’ varieties and promote dependency on industry. At
present, neoliberal capitalism seeks to consummate its historical
project by imposing everywhere a standardized package of privat-
ization laws. Thus, in addition to a biosafety law, Mexico passed a
seed law that is virtually identical to those passed in other countries
since seed corporations grouped under the International Seed Fed-
eration (ISF) wrote it. The Mexican Seeds Association, which repre-
sents the ISF, stipulates that only “certified” seeds can legally be
sown. Seeds must be stable in order to be certified, and only cer-
tified, patented seeds can be used in rural development programs
involving technical assistance and credit. In view of their repeated
failure to influence the law, activists have increasingly realized that
the nation-state acts today, as in fact it always has, as a facilitator of
capitalism by either directly repressing noncooperative agricultural
communities or fragmenting them through co-optation into devel-
opmentalism. No longer a simple defense of national identity, the
defense of maize has grown into a more focused critique of the
complicity of state institutions with transnational capitalism. The
testimony of Aldo González, included in Maize Is Not a Thing, con-
tributes an interesting reflection regarding the question of why in-
digenous activists have been more active in the defense of maize.
“They touched us on our essence,” he says, “our essence as indige-
nous peoples.”123 For indigenous peasants such as González, de-
fending maize is about defending collective rights, community
government, history and the environment. Collective rights, history
and the environment, however, are particular cultural values that
capitalism has undermined by means more subtle than land theft,
enclosure and forced migration.
Realistically, González takes for granted that “they will not pay
attention to us,” and so it makes no sense for “us” to go out onto the
street and demonstrate against globalization. Nor does it make
sense to wait for international nongovernmental organizations to
come and tell “us” about laws. At any rate, it is dangerous to make
laws when the people are not well informed. For the same reason,
mobilization must take place “inside our communities.” Commu-
nities must learn by themselves that transgenic seeds destroy the
variety, meaningfulness, knowledge and adaptability of maize.
They must learn by themselves that transgenics are good “only to
poison the lands and to destroy the economy of communities.”124
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From the network’s current perspective, contamination is not a mat-
ter of technical discussion among juridical and ecological experts.
Rather, it is a political problem involving threat and antagonism
from industry: “Only with proper, native maize (not its disfigured
transgenic version), sown so that the community eats with minimal
dependence, can the realm of the “us” be lived: collective work, our
own justice, self-government, assembly, in a life against the tide of
planetary systems.”125
Capitalism, after all, has always attacked the peasant’s way—
that is, autonomy. Activists have concluded that contamination is a
weapon deliberately employed by the industry. In their view, the
industry knows very well that many Mexican peasants will not
comply with pro-capitalist legislation imposed by the nation-state.
According to Ramón Vera, for example, the World Bank started
promoting research-based agricultural contracts involving experi-
ments with transgenic crops—such as the Master Project of Mexican
Maize (PMMM)—due to an unusual resistance to the individualiza-
tion of land titles on the part of Mexican peasants. While the
government “tries to convince subsistence and commercial farmers
without an ancestral past of their own that transgenics mean
progress,” activists spread information and debate about the actual
meaning of relations between urban and rural areas and particular-
ly about “the effects of rural devastation on cities and how urban
growth is creating sustainability problems for both the rural and the
urban environment.”126 What kind of exercise of power would it
then take to win this battle against the biothreats of contemporary
capitalism? The network’s own diagnosis clearly points toward the
need for a hegemonic strategy—that is, a strategy of persuasion that
can articulate multiple struggles. In the last chapters of Maize Is Not
a Thing, we read that even though people are rising everywhere in
defense of water, petroleum, and the forests, the defense of maize
does not appear as a “strategic axis” for a truly viable alternative. In
Mexico, the privatization of oil and other energy sources seems to
have “drained the energy of the struggles.”127 The problem is that
oil defenders are incapable of facing the situation holistically, “so
that all of the struggles can be articulated into a single one, allowing
society to recognize many other necessary spaces to defend, such as
maize and water.”128 The absence of “an integral perspective,” as
the activists call it, is strange considering that maize is the primary
target of the new biofuels ideology, which promotes the idea that
everything can be used as fuel or as an energy source. Agroecologi-
cal systems such as the milpa, where several species coexist and
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thrive as long as the soils are taken care of, are now seen as mere
raw material for the production of biofuel. Besides “a categorical no
to transgenics,” an integral perspective would promote the “rural-
ization of the city against the savage urbanization that the country-
side is suffering.”129
Painfully, activists recognize that resistance can only be “a slow,
dispersed and fragmentary process,” easily dismantled by uncon-
trolled urbanization, land theft and speculation that increase the
pressure on rural inhabitants to migrate. Depopulation of the coun-
tryside leads those who stay to replace labor with more agrochemi-
cals. Money, including migrant remittances and government allow-
ances, breaks their will to preserve agriculture as a way of life.
Neoliberal programs of social assistance “make people lazy and
dependent (even alcoholic) by giving them money in exchange for
nothing.”130 When money dominates everything, low-quality in-
dustrial food replaces the healthy diversity of the milpa, and health
problems come to plague the most vulnerable people. New sources
of instant gratification make it difficult for new generations to
understand the economic importance of agricultural work—not to
mention its cultural and political meaning for older generations.
Rather than working in the field, young people from the country-
side are driven, voluntarily or by force, into the ranks of organized
crime, which offers quick money and a false solution to the endur-
ing problem of discrimination against the poor.
Of course, the network provides an accurate empirical descrip-
tion of the effect money has had on Mexican rural life so far. It fails,
however, to provide a convincing account of a future shared by the
wider public, whose support they evidently need in order to posi-
tion their cause. Even they recognize that they “do not have the
necessary words in order to enter into dialogue with the defenders
of energy resources in Mexico.”131 Finding the words is necessary
because the Mexican public has not said a forceful no to transgenic
food, not to mention to the industrialization and commodification
of food. While the network seems to have arrived at a precise diag-
nosis of the challenges it faces at the hegemonic level, its proposed
solution seems to alienate it even further from the society that it
seeks to change. For activists, maize is not “mere culture.” Rather, it
is about a politics of “not asking for permission to be.”132 They
argue that the defense of maize demands “a sense of being different
from those who accept impositions from the government and the
companies.”133 They have declared maize “a sovereign crop” and
propose to understand it as a “creative act that has nothing to do
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with making money.”134 In a chapter titled “The Lessons of Maize,”
activist Camila Montecinos calls on citizens to support processes
that include technologies designed to generate autonomy and to
strengthen local capabilities.135 This would entail not just promot-
ing different kinds of research but also changing the researchers,
meaning that indigenous peoples should now be regarded as “the
true experts” of agriculture. Only they, by becoming “custodians”
of the land, are capable of maintaining autonomy from capital to-
day. Here we finally come across the myth of the noble savage, the
same deployed perhaps more convincingly by PMMM.
As we know, PMMM assigns peasants the role of custodian of
maize varieties. However, instead of promoting “a life against the
tide of planetary systems,”136 PMMM promises survival, social rec-
ognition and connection with the world through commercial trans-
actions. Because money is not, in itself, equivalent to exploitation,
PMMM is able to argue that the problem is not money itself but
rather the lack of it, since that lack puts people at a disadvantage in
a world structured by competition. Thus, PMMM has the benefit of
common sense on top of all the other advantages it possesses—
namely, financial, political, and media power. The activist rejection
of both money and state institutions further isolates the cause of
maize agriculture from the public, whose hearts and minds activists
need to win to effectively survive the tide of planetary systems. In
view of humanist narratives involving custodians of the land and
managerial environmentalism, the challenge remains finding the
words to make autonomy against capital appear more promising
than the morally polluted compromises offered by projects such as
PMMM. After ten years of struggle, activists have learned to work
in this direction. They now argue that all maize varieties are part of
the sacred tissue of collective humanity. More than a sacred plant,
maize is an animated object that exists in symbiotic relation with
peasant subjects.137 This discourse humanizes autonomy and sa-
cralizes humanity; yet it does not merely reproduce the modern
masculinist and humanist narratives of sovereignty that, as
Saldaña-Portillo and others have repeatedly pointed out, sustain the
colonial logic of developmentalist discourse. Rather, as Hartigan’s
analysis of Mexican racial thinking in the context of genomic re-
search suggests, there is an acceptance of dependence on the nonhu-
man other, as well as responsibility for all the nonhuman partici-
pants in the debate. The network’s sacralization of human collectiv-
ity also produces maize as a progressive image of “decentralized
decision-making, diverse strategies and tools, diverse and even di-




vergent aims, all of which will in turn allow [Mexicans] to restore
and strengthen the richness and diversity of maize.”138
THE GIFT OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL DISRUPTION
In Specters of Marx, Derrida refers to deconstruction as an occur-
rence between life and death, a “learning to live” that “can only
maintain itself with some ghost, can only talk with or about some
ghost.”139 No ethics or politics would be possible, Derrida argues, if
we did not feel any respect and responsibility “for those who are no
longer or for those who are not yet there.”140 How then can we
develop of an ethical sense of respect and responsibility for the
materiality of maize agriculture, for those who have lived and died
in it, and for those who might yet depend on its continuity? Geof-
frey Bennington explains that a compromise of purity is necessary
for the ethical relation to avoid the absolute violence of purity it-
self.141 More precisely, he suggests that ethics must “protect itself
from itself by a necessarily risky innoculatory contamination of it-
self by its apparent other(s).”142 There is therefore an ethical sense
in which it is necessary to affirm the contamination of the national
text, its constitutive disruption. To affirm incompleteness, or the
very temporality of Mexican identity, is not to celebrate the trans-
genic contamination of native maize; rather it is to point out that the
criteria for deciding how to deal with the threats of corporate bio-
technology come from an open future rather than a predetermined
past. Thus, rather than positioning my acts of questioning maize
nationalism as more truthful than the more empirical accounts of
biotechnology debates, I argue that the disruption of the signifier
“maize” involves an ethical decision. While I do not intend to pro-
duce political recipes for activists, it seems to me that a critical at-
tentiveness to the stories we live by might do more in the long run
for “a life against the tide of planetary systems” than a constant
rehearsal of moralistic recriminations for the loss of the proper. It
might, for example, begin to reconnect the country and the city
through the creation of something new and urgent for the world as
a whole—namely, a posthumanist sense of shared responsibility for
life and death.
In Bioethics in the Age of New Media, Joanna Zylinska develops a
critique of moral panics as the most frequent way in which bioethi-
cal issues tend to enter the public domain. By resorting to ready-
made and dogmatic positions, she says, moral panics foreclose dis-
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cussion about “the role of technology and new media in the chang-
ing status and nature of the human.”143 Drawing on the work of
Emmanuel Levinas, she theorizes a suspended condition between
materiality and language as the source for a bioethical alternative to
moralistic rejections of new media and technologies. The alternative
would be based on the assumption “of there being an alterity that
exceeds the conceptual grasp, and the very being, of what we
understand as the self.”144 This Levinasian philosophy of difference
would need to be “supplemented,” however, with the acknowledg-
ment of technicity in order to really “take issue with the myth of the
originary self-sufficient, total man, living in the state of nature,” a
myth that is still rather potent in many contemporary articulations
of the fears and anxieties concerning technology.145 In Zylinska’s
reading of Stiegler, the being of the human emerges as always al-
ready in relation with a nonhuman alterity. Besides correcting
anthropocentric residues in the philosophy of difference, such a
reading expands the scope of bioethics beyond the clinic and into
the multiple territories of everyday life. Thus, while conventional
bioethics has typically been more preoccupied with the biological
life of organisms than with social or political location, Zylinska’s
bioethics reminds us that decisions about life “are always already
situated in, and drawing on, a broader political context.”146 In this
vein, prior to and beyond political economy at the molecular level,
there exists agriculture as a skilled practice within a specific social
and cultural context.
A (bio)ethical framework for the Mexican defense of maize agri-
culture would require taking the issue of “contamination” beyond
nationalism, juridical thinking and, last but not least, moral panics
about technological invasion. In this vein, rather than figuring
maize and the human as individual agents interacting with each
other, my take on biotechnological disruption also locates agency in
the unstable mutual relations through which the human and the
nonhuman constitute each other dynamically, as they both take part
in a wider technical process that it is impossible to calculate or
appropriate as a whole or once and for all. This process is the world,
and therefore it includes everything I address throughout this book:
agricultural histories, cultural nationalism, academic research disci-
plines and antidisciplines, psychoanalysis, science policy, cultural
policy, popular gastronomies, tourism, environmental activism, in-
digenous rebellion, political disappointment and “the deepest per-
sonal and collective experiences of embodiment, vulnerability,
power, and mortality.”147 I argue that we do not come to terms with
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the constitutive vulnerability of the human by merely describing
empirical situations or by denouncing human greed. Witnessing
and investigating empirical causes and effects might be indispens-
able for human survival; yet the point at which we humans trans-
form our ethical relation to the nonhuman (including the nonhu-
man in us) involves a deeper and perhaps unconscious aspect of our
being—which I locate in the experience of the other.
Feminist philosopher Karen Barad attempts to rethink the causal
powers of materiality through an ontological interpretation of
quantum physics as theorized by Niels Bohr. In Barad’s reading of
quantum physics, discourses amount to the local physical condi-
tions that enable and constrain knowledge practices such as concep-
tualizing and measuring the behavior of electrons. Theoretical con-
cepts such as the electron, momentum and position are indissoci-
able from specific physical arrangements—that is, from specific con-
figurations of the world that are produced by apparatuses qua ma-
terial-discursive practices.148 Human beings do not author such
practices, Barad says, since human beings themselves emerge as
already part of them, which is to say as “part of the world in its
open-ended becoming.” Thus, Barad refigures materiality as “the
ongoing reconfigurings of the world” and the world itself as “a
doing, a congealing of agency.”149 Through an informed and crea-
tive practice of scientific figuration, she takes the discussion beyond
traditional humanist metaphysics. Significantly, she takes it toward
ethics in a deconstructive sense. Echoing Braidotti’s transpositions
and Haraway’s cyborgs, Barad writes, “Like the diffraction patterns
illuminating the indefinite nature of boundaries—displaying shad-
ows in “light” regions and bright spots in “dark” regions—the rela-
tion of the social and the scientific is a relation of “exteriority with-
in.” This is not a static relation but a doing—the enactment of boun-
daries—that always entails constitutive exclusions and therefore
requisite questions of accountability.”150
The relation between the social and the scientific, which can also
be read as the relation between culture and materiality, is for Barad
fundamentally an ethical question. From her perspective, ethical
questions in general have an ontological priority over the formula-
tion of human-centered politics. Like Derrida, Barad frames justice
as a relation to the other that is made possible by a fracture inherent
to identity itself. Commenting upon the controversial role of quan-
tum science in the making of the atomic bomb, Barad interrogates a
general tendency to reduce ethical questions to questions of rights,




as if ethical responsibility depended on the possibility of humans
achieving theoretical certainty. From a quantum perspective, how-
ever, identity “is performed differently given different experimental
circumstances.”151 Barad explains that an electron makes a quan-
tum leap “in a discontinuous fashion,” thus troubling “the very
dichotomy between discontinuity and continuity” and indeed “the
very notion of dicho-tomy—the cutting into two—itself (including
the notion of ‘itself’!).” Theoretical concepts emerge by excluding
other sets of possibilities, calling into question identity itself and
inspiring “a new sense of a-count-ability, a new arithmetic, a new
calculus of responsibility.”152 No longer a matter of “making
amends finally,” quantum ethics is necessarily “a matter of différ-
ance, of intra-action, in which no one/no thing is given in advance
or ever remains the same.”153
From Barad’s deconstructive elaboration of quantum physics, I
borrow one fundamental insight—namely, that ethical reflection
around GMOs and, more specifically, around transgenic maize in
contemporary Mexico must attend to questions other than property
rights, calculations or moral blame. This is to say not that political
and economic questions are irrelevant but that they cannot exhaust
the Mexican engagement with biotechnology as a critical practice.
The gift of biotechnological disruption, I suggest, amounts to the
possibility of realizing that agency is not a stable property of deter-
minate beings. Besides figuring maize and the human as fully con-
stituted individual agents that interact with one another either
peacefully or violently under more or less known conditions, we
may attempt to more creatively figure them as radically indetermi-
nate processes that provisionally come into being through the con-
tamination, and indeed disruption, of sedimented narratives about
identity. Since any theoretical concept will always produce its con-
stitutive exclusion, “being/becoming is an indeterminate matter:
there simply is not a determinate fact of the matter concerning the
cat’s state of being alive or dead. It is a ghostly matter!”154 Cultural
studies, feminist technoscience and post-Marxist political philoso-
phy are themselves contingent, indeterminate articulations that al-
low me in this book to render intelligible a particular conversation
with ghosts, but they do not exhaustively fulfill the task of situating,
once again, the complex issues at stake in the Mexican biotechnolo-
gy debates.
Political agency may be enacted in various ways within contexts
that are specified through (necessarily ethical) decision, but the on-
tological framework of any ethical decision and its corresponding
















political enactment remains one of unstable relations through which
the human and the nonhuman compound one another and co-
emerge as a technical process that it is impossible to calculate as a
whole or once and for all. Whereas this last statement may sound to
some like a meaningless abstraction, like mere theory that has noth-
ing to do with materiality, I have argued in this chapter that it is
fully embedded in the material world, which includes everything I
address throughout this book: agricultural histories, kinds of bio-
technology, cultural nationalism, academic research disciplines and
antidisciplines, psychoanalysis, science policy, cultural policy, pop-
ular gastronomies, tourism, popular rebellions, political disappoint-
ment, environmental catastrophe, and “the deepest personal and
collective experiences of embodiment, vulnerability, power, and
mortality.”155 Embracing the gift of biotechnological disruption
means, in this particular incomplete narrative, acknowledging the
incompleteness and vulnerability of any account of collective expe-
riences, starting with those that rely on the authority of either “au-
thentic” ancestral cultures or “true” scientific expertise. As a gift,
disruption is not purely negative critique, but the condition of pos-
sibility of any creative intellectual work.
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